

JPRS 80112

17 February 1982

Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2488

FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

17 February 1982

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2488

CONTENTS

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

- Various Aspects of Arab Aid to Tunisia Reviewed
(Muhammad ibn Bashir; AL-RIYAD, 25 Nov 81)..... 1
- Proceedings of Latest Arab Housing Conference Reviewed
(M. S. Ben Hammouda; AL-SHA'B, 3 Dec 81)..... 9

AFGHANISTAN

- War Victimization of People of Hazarajat Described
(LE MATIN, 18 Jan 82)..... 13

ALGERIA

- Leader of Revolution Discusses Views on Current World Issues
(Ahmed Ben Bella Interview; AL-RAYAH, 9, 10 Jan 82)..... 17
- Industry Reorganization Noted
(Daniel Junqua; LE MONDE, 2 Jan 82)..... 28
- Agricultural Development Problems Outlined
(Daniel Junqua; LE MONDE, 16 Jan 82)..... 30
- Development of Wilaya of Setif Examined
(EL-DJEICH, Dec 81)..... 32
- Ambitious Projects, Limited Resources, by Aissa Siouda
Interview With Bouderbala, Bouderbala Interview
Interview With Amine Ghrayeb, Amine Ghrayeb Interview

EGYPT

- Top Government Spokesman Explains, Justifies Policies
(AL-'ARAB, 13 Dec 81)..... 44

Broad Outlines of New 5-Year Plan Unveiled (AL-AHRAM, 28 Dec 81).....	54
Flow of Expatriate Earnings Reviewed (AL-AHRAM, 23 Dec 81).....	56
Major Suspects in Influence Scandal Defend Themselves (Layla 'Abd-al-Salam; AL-AHRAR, 14 Dec 81).....	58
New Press Council Formed, Expresses Commitment To Free Speech (AL-AKHBAR, 9 Dec 81).....	60
Briefs	
Defense Minister Returns Gift	62
Draft Commissions Law	62
IRAN	
Khomeyni Moderates Views on Universities, Dissidents (KEYHAN, 24 Jan 82).....	63
'Rapprochement' Between U. S., Khomeyni Regime Reported (IRAN LIBRE, 18 Jan 82).....	65
New Economic Agreements Reported (KEYHAN, 16 Jan 82).....	67
Iron Ore From India	
Reconstruction Crusade Budget	
Education Budget Scrutinized in Seminar (KEYHAN, 10 Jan 82).....	71
Mullahs Jockeying for Position on Peace Talks (IRAN PRESS SERVICE, 14 Jan 82).....	72
Power Struggle Goes on Behind Scenes (IRAN PRESS SERVICE, 14 Jan 82).....	74
Muslim Unity Campaign Reportedly Arouses Little Interest (IRAN PRESS SERVICE, 14 Jan 82).....	76
Former Plan Organization Employees Hit at Mussavi (IRAN PRESS SERVICE, 14 Jan 82).....	79
Iranians in Diaspora Described (IRAN PRESS SERVICE, 14 Jan 82).....	82
Foreign Exchange Situation 'Alarming' Says Leftist Journal (IRAN PRESS SERVICE, 14 Jan 82).....	86

People Tell Poll Opinions on Vital Issues (KEYHAN, 16 Jan 82).....	87
Repression of Opposition, Persecution of Baha'is Alleged (LE MONDE, 30 Dec 81).....	93
IRAQ	
Gulf States Charged With Compliance in War With Iraq ('Adil Amin; AL-HURRIYAH, 16 Nov 81).....	95
Briefs	
Purchases Total \$26 Billion	98
JORDAN	
Paper Comments on Husayn's Trip to U.S. (Rasel Hawi; AL-MAJALLAH, 14-20 Oct 81).....	99
KUWAIT	
Reasons for Tough New Press Law Discussed (Najib 'Abd al-Hadi; AL-MUSTAQBAL, 14 Nov 81).....	102
LEBANON	
Steps Taken To Prevent Influx of Arms (AL-MAJALLAH, 14-20 Oct 81).....	105
LIBYA	
Pakistanis Held Prisoner in Libyan Military Camps (Riyaz Batalvi; MASHRIQ, various dates).....	107
MAURITANIA	
Country's Search for Stability Analyzed (Paul Balta; LE MONDE, 16, 17 Jan 82).....	116
MOROCCO	
Ahmed Osman on Aims, Role of RNI (Ahmed Osman Interview; ALMAGHRIB, 22 Dec 81).....	123
QATAR	
Industry and Agriculture Official Discusses Ministry Projects (Ahmad al'Mani Interview; AL-'AHD, 17 Nov 81).....	128

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Talks With Ibrd on Aid, Energy Matters Held (AL-BAYAN, 22 Oct 81).....	134
Foreign Aid Figures Reported (AL-BAYAN, 25 Oct 81).....	136
Report on Offshore Drilling Operations Published (AL-BAYAN, 23 Oct 81).....	137

WESTERN SAHARA

Brahim Ghali on Fighting, Cease-Fire With Morocco (SAHARA LIBRE, 10 Nov 81).....	139
History of Moroccan Actions Against Saharans Outlined (SAHARA LIBRE, 30 Sep 81).....	144

VARIOUS ASPECTS OF ARAB AID TO TUNISIA REVIEWED

Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 25 Nov 81 p 14

/Article by Muhammad ibn Bashir: "Tunisia Is Orienting Its Economy toward the Arabs"/

/Text/ One does not need to say that there is much to discuss in the realm of inter-Arab cooperation. This is because affiliation to the unified family assumes, in advance and in principle, the establishment of firm, essential cooperative relations. However, the current Arab situation, and the relations that exist among the countries of the united nation in all fields, have made dealing with relations among given Arab countries in any field a matter that is relevant to Arab integration and solidarity. This has begun to assume significant dimensions in recent years and it gives promise of proceeding along the road to eliminating the state of fragmentation and separation that Arab society is suffering from, especially in the economic field, with its various branches. In these recent years, areas of cooperation have become intensified among numerous Arab countries, and Tunisia has been one of the Arab countries which in its economic policy have oriented themselves toward forging strong bonds with other Arab countries in the east and west. Therefore we consider it imperative to talk about Tunisian-Arab cooperation and the areas that has embraced so far.

Today, all forms of inter-Arab cooperation have become solid reality; the era of blocs of numerous multi-faceted economic and other interest groups has helped bring them to the fore. This fact has manifested itself as an inevitable necessity engendered by a deeply-rooted belief in the need to create a comprehensive resurgence based on the latent powers, resources and areas of expertise that are available and could become available in the Arab nation. Thus, cooperation among Arab countries has come to be directed toward the creation of active currents of horizontal cooperation founded on the mobilization and investment of Arab funds on behalf of a strong, comprehensive Arab resurgence.

While the forms of cooperation among Arab countries in the past were distinguished by a vertical cast that was subject to political sensitivities, and could not endure when political conditions and relations simply shifted among certain Arab countries that carried out some cooperative experiments, the orientation today assumes a deeper, more sharply realized concept of the need to implant relations of Arab cooperation that would be above political disputes and would help put them to the side and prepare a sound climate for eliminating such touchy feelings which, until now, have governed the course of inter-Arab solidarity.

Tunisia and Arab Cooperation

Out of an awareness of this need, the Tunisian nation recently turned toward attempts to create and implant different forms of positive cooperation with other fraternal Arab countries. Tunisia began to turn toward further reliance on Arab capital in place of reliance on European capital investments. When we consider the progress Tunisia has achieved in this area, we can observe that there are a number of positive facts today regarding the Tunisian nation and the other Arab countries that make us optimistic about the future of inter-Arab cooperation and Arab-Tunisian cooperation in particular. The country of Tunisia has found itself, like other Arab countries, in need to implant cooperative relations with its Arab brethren, because the existence of some forms of technical skills and expertise and the availability of specialized and unspecialized manpower in some Arab countries can meet the requirements of some other countries in this field.

Tunisia has taken these facts which Arab economic powers, both the raw and exploited, possess into consideration, realizing that there are a number of Arab countries which have important strength in the realm of training competent staffs and specialized manpower, while conversely there are other Arab countries that enjoy massive economic expertise and resources they have not yet been able to exploit as they should in view of their shortage of requisite manpower and expertise. Therefore one can see that they are compelled to import this technical expertise from Western countries, which is a factor that could help create factors of subordination that arise from the importation of technology from foreigners. In addition, we find, on the other hand, an expansion in the Arab market, which is able to absorb and market local products in all fields, and possibility for ongoing consultation among brothers in facilitating the marketing process and in eliminating customs barriers and regional laws that stand in the way of Arab industry and isolate Arab production from each other's Arab markets. The same is true in the field of financial cooperation, in particular, since the situation is quite important, because numerous Arab countries have a need for capital which will help them in the economic development process, and it has become clear that there are lending countries and borrowing countries and that Arab capital can be invested in Arab countries rather than in the countries of Europe and North America. The nation of Tunisia, in carrying out its development plans, is in need of capital in addition to domestic capital, which cannot cover the requirements of development plans, and it has thus striven to encourage Arab capital, especially oil capital, to make investments in its territory.

Proceeding from these premises, we can discern the fields in which Tunisia has established cooperation with the countries of the Arab east and the Maghreb, and the horizons toward which these cooperative relations are aimed, be they bilateral or multilateral. It is also possible to evaluate the steps which have been taken to strengthen the bonds of cooperation with Arab countries.

The Building Blocks of Cooperation with Maghreb Countries

The relations that bind the countries of the Maghreb are great and strong at all levels. We can say, and not by way of a regional vision, that the points of similarity and congruence within the group of Maghreb countries are greater than those

between them and the countries of the Arab east for a number of reasons which there is no room to mention, detail or explain here. The countries in this region, even in the era of colonialism, were subjected to a single central colonialist view which helped draw them together in backwardness and poverty, in spite of colonialism's many attempts to create artificial regional entities and spread rancor among the inhabitants of these countries. The Maghreb liberation movements unanimously held the principle among others, that a union of the Maghreb should be established. However, numerous factors have prevented that, though they have not deflected the Maghreb nations' determination to work to create the firmest kinds of cooperation, tighten bonds and deepen consultation on everything of concern to the region in the domestic and foreign contexts.

The great readiness the Maghreb countries have displayed has made it possible to cover substantial strides in the realm of bilateral cooperation. Especially in recent years, now that a serious desire to establish fruitful cooperation has manifested itself among the countries of the Maghreb, it has started to give good results in numerous areas and has made it possible to open fruitful horizons for the present and future, even though there are some discrepancies in this cooperation which the countries of the Maghreb are now trying to eliminate, so that cooperation among them may progress at the same pace and in the direction of realizing the goals that have been set forth.

Although this cooperation has not yet reached the final stage that has been mapped out for it, the achievements made so far prompt us to be confident that the Arab people's interests in this point will ultimately prevail and will rise above and transcend all the disputes and touchy feelings that are to be found from time to time--indeed will put a limit to them, because it is the interests of people that will survive and be permanent while haphazard touchy feelings disappear when their spontaneous circumstances and transitory causes disappear, especially since they do not exist among peoples so much as among governments. From its beginning, this cooperation has embraced technical and cultural aspects more than the economic ones, and these have started to grow deeper and assume weight recently.

In addition to cooperation in the cultural and technical areas, cooperation among the Maghreb countries has embraced a number of different diverse areas. The desire for rapprochement and the forging of vital links among the countries of the Maghreb has been embodied in the conclusion of numerous agreements between Tunisia and the Kingdom of Morocco, Mauritania, Libya and Algeria. In regard to the exchange of trained staffs, Tunisia has received requests from Algeria recently concerning the assignment of more than 655 Tunisian teachers, while numerous Tunisian teachers are pursuing their occupations in Algeria itself or in Libya or Mauritania.

In addition to the forms of cooperation that exist between Tunisia and Algeria in the field of education, Tunisian relations with the nation of Algeria on the trade level include the exports of significant shipments of eggs, in addition to shipments of bricks, refrigerators and trucks. These relations were deepened recently following the exchanges recently approved during the meetings that took place between the premier of Tunisia and the premier of Algeria. These meetings proliferated and launched appeals for revival of the projects that were to have been

established in the Tunisian northwest through Tunisian-Algerian financing, such as the cement plant and so forth, and the exchange of certain types of products between the two countries.

As regards Morocco, in addition to the bonds of history and civilization that link Morocco and Tunisia, some bilateral activities have emerged that are helping to consolidate these ties and move Tunisian-Moroccan cooperation forward to the maximum extent. Tunisia's commercial agreements with Morocco include the point that each country is to allocate a share of goods estimated at \$3 billion to nourish trade between the two countries.

Tunisian-Libyan Cooperation

Since the late sixties, skilled Tunisian manpower has focused on the nation of Libya, in view of Libya's need for this manpower. This process gained momentum during the seventies; in recent years some commercial transactions have been concluded, involving the export of some electrical equipment, brick and foodstuffs such as tomatoes, oil and livestock from Tunisia to Libya.

Some of the old projects that link Tunisia and Libya are still under study. There is a project to build a railway between Tunis and Tripoli and a project to establish a joint marine commercial fleet to be headquartered in Tunis with representation in Tripoli. It is now intended to revive this old project.

Tunisia's relations with Mauritania are still lacking the intensity that its relations with Algeria, Libya and the Kingdom of Morocco possess: these are still restricted to the sending of teachers and the admission of Mauritanian students to continue their education in the University of Tunisia. The change of governments may be of significance in strengthening relations between these two Maghreb countries.

Cooperative Relations between Tunisia and the Arab East

Tunisia is now starting to orient itself to coordinating cooperation between itself and the countries of the Arab east, strengthen that in present and future, and deepen it further. So far this cooperation has covered only certain Arab countries in the east, while they will remain weak in the case of some other countries. This Tunisian-eastern Arab cooperation has concentrated on the financial areas and the financing of some Tunisian projects, especially by the Arab Gulf countries, through the establishment of some joint financial organizations and cooperation in the realm of expertise and specialized manpower. Therefore we will content ourselves with focusing on Arab countries in the Arab east that are intensely linked to Tunisia by bonds of cooperation; these are Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Jordan and the Sultanate of Oman.

Tunisian-Kuwaiti Cooperation

The state of Kuwait was one of the first Arab countries to help finance some development projects in Tunisia, in the context of cooperation between Tunisia and the Kuwait Development Fund. In the period between 1963 and 1979 it was possible to

conclude 13 loan agreements that came to a total of 65.9 million Tunisian dinars, representing 7.6 percent of the Kuwait Fund for Economic Development's contributions throughout the world. These contributions, throughout the Arab world, account for only 11.2 percent.

One can point out that the Kuwait Fund for Economic Development's share of contributions continues to increase in Tunisia. While the proportion of its volume of contributions to the fourth plan was estimated at about 2.5 million Tunisian dinars, they came to 7.6 million Tunisian dinars in the fifth plan (1976-1981), and it is anticipated that they will reach a higher percentage in the coming sixth plan (1982-86).

Cooperation between the nation of Tunisia and the Kuwait Real Estate Investment Consortium has witnessed tangible progress. A number of real estate projects have been carried out in Tunisia through financing from the group. These concern tourist projects and the construction of tourist complexes on the coastal strip in Tunisia and the capital of Tunis. An agreement was recently concluded between Tunisia and the Kuwaiti consortium in which this group expressed its readiness to allocate 50 million Tunisian dinars to the execution of some development plans, including ones in the field of agriculture and upcoming sixth Tunisian development plan projects.

The forms of cooperation between Tunisia and Kuwait have grown in intensity and have gone beyond mere tourist project financing to involve investment in a number of other spheres, including completion of the Turki-El Hammamet road project. In addition, the intensification of this cooperation has led Tunisia to concern itself in particular with providing the manpower Kuwait requires. For this purpose it has opened an office that is assigned to highlight the scope for employment in Kuwait, and the Tunisian-Kuwaiti Development Bank, which will assume charge of financing a number of projects, such as the project to use the potash in Jirjis, phosphoric acid in Gabes, and super phosphate in Gafsa, has been formed. In addition, there are other projects, such as the Sidi Omar Bouhajala-La Skhirra road and the railway to link Tunis with Bordj El Sidria.

On top of these joint projects, agreement has been reached on sending a joint Tunisian-Kuwaiti committee to study means of cooperation in the field of nuclear power and joint phosphate exploration activities. In addition, Kuwait will help renovate some installations in the oil refinery at Bizerte. For its part, technical cooperation has also seen new dimensions since an agreement was concluded recently bearing on the exchange of trained staffs. In addition there are 49 Tunisian working in Kuwait, Kuwait has asked it to send 44 Tunisian technicians in the transport and communications field, and Kuwaiti staff personnel are going through training and probationary periods in Tunisia.

Cooperation between Tunisia and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is considered the country in the Arab east that after Kuwait, has most strengthened the ties of cooperation with the Republic of Tunisia. In recent years these have started to expand and become intensified, especially now that some Saudi investors have become receptive to investing in Tunisia. The

features of technical cooperation between the two countries have become clearly evident, especially as regards the transfer of manpower and experts between the two countries.

Technical cooperation is distinguished by two important characteristics. One of these is official, and concerns Tunisian aides who have enrolled to work in Saudi Arabia through the Tunisian Agency for Technical Cooperation; they number 53. In addition the kingdom has opened an employment office in Tunisia. The second characteristic is an individual one, and this takes the form of appointments some Saudi employers have proceeded directly to make of some Tunisian staffs without intermediaries. In this context, the number of aides is estimated in the thousands and this cooperation has evolved to include the security field. In April 1980 a security agreement was signed by the two countries.

In addition to this form of cooperation, cooperative relations in the medical and commercial fields have been formed between Tunisia and Saudi Arabia. Recently 20 Tunisian veterinarians were assigned to work in Saudi Arabia following the Saudi minister of agriculture's recent visit to Tunisia.

In addition, the commercial agreement between the two countries was renewed starting last Ramadan /July/; this includes Saudi financing for the tourist sector, since Riyadh for its part took part in constructing a tourist complex project in the town of Monastir and another one in Ghar El Melh (northern Tunisia).

Tunisian-Saudi cooperation goes beyond these fields into the realm of transportation, essentially marine transportation. The two parties' intention is now to create a joint Tunisian-Saudi marine transport company, now that Tunisia has acquired a loan of 16 million Saudi riyals from Saudi Arabia to finance the Sidi Saad dam maintenance project in the central area, on which work has been briskly in progress for 3 years, in addition to a loan estimated at about 7.5 million Tunisian dinars to repair some Islamic monuments and prepare cultural sites in this regard that Tunisia has acquired from the Islamic Development Bank. Toward the end of April of this year, the two parties reached agreement to construct a Tunisian-Saudi development investment firm, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is directing interest in the construction of some other projects, such as supplying the town of Sfax with potable water and maintaining some oases; in addition there is an intention to create some other oases in the El Djerid area in southern Tunisia. In this context also agreement has been reached to bring Saudi invalids to mineral spas in Tunisian towns.

Cooperation between Tunisia and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia began to become intensified, especially a year ago, when the number of specialized Tunisian workers going to Saudi Arabia increased and a number of bilateral agreements were reached in various fields, capped by the creation of a joint financial institution whose goal is to finance some economic and development projects in Tunisia. These will help draw the bonds tighter together and will help, if only in a bilateral sense, deeply to implant some bases of general Arab cooperation in order to bring about the desired economic cooperation.

Cooperative Relations between Tunisia and Iraq

On 5 April 1975 the legal framework for economic cooperation was signed by Tunisia and Iraq. Since that time, this cooperation has started to progress and become consolidated, as a result of the two countries' desire to deepen and enrich it, in order to open a broader, greater scope for cooperation. Two loan agreements have been signed, by virtue of which Tunisia has obtained 15 million Tunisian dinars (\$30 million), and Iraq has taken part in financing the construction of the Faculty of Letters building in Manouba, where teaching began in the past academic year, as well as the Faculty of Pharmacy in Monastir. It also helped repair and improve a railway in southern Tunisia.

In the same framework, commercial relations between the nations of Iraq and Tunisia have developed and have acquired a new vitality. Therefore the exports of some Tunisian products to Iraq, especially in foodstuffs, such as olive oil and paper, have become intensified; in addition a transaction was recently concluded between the Tunisian Readymade Clothing Company and the departments involved in Iraq; which entails supplying Iraq with 250,000 items of readymade clothing, in exchange for which it will entail imports of a number of oil and chemical products from Iraq to Tunisia.

Cooperation between Tunisia and Jordan and the Sultanate of Oman

Tunisian-Jordanian cooperation has covered important strides, and has come to embrace numerous fields. Recently, on 8 November 1981, an agreement was reached between the two countries in the sphere of economic and technical cooperation. A similar commercial agreement was concluded on the same date. The first important commercial agreement linking Tunisia with Jordan was concluded in November 1976. These agreements concluded by Tunisia and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan were capped by the conclusion of a trilateral agreement between Tunisia, Jordan, Morocco and the Jordanian Gulf of al-'Aqabah.

Tunisia has devoted special attention to Jordan and the special Jordanian market, now that this country has become a transit area following the recent events that have occurred in Lebanon and Iraq. Thus the Tunisian-Jordanian balance of trade in the first half of 1980 managed to record a significant figure, estimated at 427,237,000 Tunisian dinars, although Tunisia's imports from Jordan have not exceeded zero.

Tunisian-Jordanian economic cooperation in the future will experience broad range, especially now that some Jordanian businessmen and organizations have filed a request to purchase some Tunisian products such as eggs, poultry, lamps and fresh fish.

Cooperation between Tunisia and Oman is still of recent vintage, in contrast with its firm roots in the other countries of the Arab Gulf. This recent cooperation began in the field of transport and communications, where an agreement was concluded between the two countries to this end. Meanwhile, negotiations are going on between the two parties on assigning the Tunisian Republic a loan of \$10 million (5 million dinars) from the Sultanate of Oman, and there is the thought of opening

a direct air route between Tunisia and Oman. What has actually been done so far in Oman has occurred in the field of technical cooperation, essentially in the field of reception by Oman for specialized Tunisian manpower: we find about 10 Tunisian staff personnel in the sultanate, confined to experts in banks and some sports coaches.

What one can deduce, concluding this review, is that Tunisia's relations with the countries of the Arab east and the Maghreb have taken a new turn recently. The Tunisian government has actually begun to feel a pressing need to orient itself toward consolidating firm relations with the Arab group, and this feeling and awareness are mutual.

In addition, the areas of cooperation between Tunisia and the Arab countries have begun to expand and assume a more expansive, encouraging scope. Relations of cooperation and solidarity have begun to be consolidated, especially those that already existed and those that were planned and put under study. If they progress at the same rate and reach the same goals as some of the experiments that have occurred, they will augur a firm future for cooperation between Tunisia and the Arab countries. However, one must observe that these cooperative relations so far are still founded on bilateral bases and could be affected one after the other by the emergencies in the form of political events and events that are superimposed /from abroad/. The desire must be directed in the practical sense to expanding these relations horizontally and vertically in order to embrace more than two parties and to merge a number of Arab countries into formats of collective cooperation, which will yield greater benefit and help implant firm, widespread Arab relations among Arab brothers.

11887

CSO: 4504/148

PROCEEDINGS OF LATEST ARAB HOUSING CONFERENCE REVIEWED

Algiers AL-SHA'B in Arabic 3 Dec 81 pp 1, 3

[Article by M. S. Ben Hammouda: "Inauguration of Sixth Arab Housing Ministers' Conference: Strategic Goals of Joint Arab Strategy Are Spelled out"]

[Text] Yesterday morning the activities of the sixth Arab housing and redevelopment ministers' conference were inaugurated at the Aurassi Hotel in the presence of our two brother members of the Political Bureau, Mohamed Benahmed Abdelghani, the prime minister, and M'Hamed Yala, the minister of finance, along with a number of members of the government and the assistant secretary general of the League of Arab States in charge of economic and housing affairs. The inaugural session was distinguished by the important statement by which our brother Ahmed Ali Ghazali, member of the Central Committee and minister of housing, inaugurated it, speaking for President Chedli Benjedid, the president and secretary general of the party.

At the start of his talk, the minister welcomed the members of the delegations taking part in this meeting, referring to the decisive circumstances by which the situation was distinguished in the Arab context, as embodied in the blatant occupation and aggressive onslaughts by the Zionist imperialist entity against our Arab nation and the peoples of Palestine and Lebanon, and the phenomenon of economic and social backwardness our Arab countries are suffering from.

In his talk about the sixth conference and the importance that has acquired, on grounds that it is, as he said, "a new takeoff toward intensifying our cooperation in this vital sector from the economic and social standpoints," he stressed the need to face major challenges resolutely and firmly, with reliance on ourselves, our resources, our abilities and the creative powers with which our people are abundantly endowed.

Our brother Ghazali described the influences of Islamic Arab architectural civilization, which give testimony to the extent of the innovative ability that Arabs enjoy, and called on those in attendance to respond to the legacy of the Arab world and to work to mobilize their powers and all their resources to reach our peoples' goals of economic and social development. The minister described the main causes of the housing problem, which are the continuous population increase some, indeed most, Arab countries are suffering from, the drain from rural areas resulting from the lack of serious policy to control this phenomenon, which, in the case of some Arab countries is a negative one, and the lack of balance between urban development, resulting from increasing job opportunities in the towns at the expense of the rural areas.

Our brother Ghazali laid emphasis on the issue of housing in our country, highlighting the importance the political leaders have given it in view of the disequilibrium between the constant population increase since independence and basic essential needs in this field.

In this regard, our brother the minister referred to the efforts that have been made and still are being made to remedy this difficult situation, pointing out that 50,000 dwellings were built in the public sector in 1980 and 55,000 were built in 1981. The policy of carrying out construction programs has in past years been accompanied by the embodiment of two basic principles (the establishment of vehicles for construction, as represented by organizations that are in keeping with the importance of the programs set down, and the encouragement of every citizen who wants to obtain family housing through savings or construction on his own with government assistance), as well as concern for the rural world, regulation of agriculture and endorsement of the construction of 1,000 socialist agricultural villages.

After speaking at length about the means and resources that have been allocated to this vital sector, he referred to initiatives which among other things have resulted in:

Specifying methods aimed at consolidating construction material, equipment and technique standards.

Setting forth lists of certain materials and equipment that are of concern to the construction field, such as health equipment and electricity.

Setting forth an integrated technological development program that will enable organizations in the sector to apply a comprehensive manufacturing policy.

Controlling engineering and architectural studies with the goal of adapting them to the characteristics of the areas and the social environment.

The minister paused briefly before the 10 October earthquake in the Chalaf area last year and the destruction it wrought. He referred to the program that the political leaders had authorized in order to cope with this catastrophe and rebuild the ruined area. This was embodied in three stages:

First, provision of emergency first aid to reduce the terror the incident had spread among the inhabitants.

Second, preparation of more than 100 sites with an area of 1,000 hectares to accommodate prefabricated housing.

Provision of 22,000 prefabricated dwellings to house citizens waiting for the final construction of their homes.

Provision of basic installations (administrative and cultural).

Inspection of the remaining buildings and installations in order to determine the conditions for repairing or destroying them.

Third, this stage is represented by the reconstruction of the area damaged by the earthquake in accordance with scientific standards that are aimed at protecting the lives of the citizens and their property in the future.

He concluded his statement by saying, "I am certain that the activities of this conference of ours will enable us to embody these sincere desires and make them a tangible reality that will bring benefits for our Arab nation."

Dr Nawras al-Daqr, the Syrian minister of housing and utilities, had previously made a statement in his capacity as chairman of the fifth conference in which he pointed out in particular that attention to the development and service projects and the development of the economy are an important part of preserving the nation and the people.

He emphasized that the problems of housing and services accompanying it lie in the forefront of development priorities. He added that our annual conferences, and the resolutions and recommendations that are adopted at them, affect the deepest areas of the lives of Arab people and that any neglect or deficiency in this field means neglect of an important area of the lives of Arab people.

In his statement, Dr 'Abd-al-Muhsin Zalzalalah, assistant secretary general of the League of Arab States in charge of economic and housing affairs, after greeting Algeria, its leaders, government and people, commended the fact that the conference constitutes a new link in the series of conferences that are assigned to put the goals for the strategy of joint Arab action into practice in order to achieve integration, cooperation and the exchange of technical aid, experience and expertise, to establish a number of joint projects and take part in carrying them out.

Dr. 'Abd-al-Muhsin Zalzalalah in particular described the difficult state the Arab countries have been experiencing. He pointed out that the number of dwellings in the Arab world at the end of 1980 totalled about 20 million, to accommodate a population which exceeds 160 million, but that about one third of these dwellings are unfit for habitation and that aggravated obsolescence encompasses one third of the ones that are fit.

He also added that studies show that housing requirements at the end of 1980 ranged from 16 to 20 million dwellings and that the average number of dwellings that ought to be built in the Arab nation per year are approximately 3 million in number, to cost \$72 billion, while the Arab countries are facing an annual financing deficit of more than \$36 million on the average in terms of housing requirements.

In his conception of the future, the population of the Arab world will in less than 50 years exceed 600 million, of whom young people will account for more than 65 percent. On the basis of this modest conception, Dr Zalzalalah stressed the importance of the housing sector for balanced development, since that is one of the basic focal points for stimulating the domestic economy and raising the cultural and architectural level, as well as the sanitary, psychological and cultural condition of the Arab citizen.

In concluding his statement, he said, "The time has come for us to move from the stage of the endorsement of principles to the stage of carrying them out in practice

and translating documents into projects and programs that will strengthen developmental integration in the context of material reality."

After a brief period, the conference resumed its activities. The bureau was formed under the chairmanship of our brother Ahmed Ali Ghazali, the agenda was approved, and three committees were formed, the Arab Bank Committee, the Technical Committee and the Committee on Administration and Finance.

11887

CSO: 4504/144

WAR VICTIMIZATION OF PEOPLE OF HAZARAJAT DESCRIBED

Paris LE MATIN in French 18 Jan 82 p 10

[Text] Subjected to devastating raids by Soviet troops, the Shiite people of the Hazarajat (central highlands) have somehow managed to set up a system they can run by themselves.

The Hazarajat, in the heart of Afghanistan, peopled by 3 to 4 million Shiah Muslims, constitutes a liberated region in which the mudjaheddin are engaged in de facto self-determination. Their concern, however, does not prevent raids by Soviet helicopters, incursions by Soviet armor, or wanton destruction. Just returned from the Hazarajat, a doctor member of the Medcins sans Frontieres organization (161, Boulevard Lefebvre, 75015 Paris. CCP 33 769 71 La Source) who has done several lengthy tours there in recent years --both before and after the Soviet intervention in December of 1979--has prepared a lengthy informative report, the gist of which we publish below.

A natural stronghold in the heart of Afghanistan, the Hazarajat today is a wholly liberated region, endowed with its own independent administrative structure. The only part of it still in the hands of the central government in Kabul is the town of Bamyan, whose garrison, dug into its casemates, can be supplied only by helicopter.

The popular uprising took place valley by valley, and sub-prefecture by sub-prefecture. It began in February 1979, hence well before the Soviet invasion, and lasted 3 months. Once its territory was liberated, the movement organized to form the Shura Ettfaq (Unity Organization), which, in the interim, has taken over government and administration for the entire region.

Since the liberation of the Hazarajat, the Red Army and its governmental auxiliaries have dropped their efforts to reoccupy this mountainous fastness, which would require immobilization of extremely large numbers of troops. The Soviets confine themselves these days to small-scale local attacks designed to terrorize and demoralize the population. These operations follow an unvarying scenario. A column of several hundred armored vehicles leaves Kabul or Ghazni and moves into this or that valley. The population, alerted by the noise of the armor and the helicopter rotors, flees to safety in the mountains, the Soviets

find they have invaded deserted villages, but stay a few days anyhow, harrassed by night by the mudjaheddin who also bar their access to the high valleys.

That leaves them with no choice but to pull back, once they have looted and burned a few houses picked at random, set fire to the crops, and taken a handful of stragglers--mainly old men--away with them as prisoners for "interrogation" or summary execution.

In their latest attack, the Soviets engaged in systematic destruction firing all the crops, burning marketplaces to the ground in Panjaw, Yakaolang, and a number of villages along the Shibar road, pausing to sack the Yakaolang hospital beyond repair.

Everywhere you go, the people accuse the Soviets and the Khalqi militia, while the soldiers of the regular Afghan army, dragooned into this action by force, seem to have a tendency to keep their distance from it.

To defend their territory against these incursions, the mudjaheddin have organized into several "fronts," each of them assigned to guard one of the main access routes. Set up by the governing committees of their respective back countries, they are headed by chiefs whose personal prestige is often immense.

The Ghorband front guards the access route to Bamyan. The resistance here is led by a local celebrity, one Hadji Nader. A jovial, dumpy little man, and a rich landowner, he was imprisoned under Taraki and Amin and liberated when Babrak Karmal came to power, in exchange for his promise to use his influence among the Hazaras on behalf of the Kabul government. He acquired enormous prestige when he sold some of his holdings and used the proceeds to buy grain and ward off a threatened famine in the Turkoman region.

In September 1980, his mudjaheddin launched an offensive when they captured the walled town of Chardeh, in the Ghorband valley, by assault. The garrison was routed, and even now several hulks of burnt-out tanks clutter the main street of the half-destroyed town.

The Unai pass is guarded by the mudjaheddin front of Behsud, commanded by an old traditional chief, the arbabb Gharibdhad. From his headquarters in Sarcasma, he has thus far held off some 30 attacks aimed at Behsud. Only once did a column of tanks manage to force its way through the pass and set fire to the Baheud bazaar, back in April 1980.

To the mudjaheddin of Jaghori, commanded by a young mullah, falls the assignment of guarding the eight valleys that give access to the southern flank of the Hazarajat. From time to time an ambush on the road from Kandahar to Kabul lets them trap a convoy and relieve it of Afghan army uniforms and jeeps!

The pride of the Hazaras, though, is the Ghazni front, the most active and best armed of all, which guards the passes to Nawur and Behsud from the south. Commanding this front is a former army officer, Sayed Hassan Jaglan, a small, affable man sparing in his use of words and gestures, but with a piercingly bright eye, whose prestige as a war leader reaches throughout the Harazat. People there see him as a kind of commander-in-chief, and refer to him by the name bestowed

on him by his troops: "Brig General." Apparently he can call upon some 20,000 well-armed mujaheddin. The town of Ghazni and its Russian base are kept tightly encircled and attacked nightly with commando operations. At the request of the town governor, an attempt was made to raise the siege last December. A Soviet force of several hundred vehicles came and surrounded the Qiaq mountain, which is "Brig General's" headquarters. He managed to get out by night with all his weaponry and all his men, and to take up a position further to the west to interdict access to the valleys leading into the heart of the Hazarajat.

Most of the resistance forces are still armed with the antique rifle known as the "mush-kush" (or "mouse-killer"), which is fairly effective in mountain warfare, where it is often more accurate than the Kalashnikov and has a longer range. These fighting men have a great many real spoils of war. Heavy Dushka machineguns, taken from crippled tanks, are repaired by local blacksmiths using parts taken from old canon (gear levers to open fire, wheel-rims as pivots). The junkyard appearance of these weapons detracts not at all from their efficacy against helicopters. Similarly, explosives recovered from unexploded bombs dropped by aircraft enable the mujaheddin to manufacture undetectable mines covered in cowhide.

What outside aid has reached the Hazaras is nothing by comparison with even the limited amount supplied to the Sunnite parties in Peshawar by the Muslim countries. Aid from Iran, the only natural and logical partner of the Afghan Shiites, is negligible and comes mainly from nongovernmental religious organizations, perhaps because of Soviet threats to provide aid to the Iranian Kurds.

Poverty and Suffering Prevail, But Hope Endures

The war has considerably aggravated the perpetually precarious economic situation among the Hazaras. While outright famine has thus far been averted, thanks to a return to the age-old autarchy of each valley, poverty is general these days throughout the Hazarajat. The blockade laid down by Amin's regime was eased by that of Brabak Kamal. Every day a dozen or so buses, trucks, and even taxis make the round trip between Kabul and Bamyan along the Shihar road, and between Kabul and Behsud through the Unai pass. These vehicles are closely watched along most of the route by mujaheddin sentry posts, and in the immediate vicinity of Kabul by those of the Soviet army.

In Behsud, townspeople tell you mischievously that this softening is due "not to any clemency on the enemy's part, but to the fact that he needs our products (meat, wool, and firewood) as much as we need theirs (salt, sugar, tea, and oil, mainly)." And in fact, the price of a cubic meter of firewood, which the mujaheddin let through in limited quantities and upon which they levy a tax, has risen from 12 to 80 afghanis in Kabul. This winter, the citizens of Kabul are colder than the Hazaras!

While the food situation is alarming, the health situation in the Hazarajat is nothing short of catastrophic. For 3 million people, there is only one Hazara doctor, fresh out of Kabul medical school: he has an office in Jaghori, but he has no medical supplies.

War casualties, immediately taken to their homes--often several days' march away--eventually die after several months of atrocious suffering as a result of chronic infection of their wounds, lacking even simple disinfectants and a few antibiotics.

Despite the sufferings endured by the civilian population, women, old men and children, the Soviet attempt to demoralize the people by hunger, destruction, and sickness has not eroded the morale of their fighting men, sustained by their religious faith and the legends to which it gives rise: tales like the thousand-times-told one about the 60 mudjaheddin surprised and killed while they were at their prayers near Bamyan. Two months later, when the communist troops withdrew, their bodies were found totally intact, blood flowed from their fresh wounds, and the martyrs of the holy war could thus be given fitting burial.

CSO: 4619/47

LEADER OF REVOLUTION DISCUSSES VIEWS ON CURRENT WORLD ISSUES

Doha AL-RAYAH in Arabic 9, 10 Jan 82

[Interview with Ahmed Ben Bella, Former President of Algeria by 'Umran Tiryam:
"It Is Wrong To Compare the Circumstances of the Algerian and Palestinian Revolution"; date and place not specified]

/9 Jan 82 p 8/

/Text/ The newspaper AL-KHALIJ conducted a conversation with the Arab fighting man Ahmed Ben Bella, leader of the revolution of a million martyrs which liberated Algeria from French colonialism, during his visit to the state of the emirates. The most prominent person who talked with him was Mr Tiryam 'Umran Tiryam, who talked about the most important Arab and international current events and spelled out the features of the future picture of the Arab struggle he foresaw. He stated the differences between the struggle the Algerian revolution waged and the one the Palestinian revolution is waging, called for the struggle to continue, and rejected negotiating with the enemy from a position of weakness because that is the basis from which we can launch a new international takeoff in which we can play an effective role since we, as Arabs, possess all the resources. Ben Bella stressed that the Palestinians are alone today on the stage and they represent the honor of the Arabs. AL-RAYAH is publishing the conversation by agreement with the newspaper AL-KHALIJ.

Tiryam 'Umran:

In the name of all of you, I would like to welcome our brother, the fighting President Ahmed Ben Bella, an Arab hero who led the revolution of the people of a million martyrs, which still holds the status of a garland of laurels on the forehead of our Arab nation in its struggle against colonialism, against fragmentation, and against backwardness. I greet this fighting man who led this revolution at a time when our Arab nation was living under the fire of colonialism, whether that was France in North Africa, Italy, or Britain--this revolution which joined in embrace with the 23 July revolution led by the late leader Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir, and had a great effect on the liberation not just of the Arab nation but also of the whole third world.

No matter what I say about Ahmed Ben Bella and the people of Algeria will inevitably be deficient, but we have the great honor, and this newspaper has the great honor, in being allowed to pause to talk with you as Arab brothers bearing the honor of

speaking in this delicate period our Arab nation is passing through. I would like to stress our belief that this nation which has thrust up leaders like Ben Bella, 'Abd-al-Nasir and the Palestinian liberation revolution, must be capable of facing challenges, must triumph, and must realize its people's hopes for liberation and unity.

The Algerian revolution has gone through circumstances similar to those the Palestinian revolution is experiencing now, specifically as regards continued armed struggle, plans for peace that have been set forth, plans for negotiation, a government in exile, and so forth. What is your opinion regarding what has been propounded in this regard?

President Ben Bella: The comparison is erroneous. The difference is profound. We resisted on the basis that we were stronger and would continue with them along the road and that they would withdraw, but are we in the same situation now?

Can our Palestinian brothers negotiate with the Jews? The situation is different today. There is a deep difference with Algeria's negotiating with France on a referendum that was to lead to independence. We did not reach agreement with France from a position of weakness but rather from a position of strength. The French were weak, and our agreement with them was based on the premise that they would leave, but how? This initiative is not in our hands today; the decision is in the hands of the enemy, and others. If you want the details, we can go into them. The comparison is not a correct one.

/Question/ What, however, are the ingredients of the power the Algerian revolution possessed, that is, the ingredients of its negotiating strength?

President Ben Bella: The ingredients that the Algerian revolution possessed were many, and that is a subject that has been discussed to exhaustion. France accepted this decision and proceeded along with us through negotiations for the sake of leaving Algeria, for the sake of independence.

Today, however, we agree with them that the Palestinian entity is well known and that this entity would be in Gaza, for example, or on the bank. Is this logical and reasonable, or can we be convinced that the Zionist entity would accept a Palestinian entity existing in its own right, with political decisions in its own hands, and preventing through its decisions, or to the contrary accepting, an entity under the umbrella, an entity with which agreement could be reached? Perhaps developments could ultimately go against the Arab world. I do not believe in the establishment of an entity for the Palestinians in this form because that would ultimately cause shocks for the Palestinian revolution, because they have not agreed to that. Perhaps matters will reach the point where some Palestinians will be sitting on the throne along with the people who were put under the umbrella while others are still fighting.

Where, therefore is the comparison between the Algerian and Palestinian revolutions, as regards negotiations with France and the conditions for negotiations with Israel?

There are other points. American duplicity is obvious. Begin says "We are not a republic of death," so the decision is not in the hands of the Americans--the decision is in the hands of the Zionist lobby in America, since the Jews can take a decision contrary to those of the Americans.

The comparison is not appropriate. We triumphed and the French were defeated. The agreement between the Algerian revolution and France was a scenario prepared in advance that led to freedom with honor through our triumph over the French.

Here, however, the decision is not in America's hands. The decision is in the hands of the Zionist enemy. In addition, we are not the stronger party.

/Question/ This brings up the strategy of liberation.

President Ben Bella: This leads only to the conclusion that we are not in a state of agreement. What is needed is for the Palestinian revolution to continue. This is my view. Let us fight them for a year, 2 years, 100 years. This is what is relevant.

/Question/ It is clear that in Palestinian revolutionary circles and in the circles of Arab intellectuals in general there are people who are raising a question about the declared strategy of the Palestinian revolution, which is to liberate Palestine and establish a democratic state. This strategy is still revolving around generalities, all in all, constituting a basis and a point of departure, but the criticism, if one can consider it a criticism, of the Palestinian revolution is that although 17 years have elapsed since it broke out, it has not yet specified tentative program proceeding from this broad basic principle. Here two specific questions come to my mind:

What is your opinion about a government in exile, a Palestinian revolutionary government in exile? The second question, going by your experience with the armed Algerian struggle, is, has the Palestinian revolution actually reached the stage of armed struggle in the Algerian manner or in the Vietnamese manner, that is, has it shifted to a guerrilla war, and really to a people's war?

Do you consider it possible that a Palestinian national authority on the occupied territories in the bank and the strip could be a stage toward the attainment of the strategic goal, which is to establish a democratic Palestine?

President Ben Bella: You have raised several points, but it is difficult to cover them in one word. However, the same essence of the issue exists.

I have said that it is wrong to compare the two struggles. There the premises were different. From the geographical standpoint, we had mountains where we fought. The Aures Mountains are bigger than all of Palestine. Jabal al-Zahra' is twice as big as Palestine, and we have terrain that is favorable for armed struggle.

Algeria has 3.2 million square kilometers and more, and space and land facilitate armed activity. Palestine does not have this advantage. Even inside Palestine it is impossible for us to be able to carry out a guerrilla war in the full sense.

We must be realistic. It is impossible for us to conduct the same actions in Palestine that we did in Algeria in military and strategic terms. However, it is possible to launch demonstrations, guerrilla actions and the like. Guerrilla actions are complementary to guerrilla war, and action in towns must not outstrip action in the countryside, so that the action will be balanced and based on proper rules. Guerrilla war is war in the mountains, the countryside and towns and is based on guerrilla actions that complement other essential activities. This matter is not at issue in Palestine because Israel has mined the terrain and it is impossible to move across it to conduct a guerrilla war. This explains why whenever guerrilla action is launched it is stifled. The Palestinian war is not the Algerian war; at the same time, the Palestinian war transcends the Algerian war morally and strategically. In Algeria we fought, and the Algerian revolution was a giant, obvious fact of our time, whose prosecution resulted in the liberation of some African countries and greatly influenced the Arab wave of liberation, especially in North Africa, since it was a powerful wave with an Arab tide and it fulfilled its function. However, some revolutions did not yield full fruit. The Egyptian revolution, for example, did not yield its full fruit. Not all liberation revolutions have yielded their full fruit, because the goal was not just the liberation of territory. The goal was not to raise flags and sing national anthems. It was necessary for us to build a civilization, to build a model of life, a formula for life which was different from the one that the international system, which is dominated by America, has brought to prominence. The fact is that there are two systems: the socialist system and the world system. However, they are in reality a single system, not two. The world socialist system has not established its validity as an alternative; that is, it has failed to provide an alternative. The world socialist system aims at the same goals as the capitalist system; these are the goals of establishing a consumer society and nothing more. We do not want the Palestinians to raise flags and anthems and choose a president, as we have more than 20 Arab presidents--to add one more to them, ending the matter. This is an evil world. If we cannot do away with it it will be impossible for any living experiment to arise within this evil world system. Is it possible, through the Palestinian revolution, for us to shake it and become something which will deliver us from the grip of colonialism?

We can form a system like the system we had intended to establish after the meeting that was to have been held in Algeria. Now that we have become liberated, how can we build something new? How can we build our own home? How can we create the coloring of a life outside of this evil system? It was my feeling, the feeling of Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir, and the feeling of Modibo Keita, Soekarno and 38 countries besides them that we ought to build relations with the world in order to interact with it, but under the condition that we create a new world through them.

If you want to examine this system, it still exists. It has expelled us and eliminated us one after the other, with the result that I alone remain, as if I had come down from Mars, now that I am observing the world after leaving prison. It is not our problem to produce a Palestinian government headed by our brother Yasir 'Arafat, my respect for him notwithstanding. If we do that we will be going back to the same vicious circle. My opinion is that the Palestinian revolution is the foundation from which we can take off to build a new world system in which we can play an effective role. We as Arabs possess all the resources.

The Palestinian revolution is a struggle that has not just descended from a political struggle; from this premise, we must find a strategy and not just continue to search for the truth and talk about negotiations.

If we want to talk about the Palestinian view and political program, we agree with you on that, I hold to my opinion /concerning/ not just the Palestinian brothers but the scene as a whole. No one who thinks deeply about a matter fails to come up with naivety of thought, and this naivety is fatal.

We must reach a conclusion. Our war with Israel is a war of civilizations. How can a formula for a new life be brought to the fore outside this evil international system, through this struggle for which we should have a strategy that will derive its dimensions, or should we enter into a "supermarket," giving me this and giving me that? We lose even in this supermarket.

The conclusion of this observation is that the Palestinians cannot move within Palestine. There may be demonstrations and guerrilla acts, but not any action that will resolve the problem.

Finally, the problem of the Palestinians is /that of/ Arab society; they always reflect a realistic picture of the Arabs. The Palestinians are alone on the stage today and they represent the honor of the Arabs, but they have been confined to a small plot of land and they want to find shelter in Lebanon. They must move, and they can move, not from within but from outside. The opportunities must be appropriate. They must move from fronts, and there is an opportunity for some solidarity between the Palestinian revolution, the Lebanese people and resistance detachments within the Lebanese people.

/10 Jan 82 p 8/

/Text/ In the second instalment of AL-RAYAH's conversation with the Arab fighting man Ahmed Ben Bella, the discussion about national concerns, foremost among them the issue of the Arab-Israeli struggle, continues. Ben Bella called for reliance on a war of long duration to exhaust the Israeli enemy and called for the use of all resources available to the Arab nation in the form of economic and human powers to serve this goal. He also called for the formation of an Arab lobby in the United States to cope with the pressure the Zionist lobby exerts on American political decisions, and he warned that it was necessary to build bridges with the continent of Africa, in view of the objective relations that link the Arab area with the black continent and the resources it possesses, which can be combined with Arab resources to achieve self-sufficiency in our food requirements.

The former Algerian president talked about the difficult period that 'Abd-al-Nasir's generation went through and the great challenges it had to meet. He predicted the birth of a new Arab generation that would bear the banner of achieving national missions, most prominently the cause of Palestine.

Herewith is the text of the conversation:

First, now that we are in a stage of calamity, while our Arab nation, with the cultural resources it possesses and the undying aspirations it possesses, is able

without the slightest doubt to live, time has great value, because the passage of time will further help the colonialist scheme arrange affairs in the area and make the course of the struggle harsher and more difficult, and we sometimes wonder whether the relapse of national liberation movements has occurred as a result of an organizational crisis in the Arab revolution movement, that is, whether the revolutionary leaders, historically represented by Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir, Ahmed Ben Bella and their other comrades, were not able to guarantee the constant continuation of the mass movement, because of the lack of an organizational instrument that would be a link and play the role of the masses' national motive force so that they could rise up in a proper manner.

Is the crisis an intellectual one, that is, is the problem of these revolutionary leaders, in spite of all the resources they possess and in spite of all the trust the masses have given them, that they have not been able to give the masses a quantum leap from the intellectual standpoint to turn them into a force that is totally aware that the role they are playing has passed beyond the stage and that we are embarking on new resurgence? How can we transcend the stage of extreme negativism that we have reached, with nothing facing us except the option of existence, a strategic struggle of civilization in an Arab nation which also is alone qualified, in all Africa and Asia, to change all these conditions in terms of location, in terms of cultural heritage, and in terms of the historic role that awaits them? What conceptions are there now for emerging from this tribulation?

President Ahmed Ben Bella: As far as we are concerned, there were no essential errors in producing the course of action. These results were just circumstances that do not resemble the circumstances of 20 years later and require a solution, with all their premises. The actual fact is that we must know what it is we are fighting, we must diagnose it well, we must understand the facts concerning it, and we must see what we did at that time and make comparisons. It appears that we were not fully armed, because we did not have enough time. That is the basic reason. Perhaps matters are now ripe, whereas a comprehensive view, or overall view, did not exist at that time; perhaps our circumstances at that time did not allow us to study all the aspects of the solution. We felt that through this system we would not have been able to move, and ideologically we did not arrive at an ideological analysis. Nationalism, and its basis, were to stand up to colonialism, and nationalism was the most prominent feature not just in the Arab world but in the whole world. We represented the honor of the world. I do not want to flatter myself, but that is the truth. We were not the vanguard of the Arab world; rather, it was a historic innovation. Whatever strength and depth this phenomenon may have attained, and it was tantamount to a wave, this wave did not give its organization a chance. We set this down specifically so that it will not be confined to Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir or Ahmed Ben Bella: perhaps 'Abd-al-Nasir managed to keep going for 20 years, but he was weighed down with problems and tired out by his antagonists. I moved quickly. We worked together, without correspondence, without papers and without unity, but we were united and worked at the same pace, because of the sincerity of hearts; the relationship was of a kind that does not often exist, because what was in the heart was greater than what was on paper.

The British have no constitution but they have more respect for the constitution than any country in the world. That is in their spirits, and something was in our

spirits. To go tack to this subject of ours: the system that has been in existence for 400 years, since the discovery of America and the development of the capitalist system, has been living on a single evil notion, a notion that has been implanted since that Western world emerged from the grip of the church and progressed along the current of capitalism, colonialism and then the first and second industrial revolutions followed by the great war and the grave economic crisis, when Keynes emerged to solve the problem. What draws one's attention is the fact that Giscard D'Estaing, a right-winger, says that it is necessary to give shares to labor so that it will take part with him; this is the capitalism that the more it produces something, the more it digests everything as well. It has even digested world socialism.

Today, capitalism is providing Rland with a reform program. That is, France, Germany and America are the ones that are feeding the socialist program. Are they laughing at us? If we want to speak in the language of figures, Poland is indebted to the West to the sum of \$25 billion, and this takes 80 percent of its revenues. This applies to Rumania and Hungary. The Western world "lends" the socialist world massive sums, and that is very serious.

Today, the socialist world is no longer essentially hostile to, or an essential adversary of, this system. Rather, they are in competition and there is no longer a struggle. This evil system still exists. We, and this is a surprise, have acquired everything through it, but we ought to have eliminated this system. We set forth and we ought to have arrived. However, it dealt with us before we could deal with it, because we were not armed with the resources that would turn it into a comprehensive battle that would assume Arab and Islamic dimensions and /those of/ the third world and the world as a whole.

We ought to have formed a strategy by which we could acquire something, if not everything; at least we should have weakened the enemy. I ask God that he bring forth a generation in our nation that is stronger than 'Abd-al-Nasir's generation.

We must know the problem. The problem is the nature of civilization. We need a view that has greater comprehension, and, on the basis of these serious matters, we must formulate the view through action or formulate action. In my view, we must connect the people to us properly and we must liberate Arab man entirely. Here is where the issue of democracy and its liberal or other formulas, or democratic centralism, arises. There is no generosity in democratic centralism. How can we come up with a democratic formula that is outside this heart and from which its premises stand forth?

"I command you to consult among yourselves." How can we create something that will connect us to the people? How can we create men? It is not a matter of creating buildings or the like, we must create men today, tomorrow, for a century even. It is our function to create men. If we want to do so, democracy will be necessary. Matters must be based on "I command you to consult among yourselves." How should such a formulation be? This requires a long discussion, a very long one, and is hard to deal with now.

Question: If I properly understand what you are saying, we are in a new period of development as Arabs, because all the political and social powers that have assumed the keys to power in most Arab countries, despite the differences of degree in this power in connection with the future, these powers have been stifled by their political and economic programs, not to mention the power of international capitalism. This situation has been clearly and precisely confirmed since 1967. Arab regimes, whether they are called progressive or unprogressive, have said everything they have to say in the political, economic, organizational and cultural senses. We observe a complete program in the press, in leaders' speeches, in the style of negotiating, in summit conferences, and in every grain of our lives. There must be new social forces to substitute for these, that will be able to successfully carry out at least one battle against the forces of world capitalism. Could President Ben Bella talk to us about the nature of these forces, and what the chances for their emergence are?

President Ben Bella: This statement touches upon a very important aspect of the formula for action since 1967. We can say that there has been a contrary wave to this day, and therefore there must be a new wave, because we are suffering from a state of sterility as far as thinking is concerned. We must think not in terms of the national arena, or even the Arab one, but must expand our view. The second point bears on the immensity of action, its seriousness, and the nature of problems.

Each people should explore. They must strive for the worth of the individual so that they can proceed step by step alongside them. We want a formula for life to deal with this evil notion, which is exploitation. Marxism considers that there is a historic group, the workers, who create change. Marxism does not concern me one way or the other; what does concern me, rather, is the historic group, the workers. They did not create change in China or Algeria. What created it was the class of peasants. We, for example, in Algeria, in the days of the revolution, were fought by the workers in the Bab el-Wed section whose mayor was a Communist. The workers fought us in an unprecedented manner. Also for example in America at some time 40 percent /of the people/ were workers and now 20 percent are workers, which means that the historic group has diminished. When the historic group that constituted 40 percent of some society created nothing, how can it do so when it has diminished? Today we ought to be looking for a historic group and set forth new standards for it. Peasants created history in Algeria. Where today is the group that is able to formulate history? This calls for new standards and an investigation and tabulation. I say that in general a comprehensive new view is necessary. This view will not contradict Arabhood, which I consider still exists and has its effectiveness. In my view we should expand our view. This depends on us. We bear responsibility for the Palestine problem, and its challenge is a historic challenge for us.

The Arab terrain must yield fruit. Even if we take the form of islands, there is some evidence that a new second wave is coming. It must come, God willing. We just think and work must take place only in accordance with the comprehensive standards of thinking. My opinion is that we must create a formula for democratic interaction that is different from the one we know, and here we go back to the question of civilization.

Question: Mr President, you spoke about the need to have a view. I will go back to your combative history. You previously spelled this view out before the African leaders, who were talking about development, the economy and so forth; you said that Africa needed blood. Perhaps I am speaking out of turn, and with your permission, saying that the Arabs need blood and weapons. Is the new action which we are now considering a dream--is there a possibility that that can exist on the national level, transcending all political movements?

This Gulf: all Western or colonialist policies are trying to separate it from its Arab nation for the sake of exploiting it to the utmost limits. What is required of us? It is required now that we think of a regime or think of creating democracy, is Arab unity required in order to confront these challenges, or what? The fact is that everything is required, but what is the alternative at the beginning?

President Ben Bella: If you read what I have written, I am not calling for unity among the Arabs all at one stroke, because that is not possible. We must set forth some goals. Our first problem is Israel. We must know how to deal with it. We can no longer defeat Israel in one decisive battle. If we want to throw Israel out, we will have to pursue it, and that must be over the long run. Today, for example, there is a crisis in Israel; the people leaving it are more numerous than the people going to it. This problem exists, as far as Israel is concerned, and Begin recently said so in Paris and admitted it.

Israel must be fought, not in a decisive battle, because we do not welcome that, because we would be fighting America. Our war with Israel must take great stamina and be of different forms. We must see how we can hem it in in all fields, the economy, the media and so forth. We must develop our technique so that it can become a comprehensive one. We should fight it in the West and in America, fight it everywhere. Thus the struggle will become comprehensive and integrated. That is how I see it. Let Israel buy missiles and AWACS--by God, that will not stop us. A revolution of a different nature is necessary. It should not be confined to the military, but must include military methods and economic, philosophical, media and cultural methods. We must strike in America. How so? The system in America is the lobby system. There are 6 million Jews in America; in New York there are three and a half million Jews. The capital of Israel is not Tel Aviv, it is New York. It is the Jews in America that are Israel, because the greatest lobby in America is the Jewish lobby. We can do something not to win the war but to make this situation easier for ourselves. In America there are 3 million Arabs and 20 million blacks, but there are no proper bridges between the Arabs and the blacks. We can form pressure if we build bridges between the Arabs and the blacks in America. In France there are a million Algerians and 2 million Moslems. In France they alone--if they held an election, Mitterrand and Cheysson would not have been able to say what they did. Many of those Moslems have French citizenship. The Pakistanis have 1 million votes in England. They also vote. Is there any coordination? Is there any joint action with them? Is there a strategy? Even the Palestinian brothers, have they built bridges to them? I say frankly the publicity we are presenting is fraudulent. Information in this context and in these contexts is fraudulent. It is stifling information because we are increasing the contradictions--the contradictions rise to 23 whereas there had previously

been 22. Is there a strategy? Do we think that the power of Palestine doesn't lie only in the power of the Palestinians but in the power of the Arabs and the Moslems? The power of the Moslems is also derived from the revolutions of the world, and this is not an exaggeration, if we want to view our Palestinian revolution by these criteria.

We must work to distress Israel, even if it takes 20 years. Territory is on our side, population is one of our resources, and will is our property. We will try, and no one will have the right to say that we must first be an entity and then we can see. This is utterly fraudulent. This is a disruption that adds to the contradiction, and fragmentation arises. Also, we should correct the formula our Palestinian brothers' action takes. This formula is not as it should be. I told them that, that the type of link between them and the /various/ governments is bad and erroneous, and their link with the revolutionary movements is equally so. The links between Arab and Islamic governments and the Palestinian revolution are equally so. The links with the Lebanese masses show the same style of action. The existence of a revolution in this style is not the style of a revolution--to the point where there are activities and there are contradictions on the stage. The people that had been exerting and making sacrifices have started falling back today.

The depth of the Palestinian revolution lies in the depth of the masses, not in governments. The depth of revolutionary organizations likewise lies in the relationship between the revolution and these organizations. I agreed to assume the chairmanship of the international Committee on Human Rights, because I consider that our sufferings are the sufferings of mankind at various stages.

Man is fragmented. What is to be done? How can we pull ourselves up? How can we throw Israel out? There is an Israel in each one of us. We must liberate ourselves, liberate the young generation, liberate the individual, liberate the powers and the culture of the individual. We must work with him and pull ourselves up with him. Therefore the issue of democracy has come back and imposed itself once again, and, with democracy, through the development and exploitation of Arab capabilities. In this regard I have stated that there must be an agricultural base. The problem of water must be solved, and we can solve it even in areas where there is no water. If we head in a scientific direction, the direction of scientific research, we must proceed along parallel routes. Work in agriculture requires scientific research at the same time. We must import nothing but industry, especially heavy industry, because this is the specialized area of a market we do not control. It requires cooperation that we cannot absorb, and in addition it costs us an exorbitant amount and ties us to the wheel of an evil system that is working against us. For that reason we have called for an agricultural base and for scientific research, in addition to other bases. For example, Algeria can support all the Arabs, as can the Sudan, Syria and Iraq. If we want to exploit solar energy, if our money is invested in these bases, we will be able to solve many of our problems. Likewise, the realm of light industry must keep abreast of the level of agricultural activity, and this calls for a cutback in our relations with the West. We do not have a market. There is a foreign market that we supply and that supplies us. We must be a market and at the same time there must be money and there must be resources that can be used in the dialogue--not a north-south dialogue but a south-south one. We have the continent of Africa, good

people like ourselves. It has much water and tremendous powers. We are living under a stifling crisis, a crisis of wheat, which will be the strategic commodity of the next 10 years. Statistics say that the Arabs' shortage of grain in 1995 will be 10 million tons, which is what MacNamara said, and he does not lie to us. How can we act once the oil runs out, in 20 or 25 years? What will be left for us? Uranium? I say there will be nothing left for us but solar power, and, thank God, God has provided us with the power of faith, but today a power has arisen that has corrupted everything, has corrupted spiritual power and has corrupted us along with it. If we had sought to invest resources in solar energy and form an agricultural base through scientific research, we would have helped the developing countries with this money that has been deposited in banks throughout the world, with which we have strengthened this octopus, strengthened it to suck our blood; rather than have this money flow to the north, we should have it flow to the south, under objective conditions. Just from the standpoint of exploitation, Islam prohibits usury. Let us see how we can apply the rule, relying on the philosophy of the Koran as regards economics. Does that mean that we cannot create things out of this money which totals more than \$30 billion? We can invest half of it, for example, and if we do that we will change the face of the world, offer standards different from those of exploitation, and create something--create new features of a new society.

These are some examples and ideas which could be a plan of action by which we could plumb the depths through a comprehensive vision, and these are some of my ideas as regards how we should take off. I say that Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir left behind a great base, and in order for us to take off we must supply the base; let us take off with new standards, because the historic period has changed and the struggle is too comprehensive for us merely to comprehend it through standards that concern Arab nationalism, which are founded on a basis of excitability. People who talk about 'Abd-al-Nasir, let them strike themselves with themselves, people who criticize Nasir and criticize his national steps, by God, the people who distort Nasir and his principles are dwarves--little dwarves.

11887

CSO: 4504/160

INDUSTRY REORGANIZATION NOTED

Paris LE MONDE in French 2 Jan 82 p 16

[Article by Daniel Junqua]

[Text] Algiers--Announced several months ago, the reorganization of the National Mechanical Engineering Company (SONACOME), which ranks third in size among large Algerian national companies after SONATRACH (hydrocarbons) and SNS [National Steel Company], has just entered a decisive stage. A series of legal texts published in the OFFICIAL JOURNAL of 15 December actually establishes three new companies.

The first of these companies will be assigned the job of manufacturing and importing agricultural equipment. To do so, it will inherit certain SONACOME plants, in particular the Sidi-Bel-Abbes (farm equipment) and Constantine (engines, tractors) complexes and installations of the National Agricultural Equipment Office (ONAMA), which mainly produce semitrailer and tank trucks. The headquarters of this new company, which is under the supervision of the Ministry of Heavy Industry, will be located at Sidi-Bel-Abbes.

A second decree establishes the National Industrial Vehicles Company (SNVI), which will produce all vehicles for transporting passengers and goods with a cargo load of over 1.5 tons. The company will also handle all distribution, import and export operations related to its principal mission. For the time being, its inheritance is mainly comprised of one of the jewels of SONACOME, the industrial vehicles plant complex at Rouiba, near Algiers, installed by Berliet and producing more than 7,000 vehicles annually. The new company's head office is also at Rouiba.

Finally, a third company, the National Company for the Distribution of Special Vehicles, Bicycles and Motorcycles (DVP), is assigned operations mainly of a commercial nature. It will be in charge of the distribution and after-sales servicing of all vehicles with a cargo load of 1.5 tons or less. The company's headquarters will be located in Algiers.

SONACOME, which temporarily retains control of production operations in this sector, including the Guelma cycles plant in particular, is thus being relieved of one mission: the importation and distribution of spare parts, which it has never been able to manage properly. The government has decided to attack the heart of this problem. The shortage of spare parts constantly immobilizes a significant percentage of public and private vehicles, resulting in heavy economic losses and damaging the

government trademark's image. The new company which has just been established will not be able to solve the problem alone, of course, but other measures are also being taken, which authorities expect to improve the situation. Thus the Council of Ministers, in its latest meeting, has authorized the importation of spare parts by C.O.D. parcel post. In an emergency, both individuals and companies will be able to use this procedure, which is quick and efficient but expensive, since large customs duties will be collected.

The establishment of the three new companies will not result in the dissolution of SONACOME. Although deprived of important structures, it will continue to operate in very varied areas: production of cycles at Guelma, of shovels and cranes at Ain-Smara, nuts and bolts, screws, pumps and valves, etc. The reorganization plan involves the establishment of 11 companies altogether.

The government thus intends to create medium-size companies, which are easier to manage.

11915

CSO: 4519/91

AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS OUTLINED

Paris LE MONDE in French 16 Jan 82 p 5

[Article by Daniel Junqua]

[Text] Algiers--The Third Congress of the National Union of Algerian Farmers (UNPA), held in the Palace of Nations in Algiers, ended on Thursday, 14 January, after 4 days of proceedings with the reelection of its general secretary, 39-year-old Nedjem Aissa, who has headed the organization since its First Congress in April 1978.

Speaking on the main theme of the congress, "Self-Sufficiency, the Basic Goal of the Revolution," in its opening session, President Chadli Bendjedid stressed the urgent need to raise the level of agricultural production to preserve national independence, since food is today being used as a weapon by the great powers to influence the decisions of developing countries. Algeria is particularly vulnerable in this regard, since it is devoting an increasing share of its oil and gas revenues to importing foodstuffs.

Despite relatively favorable climatic conditions, grain production in 1981 amounted to only 19 million quintals, which made it necessary to purchase about 25 million quintals,* an expenditure of nearly 2 billion dinars (2.6 billion francs). Due to a drought which has persisted for more than 6 months, 1982 production appears to be in serious trouble and measures have had to be taken to protect livestock.

Under such conditions, self-sufficiency is an issue for arousing people's concern rather than an actual economic goal apparently within reach, considering the very rapid rate of population growth. Algeria will have between 35 and 40 million inhabitants by the year 2000, as opposed to approximately 20 million at present. But a more disturbing fact is that two-thirds of grain production is currently provided by the private sector, which has only limited resources and practices subsistence farming on a large scale. The socialist sector, which mainly occupies the best land formerly cultivated by French colonists, is--overall--largely inadequate. Thus in 1981 the government had to pay out a total of 1.5 billion dinars (2 billion francs) to make up for the deficit of so-called self-managed, state-owned farms and cooperatives during the 1978-79 season. And yet agriculture receives much public assistance.

*Minister of Planning Abdelhamid Brahimi told the congress that Algeria also imported 50 percent of its milk and that meat imports have increased by a factor of 20 in 10 years.

The government supports grain production prices, farmers are exempt from income tax and also enjoy, among other benefits, reduced fuel taxes and preferential interest rates on loans. A broad reorganization of "self-managed" government farms is underway, as well as plans for training, with EEC aid, 1,500 agronomists and 3,000 accountants. But agriculture is beset with deep problems common to all Third World countries. Young people are leaving rural areas for the cities, preferring to work in plants and offices. Two-thirds of the farmers still working are approaching retirement,* which explains their low productivity. Even more serious, they cannot pass on their know-how. It is a paradox that agriculture is short of labor in a country in which unemployment is rising.

Combating Bureaucracy

There is no getting around the fact that the UNPA, established in 1974, has not fulfilled its expected mobilizing role. It is true that, at the time, the primary emphasis was on quick and massive industrialization, which took up the lion's share of investments. A more balanced view of development prevails today and in the name of realism and efficiency, officials are striving to combat bureaucracy to make room for personal initiative. "In the future," President Chadli Bendjedid said, "no measure will be taken that is incompatible with the will of farmers," and noted that decisions would be adopted "only after consultation with those involved and actual workers experiencing production problems daily."

The effort underway to correct agriculture's very dangerous situation will bear fruit only after several years, for these are far-reaching measures which have been taken. The most important of them concerns the mobilization of water resources, which has been allocated 23 billion dinars (nearly 30 billion francs) for the remainder of the present 5-Year Plan (1980-84).** Reforestation is also being given preference, as well as the improvement of farmers' living conditions, in particular by the construction of some 200 dwellings. Finally, private owners will also be able to receive government assistance, particularly through an agricultural bank for the development of rural areas, with headquarters in Blida, in the heart of the Mitidja, and which will open several hundred offices throughout Algeria.

*In Biskra, in the south, 30 percent of the farmers are over 69 years old.

**Only one large dam has been built since independence, the Djorf-Torba dam. Since the new 5-Year Plan was launched in 1980, 16 dam construction sites have been started and 25 others are planned.

DEVELOPMENT OF WILAYA OF SETIF EXAMINED

Ambitious Projects, Limited Resources

Algiers EL-DJEICH in French No 223, Dec 81 pp 16-24

[Article by Aissa Siouda: "An Age-Old City"]

[Text] "Sitifis la Romaine"

Setif, or Sitifis, is a city whose roots are solidly anchored in the history of our country. Founded by the Romans around 76-77 A. D., Setif rapidly became the capital of "Setifian Mauritania," the eastern part of Caesarean Mauritania, whose capital was Cesarie, now the city of Cherchell. Sitifis occupied an essential place in the Roman defense system. It played a preponderant role in the pacification of the native population, which since the fall of the Numidian dynasties had never ceased resisting the Roman occupation, especially in the mountainous regions, the Aures, whose chief town was Timgad. These two factors contributed to the military supremacy of Sitifis: 1 -- Sitifis was founded by the "veterans" of the Roman imperial army and it was they who held all powers. 2 -- Sitifis was the capital of the entire eastern region of Algeria. It was from this city that the massive punitive expeditions left, when the local administrators could no longer handle the "rebellion."

Sitifis began to lose its importance when the symptoms of old age started to eat away at the body of the Roman Empire because of power struggles in Rome and the conquests of the Vandals, who took North Africa, and Sitifian Mauritania fell in 436.

However, Byzantium, the Eastern Roman Empire, came to reconquer what the Western Roman Empire had lost. Sitifis remained the capital and, along with the other Roman cities in eastern Algeria, was to know a prodigious political, economic and urban boom. It was at this time that Timgad and Djamila were built. These citadels are still preserved, with the exception of that of Sitifis, which has disappeared.

Setif: The Arab-Muslim Setif

Driving out the Byzantines, the Arabs conquered North Africa. Administrative partitioning was abolished. Setif therefore lost its role as a regional capital,

to the benefit of the other cities founded by the conquerors. Toward the end of the 8th century, it became a great agricultural market. The Hilatite conquerors destroyed it completely on orders from the Fatimid caliphs to punish Hamadite Shiism. It was during this period that the Byzantine citadel was destroyed. Setif thus lost all its importance. Becoming merely one of the possessions of the Bey of Constantine, it no longer played any role in the country. Following the colonial conquest, the French built a barracks in 1848. It was at the end of 1940 that Setif became the chief town of the department bearing its name.

Heroine City

Setif has always been a bulwark of national resistance to colonialism. It was one of the first cities to take up the colonial challenge. The citizens of Setif and of other cities such as Kherata and Guelma organized impressive demonstrations on the eve of the end of World War II. These demonstrations were mercilessly put down and 45,000 martyrs succumbed to the criminal acts perpetrated by the executioners of Setif, Kherata and Guelma. Setif became a symbol of the supreme sacrifice in the fight for national independence.

Setif Today: A City in the Midst of Change

With the advent of independence, for which Algeria gave 1.5 million of its finest sons, Setif rolled up its sleeves and tackled the bitter struggle of reconstruction, the struggle to build a new Algeria, an Algeria in which worker and peasant would find their dignity and the fruits of their labor. Setif was at the historic rendez-vous of the colossal undertaking of national reconstruction.

The working people of Setif took up their shovels and pickaxes and, touched with wisdom, through themselves into the grandiose task: building, producing for the fulfillment of the Algerian citizen, paving the way to the future.

All the efforts made began to yield results, despite many obstacles checking progress toward development.

Setif's appearance completely changed. The continuing characteristic of the Wilaya [governorate] of Setif is economic growth. That growth has become a pole of attraction and an example to follow for other cities and villages in the wilaya.

Far-reaching changes have marked Setif. One friend told me: "This city has truly changed. It is growing and becoming beautiful. For the first time, I like it."

Unfortunately, of "Sitifis la Romaine," there remain only a few walls and a vast site reserved for archeological research.

Buildings and constructions are springing up like mushrooms. Setif is constantly expanding, moving up into the hills, adding schools and university buildings, plants, housing compounds, boulevards lined with trees, highways, and so on.

Although ancient, Setif has practically nothing left of the old city, as Tlemcen and Algiers do. That is the price of development. In economic development,

Setif has taken major steps. It occupies an important place in eastern Algeria, especially in the manufacture of plastic products, small and large batteries. Development is concentrated along the Setif-Bordj Bou-Arredj- El Eulma axis. The three daïra [districts] have reached satisfactory levels, along with Ain-Kebira. On the other hand, the districts of Ain-Oulmene, Bougaa and Rass-El-Oued have not moved ahead significantly. This is partially due to the inexistence of these districts before the 1974 administrative partitioning. Furthermore, they are located in relatively poor agricultural areas, lacking in any infrastructure that would result in an economic takeoff. At the present time, the 5-year plan includes several projects for these districts that might open them up.

Delays in Accomplishments

According to the first and second 4-year plans, the Wilaya of Setif should have been more prosperous today. Unfortunately, the projects were not carried out on schedule. Delays had an effect on the progress of all sectors of industry and slowed down the development process. This is attributable to several factors: 1) the nearly permanent shortage of construction materials, which lasted until 1978, when the crisis began to be less acute; the lack of construction enterprises capable of carrying out projects within the time periods planned; underestimation of the cost of projects, with evaluations taking a long time because of bureaucratic red tape; overestimation of the capacities of the Wilaya of Setif; and the lack of continuity in responsibility at the wilaya level. Many wali [governors] succeeded one another within a very short period of time.

Consequently, only 44 percent of the 4-year programs and the special plan was carried out. Out of the financial package allocated to the wilaya, totaling some 6,992,420,000 dinars, only a little under half, or 3,133,375,000 dinars, was actually used.

The wilaya therefore has many things to complete in addition to the 5-year plan. This looks difficult, if an attitude of unshakable determination is not adopted.

The sectors suffering the most from the delays are housing, health and education.

Housing

According to the director of DUCH [expansion unknown] in the Wilaya of Setif, housing projects included in the first 4-year plan were carried out 100 percent. In contrast, those in the second plan are still suffering from delays. The shortage is on the order of 1,680 housing units, some 300 of which will be ready at the end of 1981.

Regarding low-cost and education-related housing, DUCH states that 957 units were included in the project of the 49 CEM [turn-key] units. During the 1980-1981 academic year, 990 units were completed and 234 more will be ready for the first quarter of 1982.

The 233 housing units that remain are now in the beginning stage. In addition, 40 operations buildings will be ready before the first half of 1982.

For the 488 housing units included in the CFPA [Adult Vocational Training Center] program, the project is still blocked because of BEREK [expansion unknown] delays since 1978.

The "near-plan" operation involved a 5,000-unit project through the wilaya. Some 10 percent of the work has been done at the site. For ZIS [Setif Industrial Zone] workers, 20 percent of the work has been done on 1,424 housing units.

The first installment of the 5-year plan includes construction of 2,000 housing units. BEREK and ETAU [expansion unknown] are in charge of studies for the project.

Health: Bottleneck

A rather considerable delay is building up in the health sector of the Wilaya of Setif. Out of the seven hospitals included in previous plans, none has gone into service. At the present time, two hospitals are under construction in Bordj-Bou-Arreridj and Bougaa and are 90-percent completed. Three others are in the planning stage. As for other proposed hospitals, the dust must be providing them with proper protection on the bureaucrats' desks!

In addition, this sector is also characterized by the total inadequacy of equipment: 1 bed for every 75,000 inhabitants. Nor is it surprising to find two persons in a bed. Those "in the know" prefer to go to Algiers or Constantine, where "the service is better" or the doctors "stronger."

The completion of health projects would solve major problems and considerably reduce the burden on existing structures. As for nurseries, maternity hospitals and resorts, it is perhaps better not even to talk about them.

Despite the inadequacy of its accommodations and infrastructure, the Setif hospital has been turned into a university hospital center (CHU). Under the direction of several assistant professors, students do their practical training there. According to the director of health and the secretary general of the Setif University Center, the inadequacy of means harms the quality of education given. The problem of staffing is also extremely acute. Out of the four assistant professors at the Institute, two are in the National Service and the administration has not been able to find anyone to replace them.

The health infrastructure in the Wilaya of Setif is a thorny problem. Given the general inadequacy of means, some regions are entirely without any infrastructure. This situation stems from the wilaya's considerable delay in carrying out development plans. In the field of hygiene and prevention, the situation is scarcely any brighter. In fact, public hygiene does not seem to be taken seriously by communal sanitation services. The persistently negative conduct of some of our fellow citizens has an enormous effect on the situation. Any operation along these lines has turned out to be useless because there is no combined effort on the part of local officials and the population. The deterioration of drinking water pipes and the sewer system adds to the existing problems, such as the absence of any control over well or stream water used by the rural population and which is the source and vehicle of bacteria and microbes.

Education and Training: Uncertain Future

Nor does the sector of education and training escape the general rule. There are major delays in the completion of projects. This phenomenon has had an effect on the quality of education and the number of persons enrolled in school. In fact, overcrowding of classrooms prevents the proper transmission of knowledge.

Out of the eight lycees planned and which should already be in use, only three are being built. Another is in the planning stage and two have been delivered. The other two seem to have been forgotten.

Of the 49 CEM, 26 are in operation, 19 are under construction and the others have not yet been launched. The situation of the technical schools is not much better, to say the least. It is even more catastrophic than that of the lycees. Out of the seven planned, the wilaya has built only one and is at work on another. As for the five remaining....

In 1978, the Ministry of Labor and Professional Training planned the construction of 18 training centers to meet the demand of enterprises for employees, on the one hand, and for pupils excluded from the school system, on the other. The Ministry of Construction and Housing was entrusted with the task of building these centers at the time, on the basis of a turnkey contract. It was the DNC [expansion unknown] that was to carry out the project. The company's consulting office, BEREG, was to complete studies for the project, but every time BEREG has been asked to produce them, it has been nothing but evasive.

As a result, the wilaya took it upon itself to carry out the project. It asked the consulting office SOMERI (SNERI [National Company for Industrial Studies, Management, Construction and Operations]) of Oran to complete the studies and since September, it has tried -- unsuccessfully -- to get those for the remaining 11 from BEREG.

All these delays have resulted in a veritable bottleneck in the advancement of education and professional training. In addition, some CEM already built do not have enough equipment and consequently, several hundred students are not being taught.

The example of the Ksar-El-Abtal CEM in the district of Ain-Oulmene is instructive. The students are 2 years behind. They did not return to their classrooms until the 1981-1982 school year. Several CEM's do not have any boarding facilities or equipment for boarding pupils. Many parents have therefore preferred to keep their children at home because they are unable to bear the cost of room and board at hotels or even at the Turkish baths. I met with several of these children in Bordj-Guedir (Rass-El-Oued district). They were all from Tazrout, located over 60 kilometers from the city of Bordj-Guedir. Their situation is pathetic. They live on a little bread and cheese with weak lemonade. The Bordj-Guedir has had boarding facilities for 3 years, but they are completely unequipped.

The current capacity of the professional training centers can meet only 11 percent of the demand. While giving horrifying figures on school dropouts, the planning

director stated that even if the 18 centers are built, this rate will remain the same because the demand increases every year.

Education Situation in Figures

	<u>Schools</u> <u>CEM</u> <u>Lycees</u>	<u>No. of</u> <u>Class-</u> <u>rooms</u>	<u>No. of</u> <u>Students</u>	<u>No. of</u> <u>Teachers &</u> <u>Professors</u>	<u>Observations</u>
Elementary	608	33,473	Boys: 111,284 Girls: 78,673	Men: 4,016 Women: 1,355	
Intermediate	33 CEM	--	Boys: 29,232 Girls: 17,786	Theor.: 1,859 Actual: 1,750 Incl. 13 for- eigners Vacancies: 109	Given delays in boarding school con- struction, 240 stu- dents were not ad- mitted to the CEM. 23 CEM under con- struction.
Secondary	11 Lycees		Boys: 7,477 Girls: 4,568	Openings: 691 Posts oc.: 538 Vacancies: 158 Foreigners: 148	6 lycees and 6 tech- nical schools planned not built, mainly affecting new stu- dents in Ain-Kebira, Bougaa, Rass-El-Oued.

Despite the rate of pupils attending schools, which is 76 percent, the school dropout rate is also growing. This phenomenon can be understood when one realizes that the rate of admission to the intermediate level is around 58 percent and that of the secondary level about 56 percent.

The following table shows figures on school dropouts and projections through 1984.

<u>School Year</u>	<u>Elementary School</u>	<u>Intermediate</u>	<u>Secondary</u>
1980-1981	15,000	3,300	1,840
1981-1982	14,000	3,380	2,200
1982-1983	14,000	3,960	2,500
1983-1984	13,000	3,160	2,900

This table clearly shows that the professional training centers (CFP) cannot meet all the demand. If 15 percent of the students excluded from the intermediate level of education can be admitted to them, those not enrolled in elementary schools have nothing ahead of them but the streets. The last chance of these doomed children before they turn to crime is to ensure application of Law 26/80, published in the JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE D'ALGERIE of 7-21 June 1981 and dealing with professional training on the job, by virtue of a contract with the enterprise or training organization.

Industrial Sector: Great Strides, Problems To Resolve

In the area of industrialization, the Wilaya of Setif has made great strides, but this sector is suffering from certain difficulties, including the following: the difficulty of marketing certain finished or semi-finished products in a number of units, particularly the Setif plastic complex and the SONIC [National Cellulose Industries Company] unit in Bordj-Bou-Arreridj; a shortage of foremen and a failure to maintain milling equipment, which greatly affects production and productivity in the units; frequent shortages of spare parts for certain pieces of equipment; the lack of information between units, enterprises and sectors. Often, several companies import products that are made in Algeria. For a long time, these practices have bled the national economy and resulted in a major foreign currency drain. In addition, many upper-level personnel and foremen have social problems such as housing, to say nothing of what happens to the workers. As a result, absenteeism is nearly becoming a daily practice. As for the brain drain, trained personnel either go to the large cities or to other countries. There is a lack of means of transport for goods and raw material and considerable delays in customs procedures for industrial products imported from other countries. This problem will not be solved as long as Setif has no customs subdirectorate. Frequent shortages of water for both domestic and industrial purposes are a problem. It is the Bordj-Bou-Arreridj industrial zone that suffers the worst and is anxiously awaiting completion of construction of the Ain-Zada Dam (Ain-Taghrout).

Industrial takeoff in Setif depends to a large extent on the solution given to the problems posed. There is no lack of willingness to work on the part of industrial management. Young executives try to put out an information bulletin, a nomenclature for products manufactured in the industrial areas. This nomenclature will be disseminated throughout the country. As a result, companies will be able to "buy Algerian" and put an end to part of the currency drain. They will also be helping to market national production.

Industrial Zones in the Wilaya of Setif

Seven industrial zones make up the industrial sector. Four of them have already taken off and have even reached the production stage. They are the industrial zones of Setif, Bordj-Bou-Arreridj, El-Eulma and Ain-Kebira. The areas of Ain-Oulmene, Rass-El-Oued and Bougaa are in different stages of takeoff.

Setif Industrial Zone

The industrial zone of Setif in the southern part of the city includes the following strategic units: the small and large battery complex of SONELEC [Algerian National Company for the Manufacture and Installation of Electrical and Electronic Equipment], which produces 55 million small batteries of various types each year and 400,000 standard batteries. Nearly 900 management personnel and workers are employed there. The SONATRACH plastic industries complex is divided into six industrial units: 1) bag and film unit. Its overall production amounts to some 10,600 tons a year. The unit uses low-density polyethylene as its basic raw material. For some time, this unit has been using polyethylene from Skikda. Results are conclusive. In the very near future, the enterprise will cease

importing its raw material. The range of products includes: rope for greenhouse farming; packing bags; woven bags for domestic purpose; and bags for multiple uses. 2) plastic mesh unit: Overall production amounts to some 6,000 tons a year. High-density polyethylene is basically used, along with some low-density polyethylene. The range of products is highly varied and includes: the manufacture of heavy mesh, vegetable crates, various types of bags, the polyethylene band used in yogurt container production and soon to be used in containers for other domestic products. 3) toy unit: This unit went into production in May 1979. PBD, PAD, nylon, heavy-duty polyethylene and crystal are basically used in production. Production capacity is some 2,400 tons a year. In addition to toys, the unit manufactures pipe connections. The connections complete the pipes made by the SNMC [National Building Materials Company]. For this purpose, it uses 200 tons of PUC a year. 4) molded units: Designed to produce plastic spare parts, this unit is of strategic importance because it will make it possible to solve part of the crisis from which the country is suffering in this field. Its capacity is an estimated 130,000 milling hours a year. The unit will also treat acid in the process of manufacturing molds and mechanical parts. The unit suffers from a lack of skilled labor. It also has a service station to handle the needs of vehicles of the entire ZIS. 5) calendering, soft PVC unit: Put into production near the end of 1980, this unit makes shower curtains, upholstery materials, table cloths, imitation leathers, notebooks, and so on. 6) furniture and maintenance articles: This unit has a production capacity of nearly 3,400 tons a year. All raw material is imported. This unit makes plastic chairs, tables of different sizes, vanities, and so on.

Since 15 September 1981, this unit has produced PMMA, or plexiglass in different colors. The marketing of products poses problems because of the high prices, the lack of outlets and of advertising.

The SONATRACH plastic complex employs nearly 1,000 white- and blue-collar workers and covers an area of 70 hectares.

SONACOME [National Mechanical Engineering Company] plans to build a maintenance and "service after sale" station. All breakdowns could be repaired there.

The SNMC has a PVC pipe manufacturing plant. It also makes "gerflex" slabs used for resurfacing home floors. The SNMC has a brickworks in the district of Setif.

SONIPEC [National Leather and Hides Industries Company] has a shoe and synthetic leather factory.

El-Eulma Industrial Zone

This zone now has three industrial units. The SONEGAS [National Electricity and Gas Company] electric meter complex was 100-percent built by SONEGAS. This should serve as an example for other national companies and enterprises. In Setif, this complex is the pride of all workers, despite how little is done to relieve them from the weight of bureaucracy they must carry on their shoulders. The example of this complex is a living demonstration of what a patriotic spirit guided by noble ideals can do.

The SNS [National Steel Company] electrode unit is responsible for manufacturing electrodes or soldering guns. The problem of marketing is an acute one. Some companies actually refuse to buy Algerian and others continue to maintain the overseas myth, or possibly complex.

Interview With Bouderbala

Algiers EL-DJEICH in French No 223, Dec 81 pp 24-25

[Interview with Mr Bouderbala, member of the Central Committee and secretary general of the *Mouhafadha* [translation unknown] of Setif, translated from the Arabic by H. L. and M. Z. R.; date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] First of all, what evolution can you see in the socioeconomic development process this past decade in the Wilaya of Setif?

[Answer] I just took office recently, but I can nevertheless give you a few general remarks and observations concerning the development process in this wilaya. The most remarkable thing is that the people in the region love to work. If they were given the means, they would be able to accomplish much more. Unfortunately, the social crises that the region has experienced for a long time have somewhat hindered the speed of development, especially in the area of housing. It is true that the wilaya has had substantial development in the field of construction, but these considerable efforts are not in keeping with the population growth and the rural exodus, which require more structures.

The problem in this wilaya does not stem from the credits allocated but from the enterprises, which cannot carry out the development projects in the time allotted.

Agriculture suffers from a certain carelessness. Consequently, it has not had the same rate of development as the other sectors have. Food needs are not met, mainly because of the constant population growth. This region is essentially agricultural because of the fertility of its land. The problem has to do with its working and irrigation and this problem was completely neglected during the preceding period. We are now hoping for an improvement in this situation. Furthermore, all products are extremely scarce, which has had a great effect on the completion of the various projects. Bureaucracy, combined with an excessive centralization of certain institutions, has also accentuated these problems.

[Question] What is the party's role in the solution of these problems?

[Answer] The party's role consists of encouraging workers and the union by asking them to double their efforts and commitment so as to carry out the projects within the prescribed time limits and increase the level of productivity. Therefore, the party, within the framework of its activities at the level of the wilaya coordinating assembly, reconciles the views of the administration and the organizations representing the workers. Nevertheless, there are still certain material problems that are difficult to solve within a given period of time and that could affect the smooth operation of the different branches, particularly housing, which in turn affects the other sectors such as education, training, health, and so on. Then there is the shortage of building materials and equipment, which hinders the

completion of plans. Actually, the national enterprises in charge of the execution of these projects very often operate inefficiently. Private enterprises are also unable to carry out the big projects. These factors are joined by another, which is bureaucracy, which I already emphasized and which is an obstacle to national development. Projects the reconsideration of whose credits was planned are blocked by bureaucracy and the centralization of decisions. In my opinion, the only solution lies in granting the wilaya greater autonomy in taking local initiatives. Concerning the social situation, the Wilaya of Setif is vast and has many poor regions. Delays in the completion of school infrastructures and the absence of boarding facilities in intermediate schools mean that students from the rural regions live under deplorable conditions. Furthermore, certain schools are closing because of a lack of equipment or interruptions in their water and electricity. Transportation difficulties (when there is any) particularly affect school children. The establishment of an interurban and interrural transportation system is still in the planning stage because SONACOME is constantly postponing the delivery of the vehicles ordered. The problem of professional training has beaten all records in delays. To date, not one of the 19 centers planned since 1978 has been started. The delay in the completion of studies is the cause. Nor am I even mentioning problems with health, the road systems, and so on.

In short, we are standing by, watching this deplorable situation, without being able to do anything about it.

[Question] During our visit to certain economic units, we noticed a certain discontent over the poor production. The administration blames the workers, who in turn throw the ball back into its court, arguing that it has not solved certain of their social problems. What does the party think about this? What is its role in ideological orientation and supervision in the field?

[Answer] The party must be the driving force of the development process and ensure the preservation of the country's socialist option, through its participation in decision-making and effective application of decisions made. And yet, certain problems still remain and poison the situation somewhat. Since the Fourth Congress of the party, certain clarifications were made. It is our task to move beyond the splits and fight outdated ways of thinking. To do so, we must go back to the fundamental laws and texts, whose application and respect could put an end to marginal, sterile conflicts and thereby ensure the maintenance of productivity. The Algerian worker is definitely not lacking in perseverance or reliability and will make an effort as long as the means exist. But the red tape and *beylik* mentality that remain in the minds of some only weaken his will and make him lazy. When the law is the same for everyone, this phenomenon will disappear. Individualism and selfishness marked the postindependence period, even though during the war of liberation, we were opposed such things, given the fact that we were united behind the same cause: liberation of the country.

Within the framework of the party, we try to create a self-critical, constructive spirit on the part of members and citizens, encouraging them to take measures and demonstrate self-sacrifice. Concerning the choice of men, we always try to look for competent, committed, honest elements in order to carry out the slogan: the right man in the right place. The decisions of the Central Committee and the party by-laws constitute the fundamental basis of any action. The disciplinary council

ensures control over the conduct of every member, either by rewarding him or by punishing him.

It is time that the law govern everyone. The time of egotism is past. A return to the principles that guided our action during the war of liberation is essential. Only work can guarantee success, on the one hand, and on the other, the expulsion of all those who collaborated with the occupier and who have infiltrated the government machinery.

Only through work can one create miracles.

Interview With Amine Ghrayeb

Algiers EL-DJEICH in French No 223, Dec 81 pp 25-26

[Interview with Amine Ghrayeb, governor of Setif: "The Future: Complementary Nature of Industry and Agriculture"; date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] There is an imbalance in the distribution of development projects among the wilaya's regions. Setif, El-Bordj, El-Eulma and Ain-Kebira have the lion's share, while Ras-El-Oued, Bougaa and Ain-Ouelmane make do with crumbs. In your opinion, what are the factors that have caused this imbalance?

[Answer] First of all, I believe that the situation is far from having been studied thoroughly in the beginning. In addition, priorities were assigned with respect to the choice of regions for the establishment of industrial units. The planner had to consider all factors permitting the plan to be carried out. The four districts in question offered conditions favorable for the establishment of a local industry, to wit, the existence of roads and the availability of management personnel and workers. The poorer regions have received several projects within the framework of the 5-year plan.

[Question] According to statistics released by the Directorate of Planning and National Development, the projects were 56 percent behind during the previous period. What were the causes of this?

[Answer] There are many reasons. They can be summed up as follows: 1) the programming of many projects which, based on available capabilities, cannot be completed on schedule; 2) the lack of coordination between the different ministries, with each one proceeding to carry out its own project independently of the wilaya and of the other ministries involved, especially those in charge of the theoretical aspects; 3) the absence of local consulting firms; 4) the nearly continuous shortage of building materials, particularly cement and bricks; and 5) the structural weakness of public construction enterprises.

Other subjective factors worsen the situation.

[Question] Setif is one of the wilayate that has had a high rate of emigration. The reintegration of these people has become one of the most important tasks in the national development process. What has the wilaya done about this?

[Answer] Actually, there is a high number of emigrants. Every time that the socioeconomic conditions (housing, work) are favorable, their return is possible. However, the wilaya's capacities are limited. The housing problem is crucial. The wilaya cannot outline a program for the reintegration of the emigrants.

[Question] Despite the size of the wilaya and its predominantly agricultural nature, the secondary roads linking the urban centers to the rural regions remain just trails. What do you intend to do about this?

[Answer] As I have already emphasized, the major projects are reserved for the population centers on the axis of National Road 5. Some 60 percent of the rural people have remained isolated in mountainous or semi-arid pastoral regions. The projects in the 5-year plan are aimed at opening up roads between the rural and urban zones, but the problem lies in the need to find enterprises capable of carrying out such projects. This task affects all the national and wilaya organizations.

[Question] Culture is lethargic and stagnant. What are the measures being taken by local authorities to breathe new life into it?

[Answer] The delays registered in accomplishments have affected cultural projects. Regarding the wilaya chief town, the private enterprise in charge of building the cultural center was not able to complete its work on schedule. Consequently, the credits allocated dwindled away rapidly because of inflation and the higher cost of construction and wages. The operation to reevaluate these credits is underway. There are other proposals consisting in building smaller cultural centers in each commune, which would make a great contribution to the cultural recovery. Despite the absence of leaders here, there is sufficient determination.

[Question] The different areas in the wilaya and agriculture suffer from a great lack of drinking water and water for irrigation. How long can this situation continue and what solutions are possible?

[Answer] The previous officials demonstrated a flagrant lack of concern over the problem of irrigation. Enormous efforts are now being made to make up for the delays. In the near future, we shall be able to meet the needs of the people of El-Bordj and El-Eulma for drinking water. As for a radical solution, it is difficult to find one, at least at the present time. However, the proposed construction of the Ain-Zada Dam could attenuate the seriousness of the problem especially concerning the growing needs for water for industrial purposes. Agriculture will therefore benefit also. This sector has not received great attention, even though the wilaya has enormous agricultural potential. If water is available, 70 percent of the land can be irrigated without major technical difficulties, for there are streams running through the regions throughout the year. The water is simply not used. The wilaya's future does not depend solely on industry, but on the development of agriculture also. The complementary nature of these two sectors will lead to the creation of more jobs, on the one hand, while responding to the needs of the people, on the other.

In my opinion, the future of the wilaya depends on agriculture, a constantly renewable type of capital.

TOP GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN EXPLAINS, JUSTIFIES POLICIES

Doha AL-'ARAB in Arabic 13 Dec 81 pp 10, 11

[Article: "Dr Usamah al-Baz in a Frank Conversation with AL-'ARAB"]

[Text] AL'ARAB'S conversation with Dr Usamah al-Baz, first deputy foreign minister of Egypt, deals with many Arab and international issues, the Camp David agreements, and strategic Arab security. Notwithstanding our differences with some of what Dr al-Baz said during the discussion, we are publishing it as it took place.

Egypt will stand beside any Arab country Israel attacks, even Syria.

We must seek to stop the cancerous Israeli deployment on the West Bank and Gaza.

Camp David is not the essence of Egyptian policy.

We basically are in agreement, that it is necessary to preserve the strategic security of the Arab nation.

We must absolutely not permit any secession or fragmentation in Lebanon.

It is in the interest of us all to stand against the phenomenon of foreign intervention and to deter it.

The normalization process does not mean that Israel will have a privileged or special position in Egypt.

For our relations with Israel to become normal, the Palestinian problem will have to be solved.

One need not fear that Egypt will suffer an Israeli economic or cultural onslaught.

Egypt is committed to the Arab mutual defense agreement.

A Sinai liberated in April 1982 will be a gain for the whole Arab nation, and these are the reasons.

Dr. Usamah al-Baz, director of President Husni Mubarak's office for foreign affairs, the first deputy foreign minister of Egypt, and one of Egypt's most prominent men, received his higher studies in the United States of America. He was the first motive

power and technocratic brain behind most of the agreements Washington and Cairo reached in President al-Sadat's era.

Dr al-Baz is well known for his Palestinian ties. He is the person who negotiated directly with Carter at Camp David on the final formulation of the agreement.

In spite of that, it is well known that Dr al-Baz, in closed rooms, emphasizes his dissatisfaction with the American party's negative attitude toward Egyptian policy and the fact that this Egyptian policy has not yet received proper appreciation from America.

However, Dr al-Baz, like many Egyptian political figures, cannot come out in the open and criticize American policy.

AL-'ARAB held this comprehensive conversation with him:

Question Has Camp David become a focal point of Egyptian foreign policy?

Answer Camp David is not all of Egyptian policy, and it is not the essence of Egyptian policy. Rather, Camp David is one facet of Egyptian policy; there are other much more important issues. The main issue preoccupying us now is that of guaranteeing and protecting the Arab identity in the present and future and protecting the general strategic situation, and perforce preserving the strategic security, of the Arab nation; this issue must have maximum priority. After this comes the Palestinian cause in general. Within the Palestinian cause we find that Camp David is a branch or a tributary; it is not the whole story as far as we are concerned. Every Arab country must realize that Camp David is not the end of the road -- it is one facet of Egyptian policy. Even if there are disputes, we must learn to permit disputes over specific particular details within the limits of our agreement on overall principles.

Question What minimum do you consider must be preserved in the Arab context?

Answer We must essentially agree that it is necessary to preserve the strategic security of the Arab nation from foreign threats and alien foreign intervention, be that from one side or another. We do not want to subject the area to polarization again, we do not want to turn the area into a cold war arena, and we do not want to turn the Middle East into a field of competition, be that heated armed competition or competition in the context of the acquisition of military bases that might push us into matters that are no less dangerous than heated confrontations. All these points are basic; we must face the foreign world in general as a single unit. That is not a point of departure for hostility between ourselves and this outer world, but rather a point of departure for our distinctiveness as a specific national, religious and cultural group facing a group which differs from it in this regard, and therefore we have a basic duty, which is that we must be concerned with ourselves. We must arrange our affairs within the Arab family first so that we will be able to act with others. We must not allow Arab disputes to be reflected in our relations with other countries. We have in front of us a clear example in European countries among which there are contradictions. There are countries in Europe that have fought among themselves. Germany 40 years ago fought most of the European countries, and they now deal with it as if it is part of the security of a single European family, just as if there were no borders between them, just as if there was no rancor between

them, and just as if there were no aftereffects. These people, possessing different languages and different interests and consisting of big countries, small countries, advanced industrial countries, less advanced countries that do not have great financial surpluses, and countries that are suffering from balance of payments deficits and deficits in the terms of trade and are suffering from unemployment, which are all countries that have had wars among them and fierce fighting among ethnic groups, can do such a thing, and these factors do not exist among us Arabs at all. Therefore we must preserve a minimum solidarity, on condition that that solidarity not be an empty slogan that is voiced but be a reflection of the true belief that mutual interests exist among us that greatly transcend the scope of disputes. We must learn from others to have room for cooperation and solidarity and a little room for disputes. We are trying to contain this room for disputes and reduce and limit it as much as possible so that room for cooperation may expand, out of our belief that Arab disputes are temporary, superficial factors that are rapidly dispelled and melted by the warm Arab sun when matters within the Arab family return to their natural course. We believe that 1981 must witness progress in the realm of Arab solidarity. There is a conviction now in many areas of the Arab world that what is going on now calls for a joining of ranks, a coalescence, and basic attention to higher national strategic issues more than at any time in the past. We cannot solve the Palestinian issue, and we cannot face Israel or face any foreign adversary, when the Arabs are fragmented and disorganized.

Question What do you mean when you say that the first goal of Egyptian policy is to preserve the Arab identity? What does this statement mean?

Answer By this I mean that the Arab identity does not mean just a corporal or material existence -- the identity means that the nation continue to exist, with its civilization and its interests, in a specific region, and that no segment of this region be infringed, so that there will be no threats to this existence. This existence therefore demands that the nation enjoy its freedom of choice -- enjoy its ability to invest its natural resources in the interests of its people. This nation must be remote from zones of conflict among international parties, so that if they fight we will not be involved with them in that or turn our country into a scene of conflict. They must fight among themselves themselves but we will not be polarized or become fragmented, and we will not be divided into supporters of the United States, supporters of the Soviet Union, or countries revolving in one orbit or another.

Rather, we must orient ourselves within a context of protecting Arab interests within a coherent regional unity where rancors and dissent do not conflict. For example, we believe that the war that is now going on in the Gulf area is a serious matter because, if it continues, it will lead to plans to spread it outside the scope of the area where it is taking place, and, if it does spread out of that area, it could be a direct threat to countries bordering on Iraq and Iran. If that happens it will not be right for the Arab countries to stand with their hands tied or must the Arab countries permit any fragmentation or partition in Lebanon at all, because that must be considered a great setback for everyone, a serious issue to which we must be alert, in the sense that preserving Lebanon's territorial unity is a subject which must represent maximum priority among all the Arabs. We must also seek to stop the cancerous Israeli deployment in the West Bank and Gaza, because if we permit it to continue and spread, we will not just be ignoring a basic right as far as the

Palestinian people go, but will also all thereby have this cancer spread, as I said, the spread of Israeli influence, the consecration of military and civilian occupation, the geographic and demographic change which is taking place, and the change in population that is occurring on the West Bank and in Gaza. I say that this situation is serious and entails numerous elements of risk.

We must draw attention to all this and our abilities to defend the region must increase, not decline -- increase not in absolute terms but in the relative sense, in the sense that our power to defend ourselves should increase relative to other countries that are able to infringe upon our strategic security. If our ability to defend ourselves against other countries or in confrontation with countries bordering us and can threaten us now is 60 percent, it must in the future increase to 70 and 80 percent. Thus, in order for us to have the power to preserve Arab values and Arab civilization, these values and this civilization must not regress before foreign invasions and invasions coming from east or west, north or south, because it is a distinctive civilization, and we believe that it is a civilization that will guarantee that our future course is protected and that our powers are directed, and believe that it is a basic part of our identity since we absolutely cannot pretend ignorance of it or act as if this civilization was a matter that belonged to the past. We believe that it is a matter that belongs to the past, present and future. This is what I meant when I talked about keeping the Arab identity strong and coherent.

Question In your statement you said that the second point of Egyptian strategy is to achieve Arab strategic security. Through this goal we find in the Arab Gulf area that there are foreign attempts to establish a presence. What role can Egypt play in the event the Strait of Hormoz, for example, faces a threat?

Answer First, Egypt has declared, has undertaken and is renewing its undertaking to commit itself to help any Arab country facing aggression or threat of aggression in the Gulf area. We are holding to our promise and we believe that if the foreign security of any Arab country in the Gulf area faces danger, we will be fully prepared to cooperate, if the country facing the threat or aggression wants such cooperation. Naturally we cannot impose our cooperation or help on anyone, but we do expect to hear the opinion of the country that faces the threat, if we are asked to help any country facing a danger or threat, regardless of contrary peripheral disputes that exist among members of the family; therefore, we, in our armed forces' development plan, are greatly concerned with realizing a development that will allow us to face these situations and face a state of emergency that will require support or aid for any Arab country that faces threats in the Gulf area. This, as well as the specific powers of the Egyptian armed forces entails an addition -- the addition of some new resources for these forces. As I have said, we express our readiness in the first place to offer urgent military aid to any Arab country that faces a threat or aggression. On the other hand, we will stand up to foreign intervention, because we consider that foreign intervention is the prelude to threats to these countries. The countries that intervene usually are the major ones; they are countries that are not concerned about the interests of the people and countries of the region but rather in the first place are concerned with realizing their own interests and aspirations. The more we can stop such intervention, which might come about in blatant form or might come about in an indirect fashion, the more it is in the interests of us all to stand up to the phenomenon of foreign intervention and repel it, in the sense that we not enable it to realize the results it is aiming at.

In addition, we must seek to help fraternal Arab countries through our contacts with various international parties, and this is what we are doing. For example, some parties, specifically our Palestinian brothers, thought in the recent period that Israel was determined to launch a comprehensive aggression against southern Lebanon, that this aggression would be accompanied by an attack by some elements whose Arab loyalties within the Lebanese structure had become weakened, and that the purpose in this would be to fragment the unity of Lebanese territory, fragment it and establish little principalities in it -- a Maronite principality in the mountain area, a Shiite principality in the south, and a Sunnite principality between the two, creating a vehicle for Syrian intervention and striking out at the Palestinian human and military presence within Lebanese territory. When we discovered that great fear had arisen within some Palestinian and Arab circles, we made numerous interventions with the American party and the Israeli party to prevent that, and the attention of the American and Israeli parties was drawn to the grievous results that would entail, which would certainly result from it. This means that we will make use of the relationship that binds us to the United States.

We will use the peace formula that is in effect between us and Israel to preserve the territorial integrity of Lebanon and preserve the territorial integrity of the Arab nation as a whole. These are some examples. We are therefore committed to defending the nation as a whole and are committed to defending every Arab nation that needs help and asks for it or accepts it from Egypt. When we defend any Arab country we are defending our own territory, and we see no difference between Kuwaiti soil, Saudi soil, Omani, Yemeni, Tunisian, Moroccan, or Algerian soil and Egyptian soil.

Question The Strait of Hormoz enjoys a strategic status. What would Egypt's position be if this strait faced danger?

Answer We have on numerous occasions declared our readiness to stand alongside the fraternal Omani people in any situation they face. We will do this from the premise of our belief in the solidarity that actually exists between the two fraternal countries. There is a general quality to Arab solidarity that we believe in and that binds us to all Arab countries, and there is another characteristic, which is the special strong relationship that binds us to Oman, links us to the leaders of Oman and the people of Oman and links us to the interests of Oman. We believe that it is our duty to help our brothers in Oman, if their situation is faced with any danger. It is fortunate that our brothers in Oman are able fully to face every eventuality; so far they have proved their ability to preserve stability in the Strait of Hormoz, freedom of navigation and the flow of international trade through it. If Oman did not enjoy this level of alertness or mobility, particular complications might have occurred, the likelihood of a flareup of war outside Iraq and Iran might have increased, and conditions might have arisen which would help foreign intervention or give Western countries, for instance, an excuse to intervene on the pretext of protecting freedom of navigation. The sultanate has proved that it is able to perform the requirements of this delicate, decisive task itself.

Circumstances have not arisen that would lead to a probable outbreak of crisis or the occurrence of a threat now, or a likely or imminent one, but, if any threat does occur, we can go to Oman in a few hours and stand alongside the fraternal people, and we also believe that the Arab countries are well aware of the danger and the grievous losses to which the Western economy could be exposed, and which the exist-

ence of the West itself and the survival of Western industry could face, if any infringement on Oman's sovereignty occurred, since that is the vigilant guardian of the freedom of shipping in the Strait of Hormoz. We also believe that the Soviet Union will think twice before harming the strategic security of Oman, and we therefore believe that the current situation does not constitute an imminent threat to Oman and its people, because Oman's political ability to move and see has caused it to avoid many dangers.

Question Can American policy, under the aegis of the Reagan administration, rid itself of Camp David? Is its role now to be considered an extension of the role the former American administration played in the peace negotiations?

Answer The new American administration, like the old one, is adhering to the rule of holding to the documents and treaties it has concluded, and it considers, as our contacts with its main personalities have revealed, that it is most important to sanctify the peace process, that Camp David was a good beginning along the road, and that the parties can move flexibly and freely in order to arrive at a suitable formula for carrying out what has been agreed to, or add or modify it in a manner that will be acceptable to the parties. There is a commitment to the principles and provisions of the Camp David agreements and there is also the notion that it is possible to use a greater degree of flexibility in arriving at the application of a suitable formula arising from Camp David.

Question Where has the normalization of relations between Egypt and Israel led? Could that harm the Egyptian economy, and the Arab economy as well?

Answer The normalization of relations between Egypt and Israel has still been passing through its first stage. This normalization process does not in any way mean that Israel has a privileged or special position in Egypt. All that can result from it is that conditions between Egypt and Israel, and subsequently between Israel and its Arab neighbors, can be normal ones, such as the relations that link us to Cyprus or Greece. In order for relations to be totally normal, it is necessary to resolve the Palestinian problem.

What is going on now is the start of the gradual normalization process in various fields. One cannot view normalization as possibly threatening the Egyptian or Arab economy, the Egyptian or Arab culture, or the Egyptian or Arab people or values with danger, because this would entail a great underestimation of the status of the Egyptian economy, Egyptian abilities, Egyptian culture, and Egyptian and Arab civilization. The Egyptian economy is a guided one that has many rules. There is the public sector, which has been assigned about 80 percent of the production process and has taken charge of a large portion of the aspects of the distribution and provision of services. There are many rules governing the private sector and there are conditions and bills that govern it, such as imports and exports; all aspects are organized; nothing is left to spontaneous treatment in the context of these rules and provisions. Israel cannot realize any dreams of a privileged economic, cultural or intellectual position in Egypt, and there cannot be any Israeli invasion of Egypt from any of these angles, first, because the matter is subject to rules and provisions, as I have pointed out. Proof of that is that we have strong relations of cooperation with many big countries like the United States and the European countries; they are more powerful than Israel from the economic angle, but they have nonetheless not been able to invade the Egyptian

economy or dominate it; in the first place, a country like Israel, whose resources are as I have described them, cannot. There are rules for goods whose imports into Egypt is permitted, the goods that are imported, the volume of trade, the types of such trade, production operations, the control and regulation of production, the distribution process, the infrastructure of the Egyptian economy, banking, export and import activities, ownership of farmland, types of projects in which foreign activity is permitted to function, and the extent of such activity.

All this is subject to rules. There are specific bodies for that, such as the Foreign Investment Oversight Authority. There is vigilance over banks in general, over foreign banks, their activities and banking operations in general, and it is therefore impossible for anyone to imagine that Israel could infiltrate the Egyptian economy or control any segment of it. Then, on the other hand, it is not right for us to forget that Israel does not have either the productive power or the productive capacity to enable it to penetrate the Egyptian economy, because most of the goods it exports or produces in abundant quantities are goods that Egypt also produces in abundant quantities. Our economy, in this respect, is one that competes with and does not complement it. As regards some types of goods that Israel produces and exports to countries outside the area, such as electronics, Israel has achieved some success in these areas, and we find that our traditional market for acquiring these goods is the Western market, for instance the United States, Japan France, Switzerland, Italy, the United Kingdom and Sweden.

It is unreasonable that Israel should acquire an advantage here, because these countries have the advantage of having previously dealt with Egypt for a long period.

As regards an intellectual invasion, we cannot imagine that Israel, with its Hebrew language, could launch one. Although the Arabic language is used there, more than 95 percent of the material printed in Israel is published in Hebrew, which is a language that is not known in Egypt; it is not anticipated that it will become known or widespread, and nothing will be sold in Egypt except the newspaper JERUSALEM POST, a publication which is distributed in a narrow circle, that of people concerned with foreign policy who have a good knowledge of English. Other Israeli papers and publications have no circulation in Egypt and it is not possible for us to imagine that Egypt, with its civilizations, its old culture, the genuineness of its thought and the fact that the al-Azhar University is there protecting the Arabic language and the Islamic religion -- we cannot imagine that a cultural or intellectual void exists that Israel could fill. Indeed, to the contrary, there is a genuine tradition and a great heritage which will prevent any possible Israeli infiltration into Egyptian culture. In addition, it is to be noted so far that the number of Egyptians who have visited Israel can almost be counted on the fingers of one hand. There naturally is the possibility that this will increase, and it will be in our benefit to increase cultural contacts with Israel so that we can influence broad segments of the Israeli people, specifically the new generation and the well educated elements that belong to the Peace Now movement. These are opposition elements which consider that it is necessary to shake the old Israeli notions about the Arabs, Arab intentions, Palestine, the Palestinian issue and the Palestinian state specifically. Therefore it might be in our interests, and I believe that it really is in our interests, to increase the cultural opening to Israel, bearing in mind that an inundation of Egypt by Israeli culture absolutely will not come about and bearing in mind that there is no broad, powerful, distinctive culture, that that

culture is published in a language that is not known in Egypt, but that it is an amalgam of numerous European cultures we do not need to acquire from a second source but that we can acquire from its primary source. If we need to learn about modern schools of European literature, for example, we need not learn about them via Israel but can learn about them through their original sources. Aside from that, I see no danger at all.

Israeli tourists who have come to Cairo -- and the Israelis have vied with one another to come to Egypt, since that was a dream that preoccupied many of them, they do not believe that that dream will last, and they do not know the scope of what the future will bear in that regard -- come, learn and become acquainted with the legacy of Egypt and its civilization, specifically the ancient aspect of it. Then they enjoy just going about on the streets of Cairo. However, you will nonetheless not sense that they have an effect on a city whose population totals 9 million, in which there is a large number of tourists from all nationalities. If you go to any hotel you will find that the number of Israelis present there, even in the context of this race to come to Egypt, hardly indicates a presence worth mentioning on their part.

When Nixon came to Egypt and went to Alexandria, he said it would be madness for Israel to continue its hostility toward Egypt and the Arabs, because the population of Alexandria alone was equal to that of Israel.

[Question] What have the Camp David agreements done for Egypt?

[Answer] Peace actually only began officially on 26 March 1979. On that date, the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty was signed and the reciprocal convention on establishing autonomy on the West Bank and Gaza also was signed. This was a practical beginning of peace in official form. Only at that time did we start talking about normalization, the exchange of diplomatic representatives, and trade and cultural exchange. The Israeli withdrawal began, in exchange, and Israel began to be concerned with its commitments vis-a-vis the normalization process. What the peace has achieved for Egypt is:

First, the restoration of a large part of our territory in Sinai that had been occupied, and the completion of this withdrawal in April 1982. On 1 April 1982 Israel will have made a total military and civil withdrawal from Sinai, and Egypt will have come to exercise its sovereignty and dominance over every square inch of Egyptian territory. This in itself is a great gain not just for Egypt but also for the Arabs as well, and we must view it from the strategic standpoint, not just from the standpoint of acquiring a plot of land here or there. Therefore we began to travel on the right road when we started to redevelop Sinai, because the failure to develop Sinai will entail great risks in terms of the future. We must view the process of redeveloping Sinai in the long term and in light of the future and we must turn Sinai into a region that protects Egypt and North Africa. We do not mean to say that we are imposing our protection on others or say that we are better able than they are to control the strategic security of the region, but we do say that Egypt has a specific gravity and that this gravity in addition to its readiness to exercise it, has led to its ability to play a special, distinctive role in helping to defend the security of the Arabs, on grounds that this is a national responsibility for Egypt. For this reason we were anxious to stress, even at the time we were signing the peace treaty, we were anxious to state to Israel and the United States, that we considered that we were continuing with the commitment to the Arab collective solidarity

guarantee treaty that is sometimes referred to as the Arab mutual defense treaty, and we still are stating up to now and stipulating that we are committed to the provisions of that treaty and that we consider ourselves responsible for answering aggression against any Arab country against which Israel commits aggression, including Syria.

Question Even if Israel invades Syria?

Answer Any country. If Israel attacks any Arab country, Egypt will take the position of supporting that Arab country; Israel, in my mind, does not enjoy a position of pre-eminence. Not only Israel. If the Soviet Union, if the United States, if Israel, if any Arab country attacks, Egypt has complete freedom to rise up to help that country, because we are committed to the collective guarantee treaty. For that reason, when we finish regaining Sinai, that will entail a very great addition for us and Arab strength, military strength, strategic strength and security strength -- that will be the first achievement.

The other achievement is that the Palestinian cause will be moved forward. Since Israel emerged, the dossier on the Palestinian cause was sealed and it neglected for many long years. In 1967 the issue of regaining occupied territory became prominent, but the file itself was not presented to Israel specifically or to the international community with the insistence and clarity with which it was presented after the peace process started. Israel, now and for the first time, has started to face the adoption of a position, or, specifically, its conception of the Palestinian issue. A large number of politicians in Israel were not prepared to formulate their positions or understand what position to adhere to regarding a resolution of the Palestinian question, and we therefore find that there are great differences among them and we even find specific shades of this dispute within the ruling coalition itself.

One person wants one thing, someone else want something else, and it has been clear in most of the meetings that we have attended in meeting Israeli delegations that there are contradictions among them, because the file had not previously been opened. Now the file has been opened wide for the first time and they have started to be asked to adopt a position that they cannot evade.

Moreover, we have realized a media breakthrough for the Arabs and the Palestinian cause specifically. Since the peace process began, the image of the Arabs and the image of the Arab cause and Arab demands, specifically the Palestinian cause, has improved in many areas of the world, especially in the West. If you go to any Western country, whether in Europe or the United States, and to many countries that lie outside that context, you will find that the Palestinian cause and the Arab position in general have realized tremendous gains in the media in various levels. None of this could have happened in the absence of an active, dynamic policy handling the international situation with adequate flexibility. The peace proposal has become positive, popular and well liked in countries, especially countries which have suffered from the agonies of war. If you go to any European country you will find that peace there has a magic ring. The Netherlands for example would not have been able to withdraw its embassy from Jerusalem to Tel Aviv had there not been this leap forward in the media, which was achieved because of the peace policy and the dynamism of the Arab position that Egypt is expressing to broad segments of public opinion in The Netherlands on the soundness of Arab policy and the fact that the Arabs ultimately want peace -- even if the notion still prevails that the Arabs want destruction

and negative features, want to throw the Jews into the sea. This is all an erroneous image of our policy in the recent period that Israel made first of all, then tried to exploit. Similar circles in most of these countries have striven to consecrate the image; the image of the Arab used to be a negative one.

The image of the Arab position used to be a negative one. It is in the context of this negative image that support has been acquired in European or American countries for the Arab cause -- now I am not saying that we have acquired all the requisite support, but I do say that there is adequate background for me to acquire specific support if we exploit this background wisely and in a dynamic, active manner. In addition it could be said that the beginning of the peace process, in its consecration and implantation, could prompt the whole area to face our basic issues. The most important issue facing us now is that of protecting the Arab identity and protecting the strategic interests of the Arab nation. This protection will be provided if we devote our efforts to it and if our efforts over it are not fragmented. The notion of confrontation between us and Israel, and the fact that it was isolated and we did not give attention to it, caused a disequilibrium in this balance. We considered that all our efforts had to be directed here, and a large portion of our resources were directed in that framework. Now since the start of the peace process has reduced the priority of confronting it, not because of the fact that it has now become less important, but because the severity of the conflict itself has been diminished, with a diminution of the severity of the struggle, we can direct a large amount of our resources for the confrontation with Israel -- we will be able to devote a basic portion of our efforts to the basic issues and the issues of guaranteeing the Arab identity and guaranteeing the Arab interest, be it individual or collective, over the long range.

11887

CSO: 4504/158

BROAD OUTLINES OF NEW 5-YEAR PLAN UNVEILED

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 28 Dec 81 p 8

/Article: "The New 5-Year Plan Aims at Increasing Production from 27 to 42 Billion Pounds, or by 54 Percent"/

/Text/ Dr 'Abd-al-Razzaq 'Abd-al-Majid, the deputy prime minister for financial and economic affairs, has completed preparing the new 5-year plan, which is to begin next July. Its goal is to increase production from 27 to 42 billion pounds, at an annual compound growth rate of 9 percent, or 54 percent over the 5-year period. This rate will contribute to the completion of a large number of projects and replacement of obsolete capacity in them. The deputy premier stated at the fourth scientific conference of the Society of Graduates of Economics and Political Science yesterday that the plan entailed an annual increase of 8.3 percent in the commodity production sector to cope with the population increase and raise the masses' standard of living.

The volume of investments in the plan come to 26 billion pounds; of this, 19.5 billion will be for the public sector, or 75 percent, in view of this sector's resources and revenues; 6.5 billion pounds will go to the private sector. The great role which has been assigned to this sector may be ascribed to the economic policies that are currently being followed, which are aimed at encouraging it and giving it opportunities to help advance production activity and develop the national economy.

The deputy prime minister said that the plan is aimed at increasing gross national product in 1979-80 costs and prices from 15,947,000,000 pounds in 1981-82 to 24,959,000,000 pounds in 1986-87, an increase of about 9 billion pounds and 57 percent, or an annual compound rate of 9.4 percent.

The targeted annual increase of production has been estimated at 4 percent in the agricultural sector on the average, in the transformational sectors at 13.2 percent a year, in Suez Canal production at 10.2 percent, in the petroleum sector at an average of 7.5 percent, and in other sectors at percentages that are in keeping with the needs of harmony and equilibrium.

The investments targeted for each activity have been defined in accordance with the strategy and the goals; 16.3 percent of total investments have been allocated to agricultural and self-sufficiency in food projects; this is approximately the

volume of transport, communications and storage projects. Housing and infrastructure projects have been allotted 21.9 percent, projects directly connected to increases in exports have been allocated 14.8 percent, industrial projects receive 13.8 percent, and social services 8.1 percent.

The deputy prime minister stressed that the new plan attached great importance to increasing national and joint private sector savings and consequently to raising the volume of investments in it in a manner that will allow it to assume responsibility for development to the desired extent. Its savings have been estimated at 6.5 billion pounds over the 5 years, and these equal the value of financing of direct investments in this sector.

Dr Sulayman Nur-al-Din, minister of economy, stated that rules have been set forth for the policy of economic liberalization to meet investments and the actual needs of the government, and not the buying power of individuals.

11887

CSO: 4504/150

FLOW OF EXPATRIATE EARNINGS REVIEWED

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 23 Dec 81 p 13

/Article: "Savings of Egyptians abroad Are Directed to Egyptian Banks"/

/Text/ The remittances of Egyptians working abroad, which are carried out either in the form of cash through bank transfers from abroad or in the form of assets, that is, imports that do not entail the transfer of hard currency, in addition to tourist revenues, are to be considered the greatest sources of foreign currency accumulations in commercial banks. Through a reading of the revenues from these accumulations, the following is apparent:

Remittances of Egyptians working abroad have come to account for the bulk of foreign currency revenues accumulated in the accredited banks. Their proportion of total revenues came to 58.2 percent in fiscal year 1980-81, as compared with 58.8 percent in fiscal year 1979-80. It is clear that cash transfers increased by 51.8 million pounds, or 7.8 percent, totalling 719 million pounds, while remittances of assets coming in via imports without the transfer of hard currency dropped by about 22.7 million pounds or 2.2 percent, to about 1 million pounds /sic/, so that the total remittances of Egyptians working abroad increased by 29.1 million pounds in 1980-81, or 1.7 percent, over the preceding year. This may perhaps be attributed to recent economic decrees aimed at guiding imports, in particular those that do not involve hard currency.

These figures increase hopes that the rate of remittances by Egyptians working abroad, be they in the form of cash or assets, will rise instead of being directed toward banks in Europe. With regard to tourism, the Ministry of Tourism data and balance of payments estimates assert that tourist revenues came to 514.9 million pounds in 1980-81 as compared with 466 million pounds in 1979-80, an increase of 49 million pounds or 10.5 percent.

There was improvement in tourist activity during the fiscal year 1980-81; it recorded a noticeable increase both in terms of the number of tourists coming in and the nights spent. The number of tourists rose by 17.3 percent; the bulk of that increase may be ascribed to people coming from Arab countries, whose number increased by about 96,800 or 22.6 percent. The number of tourists coming from the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development countries increased by 9.9 percent while the number of tourists coming from other countries increased by

62.4 percent. The number of tourist nights increased by 28.6 percent, reaching 9 million. In spite of this increase in tourist revenues, there was a drop in numerous forms of tourism, such as youth, religious, medical treatment and athletic tourism. In addition sluggishness in the construction of tourist hotels continued.

11887

CSO: 4504/150

MAJOR SUSPECTS IN INFLUENCE SCANDAL DEFEND THEMSELVES

Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 14 Dec 81 p 1

/Article by Layla 'Abd-al-Salam: 'Hilmi 'Abd-al-Akhir, Na'im Abu Talib and Jalal Fahmi Reply to Charges Directed against Them in the Rashad 'Uthman Case"/

/Text/ Counsellor Hilmi 'Abd-al-Akhir, minister of state for People's Assembly affairs, denied the charges directed against him in the course of a review of the Rashad 'Uthman case last Saturday. Dr Na'im Abu Talib, the former governor of Alexandria, and Maj Gen Jalal Fahmi, director of the Port of Alexandria Authority, also denied the charges directed against them in the same case.

All three officials asserted to AL-AHRAR that they had no responsibility regarding the millionaire Rashad 'Uthman, whom the Court of Values has put under sequestration.

Counsellor Husni 'Abd-al-Hamid, the assistant socialist public prosecutor, had accused Counsellor Hilmi 'Abd-al-Akhir before the court of values of sending the former governor of Alexandria a recommendation requesting that the governorate allocate three apartments in al-Ma'murah to Rashad 'Uthman, his brother and his late father, and that the governor gave agreement immediately to the allocation of the apartments:

Hilmi 'Abd-al-Akhir, responding to the charge, told AL-AHRAR that he, as minister of state for People's Assembly affairs, gave a great many recommendations every day to members of the assembly, and the same thing that applied to the other members of the assembly applied to the member Rashad 'Uthman.

Hilmi 'Abd-al-Akhir added that if a recommendation on a person is given to an official, that does not mean that official violates the law when he carries out the recommendation.

Accusation of the Governor of Alexandria

The socialist public prosecutor dealt with the conduct of the former governor of Alexandria, Dr Na'im Abu Talib.

The assistant socialist public prosecutor stated before the court of values that the former governor of Alexandria, Dr Na'im Abu Talib, made an exception in the

case of Alexandria, Dr Na'im Abu Talib, made an exception in the case of Rashad 'Uthman and gave him three apartments in al-Ma'murah, one for him, another for his brother and a third for his father.

In response to that charge, Na'im Abu Talib, former governor of Alexandria, told AL-AHRAR:

"The governor has the right to allocate a share of apartments. Although the al-Murah Company belongs to the public sector, it has the freedom to act, because it belongs to the Ministry of Housing, and the governor has the right to make exceptions in any apartment allocations in cases which he considers merit that. The prices of these apartments come to 70,000 pounds, which means that demand for them is slight."

Mr Na'im said, "I am wounded, and I regret having worked for the government."

A Charge against the Port Director

Counsellor Husni 'Abd-al-Hamid, the assistant socialist public prosecutor, directed an accusation against Maj Gen Jalal Fahmi, director of the Port of Alexandria Authority and National Party secretary in Alexandria.

The assistant socialist public prosecutor said that the Port of Alexandria Authority had given Rashad 'Uthman a concession in part of the port that is devoted to the lumber trade.

Maj Gen Jalal Fahmi, director of the port authority, told AL-AHRAR, in response to this charge:

"The allocation of a space of 3,150 square meters in the port for Rashad 'Uthman's company was made because his company's activity was unloading /cargoes/ in accordance with Ministerial Decree 1060 for 1978, as was true with his colleagues in the port, who own 18 companies which obtained work inside the port in accordance with the ministerial decree and its provisions. These include the Artesan Company, which obtained 2,000 square meters. These areas were allocated to companies, among them Rashad 'Uthman's, in accordance with the decree of the port authority's board of directors, and he pays rent at once for the entire area he occupies."

11887

CSO: 4504/150

NEW PRESS COUNCIL FORMED, EXPRESSES COMMITMENT TO FREE SPEECH

Cairo Al-AKHBAR in Arabic 9 Dec 81 pp 1, 2

/Article: "Formation of the Supreme Press Council Bureau"/

/Text/ The members of the Supreme Press Council gave their legal oath yesterday, stressing that they would protect the freedom and independence of the press. In addition the council's bureau committee was formed. Winning the positions of vice-chairmen were Muhammad 'Abd-al-Jawad, chairman of the board of the Middle East News Agency, and Salah Jala', head of the Journalists' Union, while Sabri Abu-al-Majd, former editor in chief of AL-MUSAWWAR, won the position of secretary general and Jalal 'Isa, assistant editor in chief of AL-AKHBAR, the position of assistant secretary general of the council.

The Supreme Council held its meeting yesterday under the chairmanship of Dr Subhi 'Abd-al-Hakim, chairman of the Consultative Assembly and the Supreme Press Council. At the session, which was devoted to procedures, he declared that in accordance with Article 17 of the council's executive bill, which stipulates that the council chairman is to declare the victory of the candidates by recommendation if only the requisite number nominates itself within the specified period, the following won: Muhammad 'Abd-al-Jawad and Salah Jalal, council vice chairmen; Sabri Abu-al-Majd, secretary general; and Jalal 'Isa, assistant secretary general.

The Council chairman said, "I greet the members of the bureau committee and wish them success and good fortune." Sabri Abu-al-Majd also spoke in the name of the winners, and praised the council's precious confidence in the bureau committee members, who have committed themselves to strive to raise the status of the press and the nation. The bureau committee held a meeting under the chairmanship of Dr Subhi 'Abd-al-Hakim after the conclusion of the board meeting.

The members of the Supreme Press Council gave the legal oath at the beginning of the session in accordance with Article 63 of the executive bill of the Press Powers Law. The oath stipulates: "I swear by almighty God to observe the interests of the nation, to perform the duties of my membership in the council truthfully and honestly, and to protect the freedom and independence of the press in its pursuit of its powers and mission in the context of the basic values of society and in accordance with the constitution, the law and the provisions of the executive bill of the Supreme Press Council."

The oldest member, Hafiz Mahmud, began by reading the oath. He was followed by Samir Rajab, the youngest member, then the remaining members of the council, except for those who had excused themselves from appearing because of travel or illness--Tawfiq al-Hakim, Ihsan 'Abd-al-Qaddus, 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Sharqawi, Muhammad Zaki 'Abd-al-Qadir, Dr Hasan Hamdi and Muhammad Hanafi, chairman of the Information Department.

The second meeting of the council will be held next Tuesday, 15 December.

Supreme Press Council Stands in Mourning for the Late Leader

At the beginning of the Supreme Press Council session yesterday, the members stood for two minutes in mourning for the martyr Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat. The members read the opening chapter of the Koran in mourning the soul of the departed leader. Dr Subhi 'Abd-al-Hakim said that the late leader, who chaired the first meeting of the council after it was formed, expressed his appreciation for the family of the Egyptian press.

Press Organization Election Supervisory Committees Answer All Requests for Information.

The committees that have been formed to supervise elections to the boards of directors and general assemblies of the press organizations are answering all legal and objective requests for information bearing on the elections.

This was stated by Dr Subhi 'Abd-al-Hakim, chairman of the Consultative Assembly and chairman of the Supreme Press Council.

11887

CSO: 4504/150

BRIEFS

DEFENSE MINISTER RETURNS GIFT--Let Gen 'Abd-al-Halim Abu Ghazalah, the minister of defense and war production, refused to accept a gift presented to him by the graduates of the College of National Defense at Nasir Military Academy yesterday. He said "There are instructions prohibiting the acceptance of gifts, and I am handing the gift over to the academy." /Text/ /Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 2 Dec 81 p 1/

DRAFT COMMISSIONS LAW--Counsellor Ahmad Samir Sami, the minister of justice, is preparing a draft law on commissions. This includes a prohibition on the grant of all illegal commissions, a total prohibition of commissions in contracts on armaments, nuclear plants, and supply transactions which the government finances with easy loans, the recording of legal commissions in contracts so that it will be possible to hold the people who receive them accountable for tax purposes, and the adoption of decisive measures against violators. The ministry has received some memoranda from the ministries in the economic group regarding their opinions on this subject. A committee has been formed to prepare the necessary studies for the new draft, including the provisions of the commercial law which does not permit government employees to receive commissions, be they public employees or employed in the public sector. Even people working in private sector companies cannot receive such commissions because in all cases the employees are not commercial agents and are working not independently but on behalf of the entity where they are employed, as part of their employment activities. The administrations of the entities where they work should reward them for the exceptional efforts they may have exerted within the limits of the financial rules these entities enforce. Commissions which government employees receive from the parties with which they reach contracts can be described only in one fashion, as bribes, even if they are paid after the work is completed. /Text/ /Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 26 Dec 81 p 1/ 11887

CSO: 4504/150

KHOMAYNI MODERATES VIEWS ON UNIVERSITIES, DISSIDENTS

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 24 Jan 82 p 1

[Text] Officials of the Reconstruction Crusade, scholars of the Judicial College at Qom, representatives of female students from high schools at Qom, a group of scholars from the clerical college at Kashan, Revolutionary Guard commanders nationwide and a group from the Red Crescent of the Islamic Republic of Iran met with the Imam of the nation this morning at Jamaran.

During this meeting a special hymn was recited by university students and then, in turn, Hejjat el-Eslam Khalkhalki, Seyyed Heseyn Taheri and Haj Abdollah Nuri, the Imam's Reconstruction Crusade representative, presented reports to the Imam of the nation.

During his statements afterwards, Imam Khomeyni, leader of the revolution and founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, touched on several basic domestic and foreign problems, saying:

"Overcoming the shortages of judges and missionaries is an important problem and it must be surmounted through the efforts of scholars and seminary clerics."

The Imam then alluded to the war and said: "First of all we think the war is an important problem for us but it is clear that the benefits of this war have for us been greater than the loses. The spirit of mutual assistance and self-sacrifice of all our people has become a reality and thus has made the world realize that the problem in Iran is different from all other problems. God willing, this war will end soon in victory." The Hope of the World's Deprived then turned to the problems of hoarding and profiteering. He said that everyone must be equitable and show consideration for the plight of the oppressed.

Then he addressed the report of Hejjat el-Eslam Nuri, his representative in the Reconstruction Crusade. He stressed: "These reports and statistics are very satisfying and we hope the activity of this institution will increase and there will be greater attention given the peasants and the deprived who have historically been neglected. I also thank all the members of this institution and hope Mr Nuri, who has joined its ranks, will, together with the effort of the other brethren, resolve the difficulties at hand."

Regarding the reopening of the universities, the Imam said: "This problem is in the process of being solved. I must complain about certain newspapers because some of their headlines have been in contradiction to what I have said on this matter. We say that the universities should be reopened so long as they are not Islamized. I reprove these papers for holding me responsible for these statements. My subsequent statements are addressed to the members of the Center for Cultural Revolution, who take their job too seriously."

The Imam of the Nation then said: "When the universities are reopened, the path of penitence will be open for male and female students who are not corrupters but who have done wrong. Their penitence shall be accepted before God and they must be admitted to the universities to serve the country and the nation."

The Imam repeated that serious effort must be made to reopening the universities which clearly must have Islamic curricula.

In concluding his address, the Imam of the Nation pointed to the difficulties of Muslim countries by saying: "Whatever has befallen Muslims up to now has been from the superpowers and the lack of unity and accord among Muslims. National leaders and Muslims scholars of all countries must take note of who is an enemy and who is a friend, and they can surmount these difficulties through unity and mutual assistance."

CSO: 4640/148

'RAPPROCHEMENT' BETWEEN U. S., KHOMEYNI REGIME REPORTED

Paris IRAN LIBRE in French 18 Jan 82 pp 1-2

[Text] For almost a month, strange rumors have been circulating. It is reported that there have been negotiations between the Islamic Republic and the United States, the cost of which would be borne by the Soviet Union.

Three developments, taken at random from the news reports by overly hasty observers, underlie these rumors:

At the end of the month of December, a military mission visited Washington to negotiate the purchase by Iran of new weapons and replacement parts.

Several days later it was rumored that the Khomeyni regime had decided to hunt down the communists.

Parallel with this, some said that the Kremlin had decided to resume its sales of weapons to Iraq, definitely taking sides with Saddam Hussein in the dispute between Baghdad and Tehran.

Now to date, Washington has not confirmed that the United States will sell weapons to the Islamic Republic. Thus one cannot speak now of a rapprochement between the Khomeyni regime and the Americans.

Let us presume that the deal has finally been struck. Whom would it benefit? It has to do with very sophisticated weapons which could only be used at present by highly trained officers. Everyone is well aware of the mullahs' mistrust of these high level cadres. Thus if a transaction is arranged, it will hardly be between the United States and the Islamic Republic, but rather between the Americans and the Iranian Army.

Now let us consider the reported decision by the Kremlin to provide Iraq with weapons again. If such a decision has in fact been made, it could not in any case have any special importance. It would at best represent one trade operation among many others, involving a market which the USSR won long ago.

As to the hunt for the communists, a decision reportedly made despite the opposition of the Tudeh Party membership, it would in no way represent a break between

the forces subverting the Khomeyni regime and the Third International. For communism has access to vastly more effective means than the Tudeh, which is but one of the gears (doubtless one of the smallest) in the pro-Soviet war machine in Iran. Everyone in our country knows that the Tudeh, its credibility gone, no longer serves any purpose. The party's leaders themselves know this. There are many Iranian observers who believe that in reality, Moscow and the Khomeyni regime have agreed on the need to eliminate the Tudeh, which has become too much of a burden because of its bad reputation, so as to base their de facto alliance on another foundation. This is a possibility which should be considered more frequently in the West.

Whatever the case may be, the USSR has too many interests in Iran, and has had for too long a time, to justify overly hasty conclusions from events mistakenly interpreted by Western commentators.

The Russians have dreamed for centuries of annexing Persia. This dream survived the socialist revolution to perpetuate itself in the expansionist strategy of Soviet Marxism. There have always been in our country, under all regimes and in every era, agents of Russia--whether red or white--acting both individually and within the framework of associations, groups or parties, aided and manipulated by Moscow.

The Kremlin maintains a solid and diversified base in the Islamic Republic. Some of these forces, such as the Tudeh and the fedayeen, are in open and direct contact with Moscow. Others, such as the Organization of the Mujahadin of the People, maintain indirect and underground relations with the Soviets. Still others control the levers of command within the Khomeyni regime itself. For example, the president of the republic, Ali Khamenei and his brother, Musavi, the prime minister, are, along with their sympathizers, notoriously pro-Soviet.

The USSR and the Islamic Republic, accused of collusion, and suspected day after day of converting the regime into a people's republic, are seeking to bring about change. They are trying to conceal their close links, but no one should allow himself to be deceived by this crude camouflage.

Never has Soviet influence in Iran been so real.

5157

CSO: 4619/42

NEW ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS REPORTED

Iron Ore from India

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 16 Jan 82 p 15

[Text] To study the agreement signed between Iran and India concerning the purchase of iron ore from India, a commission from the Islamic Republic of Iran will travel to that country. The economic correspondent of KEYHAN spoke with the deputy minister for mines and exploration of the Ministry of Mines and Metals concerning the details of the above-mentioned agreement.

Engineer Jurabchian, the deputy minister for mines and exploration of the Ministry of Mines and Metals, said in this regard to our correspondent: During the period 21 Mar 75-20 Mar 76, agreements were signed as follows between the governments of Iran and India, on the one hand, and between the National Iranian Steel Company (formerly the Steel Industries) and the newly established Indian "Kudermukh" Company, on the other:

1. Payment of \$630 million by the government of Iran to India at an interest rate of 2.5 percent to invest in and equip one of the iron ore mines in southern India.
2. Purchase of 7.5 million tons of purified and polished iron ore annually and 150 million tons by the National Iranian Steel Company from the Indian "Kudermukh" Company over a period of 20 years for use in the Ahvaz and Bandar 'Abbas steel complexes.

He added: Before the victory of the Islamic revolution of Iran, the amount of \$255 million of the intended loan had been paid in accordance with the agreement between the parties. Since then, however, because of differences with the Indian party concerning additional investments over and above the amount agreed upon and also because of the victory of the Islamic revolution of Iran, this issue has been suspended. Also, because of the imposed war of Iran and Iraq

and the transfer of the Bandar 'Abbas steel project to Mobarekeh, Esfahan, no iron ore has been delivered from that country to Iran. Engineer Jurabchian added: After the victory of the Islamic revolution, talks were held with the government of India concerning this agreement; but, because of certain articles within this agreement which are not in the best interests of Iran, these talks have not achieved any results.

He added: Recently, some correspondence has taken place through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of that country with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran concerning the solution to this problem and the continuation of the agreement. Since the government of Iran would like to have good relations with India, it has been determined that a commission should go to India from the government of the Islamic Republic within the next few days.

Concerning the issues which will be discussed by the Iranian commission, he said: The basis of the negotiations of the commission will center around the agreement in such a way as to satisfy both parties. This commission will also make an effort to amend those articles in the agreement which are not in the best interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

In conclusion, the deputy minister for mines and exploration of the Ministry of Mines and Metals added that, considering the existing good relations between Iran and India, we are sure that the government of the Republic of India, noting the interests of the two countries in expanding their relationship, will cooperate with the Iranian commission to solve these problems.

Reconstruction Crusade Budget

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 16 Jan 82 p 12

[Text] Brother Afshar, a member of the central council of the construction crusade, announced this statement concerning the budget of the construction crusade for next year in a press conference: The planning policy of the construction crusade has been 100 percent in keeping with the budget policy of the government of the Islamic Republic, last year having received 50 billion rials and this year more than 60 billion rials from the government. With a budget of nearly 100 billion rials, the construction crusade is one of the largest implementary organizations in the country, which can certainly play a great role in the elimination of the economic problems of the country.

He added: The government of the Islamic Republic, noting the importance of the role of the construction crusade in economic issues, has approved a budget of 84 billion rials for next year through the Economic Council.

Brother Afshar, pointing out that the requested budget of the crusade from the government of the Islamic Republic was about twice the above-mentioned figure, expressed hope that the Majlis will be able to amend the approved budget and provide the construction crusade with the resources for more production and activities. Responding to the question of the correspondent of the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC NEWS AGENCY who asked, given the unlimited budget for war activities, how much of the budget of the construction crusade for last year was allocated to behind the front activities, the member of the supervisory council of the construction crusade said: The budget for war activities of the crusade last year was an amount of about 15 billion rials. Considering this figure, 20 billion rials have been allocated for next year. After the war, this amount will be spent to rebuild the rural section of the war torn regions.

In continuation, in response to another correspondent of the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC NEWS AGENCY who asked, noting the importance of the plan for rural identity cards, how much progress has been made on this project in the planning of the authorities of the country, brother Afshar said: The rural identity card, which, in fact, is considered a statistics move in the Islamic Republic, was prepared in the shortest possible time at a cost of about 170 million rials. He added: These identity cards will be ready in a month and by categorizing them, the national authorities will be able to carry out essential planning in the villages on the basis of more accurate statistics.

He added: The information on the rural identity cards will be fed into the computers, to be examined and updated every so often.

In response to the question of what issues were discussed in his recent meeting with national authorities, he said: The future programs of the crusade, especially the role of the crusade in the Islamic Republic, its budgetary problems, coordination of the crusade with government organizations, and the issue of the charter were the most important issues discussed with the authorities. In these areas, we benefited from the views and guidance of our brothers. He added: The national authorities also mutually expected that we make the construction crusade a strong lever dependent on the general policies of the government so that they can solve national problems rapidly by relying on revolutionary, Islamic values. In response to another question, brother Afshar explained the priorities of the 21 Mar 82-20 Mar 83 budget of the construction crusade to include spreading Islamic culture in the villages, achieving self-sufficiency in the agricultural sector, providing water for irrigation, the relative comfort of villagers, support for job-creating industries, raising the level of sanitation awareness, and creating health care centers, as well as the reconstruction of the villages of the war zones.

At the end of this interview, concerning the views of the construction crusade about Paragraphs C and D and the land issue, he pointed out the experiences of brothers in the construction crusade dealing with the villagers in regards to the land and said: We believe that land should be at the disposal of those who are interested in working it. The authorities must put at their disposal other resources in addition to the land.

He added: Certainly, all those who think about Islam agree that a small number of landowners should not be the life, belongings, and even the family honor of our villagers. He emphasized that when the authorities of the Islamic Republic arrive at this conclusion, they will distribute the land of the large landowners among the oppressed villagers.

9593
CSO: 4640/135

EDUCATION BUDGET SCRUTINIZED IN SEMINAR

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 10 Jan 82 p 13

[Text] The seminar of department heads and experts responsible for the organization and budget of the general departments of education throughout the country opened yesterday morning at the Teachers' Club with the reading of several verses from the Holy Koran.

During the seminar, following the statements by the financial, administrative and parliamentary deputies of the Ministry of Education, views were exchanged regarding the classification and standards of organizational posts.

At the conclusion, brother Nowruzi, deputy minister for Financial Affairs of the Ministry of Education, while speaking with the KEYHAN correspondent about the objectives of this seminar, said: "Since the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran is considering submission of the proposed budget to the Majlis by 19 February, the Ministry of Education invited those responsible system, the elimination of unnecessary bureaucracy, the affairs of regional councils and related problems."

Regarding this year's proposed budget for education, he said: "The current budget is a proposed 506, 395, 500 rials while the developmental budget is a proposed 33, 375 billion rials."

In response to the question as to which regions have been given priority in the proposed budget, he replied: "Considering the fact that the government has often made it clear that it will give priority to deprived regions, in light of this policy the Ministry of Education in the proposed budget has a priority weighted toward the remote and deprived regions. And in this way we hope this ministry will pay its debt to the deprived, martyr-nuturing compatriots."

CSO: 4640/148

MULLAHS JOCKEYING FOR POSITION ON PEACE TALKS

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 54, 14 Jan 82 p 1, 2

[Text] The Tehran mullahs continued their denials of any moves to try to bring about a ceasefire in the war with Iraq this week. If anything they were more vehement on the question than before, and observers inside Iran said that, though they still did not doubt that some moves were under way, it was obvious the mullahs, at least, did not yet feel they had reached a serious bargaining position.

No peace negotiations would take place "as long as the consequences of the aggression still remain," their spokesmen insisted. They denied foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati had discussed peace moves on his visit to Damascus and Syrian foreign minister Khaddam, seemingly in response to pleas from Tehran, also denied any discussions on the subject had taken place.

Government spokesman Ahmad Tavakoli said boldly that it didn't matter if the whole world, never mind other Arab countries, were helping Iraq "for that won't frighten us and we'll beat them all."

But Tehran sources said these denials only proved the mullahs were not yet ready to have the Iranian people think any negotiations are under way. They pointed to reports that the Arab League had asked Turkey to take over the negotiations, and widespread ones that Syria had asked for this initiative because of the possible effects on the relations between Damascus and Tehran. Voice of Israel radio claimed that the Syrians had offered the Turks help in controlling Palestinian and other elements who had been mixing in Turkish politics.

Last weekend president Ali Khamenei elaborated on Iran's terms for what he called "sitting down to talk peace." He said first of all the Iraqi army should withdraw to its own territory, and "far enough from our border." Then, he stressed that "a competent international commission should investigate the whole affair, publicly identify the aggressor and determine sanctions against him." The question of compensating Iran for war damage, he added, would be embodied in the package of sanctions.

Khamenei refused to elaborate on his remarks other than to say that aggression was "an unacceptable state of affairs whose consequences must be eradicated." He then added, "We have the power to push the enemy back, so why not insist on our original terms?" When press representatives asked him to verify whether president Assad had

given up his peace moves, Khamenei retorted: "He has never raised the question of mediation with us and Mr Velayati's visit to Damascus had nothing to do with peace."

Tehran analysts said Khamenei was not telling the truth when he said Assad had not raised the question of peace moves with the Iranian authorities. Khamenei is obviously trying to keep his options open," the analysts said. "He may well try to bring up the question of a ceasefire with Iraq during the Unity Week now on, which was declared by Ayatollah Montazeri as a period during which all Muslims from various races and sects are invited to unite against Israel and America on the occasion of the birthday anniversary of the Prophet."

The analysts believe that Ayatollah Khomeini himself has not yet spoken on the peace prospects because as the top leader he does not wish to implicate himself yet in an affair which could be regarded as a sell-out. "Khomeini has a habit of keeping silent when an important matter is under consideration," they said, pointing to the fact that he had made no significant public speeches for a relatively long time.

"People like Khamenei and Rafsanjani are expendable," the analysts said. "But Khomeini himself is top; if he has preferred to let his underlings talk about the peace, then the issue has not reached its final stage."

According to the analysts the mullahs are waiting for recent developments in the Arab world to clarify before they adopt a final position. Meanwhile, they are trying to push for the best bargain they can strike.

If the Iranian regime is forced to accept a peace package falling short of its original terms then there is a possibility of an intensification of the ongoing power struggle between Khamenei on the one hand, and Majlis speaker Hashemi Rafsanjani, together with former prime minister Mahdavi-Kani, on the other, each side trying to put the blame on the other.

Analysts in Tehran who are in touch with the IPS have so far failed to assess the army's feelings on Assad's peace move. The top military brass are known to be apprehensive about the possibility of yet another purge in their ranks once the war is over. They also fear that if the mullahs accept a "shameful" peace accord they may try to shift the responsibility for it onto the army and in the process dismiss or even execute some top commanders.

CSO: 4600/238

POWER STRUGGLE GOES ON BEHIND SCENES

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 54,14 Jan 82 p 2, 3

[Text] The two opposing factions within Iran's ruling clergy last week briefly resumed their squabbles, but later shelved their differences mainly through Ayatollah Khomeini's personal intervention, according to reliable informants in Tehran.

The rift between the Mussavi group, led by president Ali Khamenei on one side, and the Qom theological group, led by Majlis speaker Hashemi-Rafsanjani and former premier Mahdavi-Kani on the other, has been going on for some time. But two months ago both factions arrived at a kind of stand-off when Khomeini warned them of the dangers of a Royalist putsch. Khomeini also assigned his heir apparent, Hossein Ali Montazeri, to act as an arbiter.

While the two sides were seemingly mending their relations Montazeri went on to reconcile warring factions with the ranks of the revolutionary guards, and also worked out a formula to create a better working relationship between revolutionary guards and revolutionary judges.

In the meantime, Khamenei began to consolidate his own personal power base. He ordered his prime minister and members of the cabinet to get to work on such major tasks as compiling the budget and development plan, as well as export-import policies. He then, significantly, advised the cabinet to avoid attending Majlis committees.

For his part Rafsanjani got down to work to establish the supremacy of the Majlis over the executive branch. He even issued orders to set up a para-military force, to be known as the Majlis guard, to function under the command of the speaker of the Majlis, meaning himself.

Around 2 weeks ago Rafsanjani appeared to realise that while the stand-off continued the other side was gradually gaining more ground. He was particularly alarmed at the way the cabinet ministers went about their jobs ignoring the parliament, in obedience to Khamenei's edict.

He, therefore, convened a private session of Majlis deputies in which he complained that the government was acting as if it was not accountable to the parliament and worse, it was putting off implementation of the legislation approved by the Majlis, giving preference to enforcing cabinet decrees. Rafsanjani made sure that a short account of his speech was leaked outside, though he knew that the press would not print it.

Khamenei was forced to reply. He wrote a letter to Rafsanjani asking for "explanation." Rafsanjani explained that he did not wish to engage in "correspondence" with "brother Khamenei," and that he simply wanted members of the cabinet, "whose legitimacy depends on the vote of confidence of the Majlis, to come to the parliament and stand accountable to the "highest institution" in the republic.

However, as the Muslim Unity Week marking the birth of the Prophet, began last Friday both factions accepted a temporary ceasefire. But outstanding issues are yet to be sorted out. Characteristically, Khomeini has decided to sit on the fence.

Contrary to earlier press reports many observers on the scene say differences between the two factions do not stem from significant differences over ideology or even policies. So it is misleading to call one faction hardliners and the other moderates. The whole thing is a power struggle pure and simple, they say. Khamenei is a highly ambitious man who intends to merge his governmental power with his clerical status and become, in time to come, the sole strongman of the country; while the other side intends to create a clerical overlord above the head of the government machinery.

The faction led by Rafsanjani has reportedly the support of the Qom theologians, including Montazeri, as well as part of the bazaar. It also theoretically holds the purse strings and can vote the government out of power because it enjoys a majority in the Majlis.

Khamenei, on the other hand, operates the wheels of the government machinery, although the revolutionary guards and courts function independently, and can, if need be, provide a parallel administrative machinery.

Yet, neither side can move against the other in any decisive way without Khomeini's approval. In a sense Khomeini holds what could be called the casting vote, though he cannot force the two sides to sincerely give up their differences and to work together.

Some analysts believe that Khomeini has skilfully kept the two sides balanced while allowing them to keep their squabbles running because he does not want the situation to stabilise. In a strange way Khomeini is a vital factor in keeping the machinery of theocracy together; yet, he is dubious about the need for full stabilisation of his regime. Analysts believe he fears that once he allows the mullahs to settle down to a stable life they would be a sitting duck for would-be plotters.

CSO: 4600/238

MUSLIM UNITY CAMPAIGN REPORTEDLY AROUSES LITTLE INTEREST

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 54, 14 Jan 82 pp 3, 4

[Text] Muslim Unity Week in Iran brought new attacks on nationalism from the leading clergy and claims that it was "a barrier to Islam" and divisive. Khomeini felt nationalism was the most powerful enemy of Islam, but later qualified his concept of nationalism in case Iranians misconstrued it as synonymous with patriotism.

Ayatollah Montazeri said unity among Muslims could destroy all plots hatched by the Americans, a theme caught up, too, by Majlis Speaker Hashemi Rafsanjani, who urged the time had come for the oil embargo weapon to be used against America and the Zionists.

But Tehranis contacted this week reported little interest in the campaign. Some saw it as yet one more sign that the mullahs were trying to soften up the public to accept a peace settlement in the interests of a united Muslim front against Israel.

"I think the mullahs are beginning to realise that the Golan Heights are of far more concern to Syria and the other Arabs, too, than is the fate of the government in Tehran," a Paris observer commented. "That has sent a shiver up their spines when they realise how much they might need Syria and Libya if they want to survive. The spectre of sacrifice looms for them."

The only foreign delegations on the spot for the opening of the week, according to monitored radio reports, seemed to be one of Iraqi dissidents and another from Lebanese Shi-ites. Tehran sent its own missions to Pakistan and India.

Confirmation of the lack of enthusiasm shown by Iranians for the Unity Week came from no less an authority than Khomeini himself when he spoke to clergymen from Gilan province, never a strong centre of the clergy. The news he heard from there had obviously upset him and he wondered aloud why the people bothered to read anything other than the Qoran, which dealt with everything of importance.

The leader of Friday prayers in Rasht, a mullah named Ehsanbakhsh, had reported to the ayatollah that his area was suffering a shortage of mullahs--a statement that must have rocked Iranians, who are said to damage vast numbers of television sets through throwing hard objects at them as the mullahs continue to hog the screens. Khomeini replied that the shortage of clergymen was due to the fact that "the son and the father," a reference to the late Shah and his father, would not allow them to be created.

The same shortage of mullahs was blamed by Montazeri, on another occasion during the week, for the problems relating to law and order. In recent weeks there have been widespread complaints of sudden snooping raids on homes as religious thugs checked for card parties and other immoral activities. Montazeri said the trouble was that there were "very few mullahs to enforce the law." He did not say whether he meant snooping and other activities were only legal when superintended or carried out by mullahs.

CSO: 4600/238

FORMER PLAN ORGANIZATION EMPLOYEES HIT AT MUSSAVI

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 54, 14 Jan 82 pp 4, 7

[Text] The battle of words between Iran's ruling mullahs and the centrist opposition groups took an interesting twist last week as a group claiming to be former employees of the Plan Organisation who now belong to the clandestine Iran Civil Servants Association wrote an open letter to prime minister Hussein Mussavi calling him "a liar and a traitor."

The letter was a reply to a statement by Mussavi, broadcast by Tehran radio on 2 January, in which he claimed that before the Islamic government came to power "the experts at the Plan Organisation took orders from America and drew up economic plans which served the interests of the imperialists as well as a tiny group of rich Iranians." Mussavi then said that only now was the organisation acting independently.

"You made your accusations and had them read out over the radio and television. They will also be printed in the papers. Our letter is an attempt to reply to those accusations and we would like to know whether you have the courage to let this reply be broadcast by the radio and printed in the papers," the open letter said. "If the media features our letter only once, next time we will put names and addresses on our letters."

The letter then goes on to say: "You made a categorical accusation that the Plan Organisation had been a tool of imperialists and American interests since its inception. You said that many planning experts were hired by imperialists and so they served imperialists rather than the Iranians. You also said that those who were anti-American had no chance to make positive contributions and so remained inactive.

"You praised those experts who were inactive during the past regime while claiming that all those who were then active represented American interests or interests of corrupt Iranians. You boasted that Islamic cadres had purged all those experts who represented America.

"Well, as usual, like you turbaned masters, you fail to back up your wholesale accusations by evidence. You just go on defaming respected and honest Iranians without ever giving them a chance to defend themselves. But this time we will not let you go unchallenged. This does not mean that your lies are worthy of our concern; it simply means that we want to expose you as a liar and traitor in case some simple-hearted people may still have doubts about your lies.

"Since it is possible that you may be ignorant of Iran's recent history let us start from the year 1326-27 (1948) when the Plan Organisation was set up. At that time Americans had no influence in Iran. Some patriotic Iranians believed the best way to develop the economy was to plan for it. But because of a lack of funds the P.O. was not able to perform any service and it simply lingered on. Apart from lack of money, there were problems of political confusion and lack of stability.

"Then in 1329 (1950) Prince Abdol Reza Pahlavi, who had studied economics at Harvard University in America, showed an interest in our work and became honorary president of the organisation. You might like to call his presidency an American connection but let us give you some basic education about Americans. Well, planned economy is a socialistic way while Americans are capitalists. They believe in free enterprise. Prince Abdol Reza's interest in P.O. was simply his personal interest and had nothing to do with Americans. His schooling in America does not make him an American spy. Anyway he left the P.O. in 1953.

"In 1954, with the increased oil revenues, there was capital to finance some large development projects. The P.O. president at that time was able to secure additional financing from the World Bank. At this juncture we see a new turn in the policies and administration of the P.O., which may constitute a swing to doing things the American way.

"The World Bank, which is an international body partially under U.S. government influence, sent advisers who were Americans. Also some American firms were contracted to advise us on drawing up big projects, such as the Karaj, Dez and Sepidrud dams, as well as highways. There were also consultant and construction firms from other countries which came to Iran to help us build dams, highways and other works.

"At this time the P.O. was engaged in realisation of the Second Seven-Year Plan. The first Seven-Year Plan never got off the drawing board because of political unrest and lack of expertise and money, to which we referred above. Under the second plan we built some dams and roads but above all we turned the P.O. into a powerful brains trust.

"By the time the seven-year term of the Second Plan came to an end several hundred young and well-educated Iranians, some graduates of foreign universities, were on the staff of the P.O. But before going any further let us tell you and your masters that with the conclusion of the Second Plan all forms of American cultural influence at the P.O. ended. The Second Plan was not a comprehensive programme of economic and social development. It was a collection of individual and not so well coordinated projects. But for its time, the Second Plan was a major event since it put the engine of progress in motion.

"In drawing up the Third Plan we decided to present a fully comprehensive document in which all sectors of the social and economic life were to receive due attention. But we faced with an economic recession and some political agitation. At that time the Central Bank, newly set up, and the Ministry of Finance took the initiative away from us and with the help of the International Monetary Fund implemented a programme for the stabilisation of the economy. Once that programme was concluded the late Shah initiated a package of reform measures known as the White Revolution. Two years later His Majesty came to an agreement with the Soviet Union to sell gas to finance a number of basic industrial projects, including a steel mill. All

these measures, which transformed the basis of our social and economic life, were adopted independently of our work. In fact, we were looking hard to adapt our planning according to those developments. We liked everything to be done through our office but the process of development was moving faster than our planning resources could cope with.

"This does not mean that what was happening outside the P.O. was against our wish. It only means that other organs of the government were becoming conscious of the process of development and in many instances the P.O. was providing management skills and top executives. We had accumulated a pool of talent and expertise which could help the country.

"All this time we succeeded in convincing the government that they should think scientifically, set out priorities in allocation of resources, budget in a modern way and set targets for success. This may sound a kind of acceptance of Western methods. But we are proud of our achievements because this was the only way we could break out of the backwardness in which we were imprisoned. For your information we must say that in all these efforts there was no trace of imperialistic influence. Indeed, we had not a single foreign adviser. Sometimes we would benefit by studies done on our orders abroad but we were our own masters and everything we did and achieved was through our own work and for the good of the nation. We now know that we had an excellent programme.

"Later we arrived at the Fourth Plan, which was the best document for an orderly development. By then we had all the essential elements of a modern society. Of course there were mistakes, bottlenecks, some sort of social displacements and corruption. But these are inevitable parts of a fast-moving society. The important thing is that we had set the country on a correct and progressive course and lived in a society full of hopes and dynamism. We intend to end this matter and leave discussion of the Fifth Plan to a second letter. But we must add the following.

"This concerns a direct reply to your charges that we were willingly or unwillingly in the service of foreigners. We have said that after the Second Plan there was no foreign influence in our office. It is on you to prove your charges. Yet we make it easy for you by giving the following account.

"If between 1953 and 1963 you see a thread of Western and specifically American influence, it was not a kind of subjugation but rather a kind of admiration for a more advanced civilisation. Also, those years were marked by the global cold war and our nation had been wise to choose a good side in the cold war. The West (America) helped us to get rid of Russian soldiers and puppets--in Azarbaijan. We could not remain neutral because Russia was on our doorstep waiting to jump in. But as soon as we were strong we modified our policy. All along we were so independent that we got the Russian steel mill, Japanese chemical plants, German bus and British car plants and so on. That is the correct way towards progress and modernisation. It can hardly be imperialistic. In fact, it is since Mr Khomeini's arrival that Western and Eastern imperialism have had a good time in Iran. Because today Iran is so weak that not only is it an easy prey for Russia and America, but worse still, it is a surrogate of tiny little Syria. You and your turbanned masters would not understand our position because you have distorted and dirty minds; be-

cause you yourselves are liars and traitors you cannot understand our feelings. But we promise you that you will never succeed in selling our country to Syrians nor to their Russian masters."

The open letter has already provoked a vicious riposte from leftist sources, who have strongly condemned it and accused the writers of it of "reviving nostalgia and "Aryamehr" sentiments.

CSO: 4600/238

IRANIANS IN DIASPORA DESCRIBED

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 54,14 Jan 82 pp 7-10

[Text] John Renner, a senior producer and talks writer in the BBC Eastern Service, recently went to Paris and met former Iranian president Abolhassan Bani-Sadr. He found him, he wrote in last week's BBC magazine The Listener, spending much of his time writing a book explaining his view of why the revolution went wrong and "developing his theory that Ayatollah Khomeini's policies are based on alien intrusions of Hellenic philosophy rather than on true Islam."

Talk about Nero fiddling while Rome burns! Bani-Sadr implied to Renner that he regarded the executed Mojahedin supporters as having responded to his call to the Iranian people to resist Khomeini's government. Yet as their blood spills he sits in Paris trying to work out how the ancient Greeks have influenced Khomeini's thinking instead of trying to help them!

Is it any wonder that few Iranians have anything good to say about this eccentric son of a religious family, who is as medieval a type in his own way as his former patron Khomeini? Bani-Sadr never seems to have asked himself if at any stage since the revolution he has made any errors, never to have questioned his own judgment on any occasion. The God complex at work again....

Yet, if we can believe the evidence of some people who could have known what went on in Tehran at the time, it was Bani-Sadr who, after helping mastermind Khomeini's performance in the pre-revolutionary period, refused to agree to Mehdi Bazargan and Ibrahim Yazdi, two other leading revolutionary figures, discussing with Shahpour Bakhtiar some measures to try to save the situation before the destructive anarchy set in. He was determined that Khomeini should come to Iran and any restraining forces should be broken up.

Yet according to Renner, Bani-Sadr said he always opposed the dominance of the clergy in Iran and that he was elected to the presidency precisely for that reason. "The people did not vote for me because I was close to Khomeini," he was quoted as saying. "On the contrary they voted because they did not want the dominance of the mullahs."

If that is the case, one cannot forbear to ask, then how is it the people did not come out in his support when he was deposed? He says the Mojahedin came out in response, but most people saw their move as inevitable in the face of the mullahs' attacks on them.

But Bani-Sadr's naivete borders on the incredible when he tells Renner that the bulk of the army is on his side..."but I am not at all in favour of the army going into political action."

"One doesn't want to govern at no matter what price," he is reported to have said. "To re-make, re-establish, a military regime in Iran would be to re-commence an experiment that has already failed. In no circumstances, then, would I give my agreement for such an enterprise."

Those remarks verge on lunacy. They imply, from one aspect, that it is better to continue with black oppression and slaughter of the innocents rather than let the military stop it if they had the mind; it also suggests that Bani-Sadr is so utterly naive, too, about Western attitudes that he thinks to appear a real democrat he must spurn use of the military even to save lives or the country.

He apparently does not realise he is contradicting his claim that the bulk of the army supports him--that he is afraid they might move and put someone into power who has no sympathy with Bani-Sadr. Since the former president's intransigence in those fateful days before the final debacle must have contributed very considerably to the humiliation of the military this could be a reasonable fear.

Poor Bani-Sadr seems to be a completely lost cause, stringing along with the Mojahedin who make no secret of the fact that his only value to them is that as former president they can use his "legitimacy" as head of state to give themselves some legitimacy, too.

Did it never occur to him that his mindless campaign of opposition to the mullahs when he was president could only lead to them getting rid of him, no matter how close he had once been to Khomeini? Can he point to any government in the world, never mind one made up of fanatical priests, that would put up with such a situation? Quite a number we know would have ensured he didn't fly out in a private aircraft to cogitate in comfortable exile on the alien philosophical influences that motivated his misguided opponents....

Whether he caught the infection from Bani-Sadr, living in such close quarters with him, or whether it's just endemic in all Iranians, Paris observers now see signs also in Rajavi's recent pronouncements that he is developing a touch of the same complex.

He and his organisation, the Mojahedin-e-Khalq, have begun to issue reckless claims over the numbers of executions in Iran which, in default of proper evidence, have begun to raise doubts among Western journalists who have been among Rajavi's most ardent supporters. His latest figure of 8,000 could, let's face it, turn out to be true, given the incredibly supine reaction of the Iranian public to the crimes the mullahs are committing against them; but one can't help asking oneself if, when one takes into account the casualties being incurred in the war, there would not be a massive public outburst if so many families were being bereaved.

The attitude of the mass of ordinary Iranians, indeed, goes a long way to confirm the theories of those who say that what happened in Iran in 1978 was not a revolution, but an uprising conjured up by outside forces in league with Iranian dissidents and foisted onto Iranians through Khomeini and the mullahs, who had foolishly been allowed to keep their influence with the Masses. The poor Shah even trusted the "friendly" mullahs whom he had been paying for years to keep the flock in order; surely, as an Iranian, he should have realised that when the foolish Jamshid

Amuzegar cut off their stipends the first instinct would be for the mullahs to bite the hand that had always fed them. It's the common reaction of longtime remittance men all over the world, not just in Iran.

The Mojahedin learned the value of exaggeration in the final months of the Shah's reign, though most of the Shah's opponents had found that a world public to whom the idea of absolute monarchy was anathema were very receptive to any accusations against a Shah who had the cheek to lecture them on the way they ran their hard-won freedoms from such a yoke. They continue them today, apparently without any realisation that they are killing the goose that helped lay the golden egg for them in 1978.

One example of the kind of stupid accusation they make against the Shah's regime was contained in a recent statement handed out along the route of a pro-monarchist demonstration in London. It said the Shah had killed thousands and that he had left behind 100,000 handicapped victims of his torturers.

Now Western pressmen who were at the scene when the Tehran regime gathered together a big group of disabled to show as Savak victims to hapless Third World worthies the United Nations sent to Iran in 1979 can vouch for the fact that these were largely drawn from registered disabled who had for many years been beneficiaries of the rapidly growing rehabilitation services under the Shah and who had probably never even seen a Savak man. The first "show" had to be called off because the "victims" had not been properly briefed; many openly stated the Shah had never hurt them and fierce rows broke out.

Later the UN delegates were shown a properly briefed crowd in the Hilton ballroom in Tehran and one of them, an Algerian, made an emotive speech with tears rolling down his cheeks. Not only was he being taken for a ride; but the UN was showing its cynical disregard for morality in allowing to represent them a man whom UN officials themselves later admitted in private had a reputation as erratic and even unbalanced. So the charade in Iran has been going on since the revolution and Iranians do nothing at all to rebut it.

Talking of rebuttal what has happened to the much vaunted new Iranian body for human rights set up in London recently? We haven't received a word from it yet, nor have we seen it gain one iota of publicity. If it is merely publishing in Persian, like other Iranian rights and political bodies seem to be doing, it will be wasting its efforts. For every Persian except perhaps Khomeini himself is well aware that all but a handful of Iranians today are low on civil and human rights.

Happily, the leftists at least have learned the lesson of the revolution and the benefit that can be obtained from providing information to foreigners and the foreign media if you want them to be sympathetic towards you. Not only in London, but in other countries in the West, too, they have begun to publish their own newspapers in various tongues.

In the British capital the Mojahedin-e-Khalq last week launched an English language weekly--or at least its supporters, the Muslim Students Society of Britain did in its name. On its front page it wrote, "It is our firm purpose that our publication will work for a more aware British reading public on Iran and its present medieval regime...."

If only all the opposition groups had thought of this three years ago perhaps there would be a more aware world public that would have expressed its voice to force governments to pursue a more courageous policy in attitude to the vicious slaughter in a country whose people used to be their good friends.

Another leftist students group, the Iranian Students Association (SETAD), said to be Maoist, has also published a four-page newsletter since the end of last year. Not only do these organisations have sufficient funds to be able to distribute their publications free of charge but they can also rely on their membership to put in many hours of volunteer effort every week in helping produce and distribute them. They do invite donations, however, but one can appreciate that the newsletters will still come out whether they get them or not.

The SETAD paper, by the way, after condemning Khomeini's killing of Bahais, went on to justify the charges by the mullahs against this sect as their pretext for killing them--another example of the Iranian Left's illogicality and limited awareness.

"During the Shah's reign Bahais held key positions in government and the army," it wrote. "Their close links with suspicious centres, foreign missionaries and advocating non-political life when there was not any "neutrality" in the Iranian people's life, are all the proofs of this "religion" acting against the interests of the whole Iranian nation." Which sums up exactly the charges on which Bahais are being executed in Iran these days--and implies that some sections of the Left, at least, are in favour of Khomeini's policy. It should be a warning to Iranians for the future.

Incidentally, Bani-Sadr, Mojahedin boss Rajavi and their newest ally Hedayat Matin-Daftari represent three significant sections of Iranian society. Bani-Sadr is from a mullah's family, Rajavi from the bazaari section and Matin-Daftari from the upper class. Matin-Daftari attended a well-known English public school, while the other two had their school education in Iran. Like all Iranians abroad they all dress rather nattily.

Matin-Daftari is now settled in Paris to start full-time campaigning. He is reported to be singing the praises of Bani-Sadr loudly. Since the trio Matin-Daftari is the only one that most people would bet on to be a sincere democrat it looks as if he is concerned, like the rest of us, over Rajavi's obvious tendencies towards autocratic, if not totalitarian leftist ideas; like the one that Iranians must have a political moratorium for some years before they are allowed to think about their futures .. leaving Rajavi and his inexperienced but apparently supremely knowledgeable and politically astute students to organise the lar... Sounds like things we have heard elsewhere.

CSO: 4600/238

FOREIGN EXCHANGE SITUATION 'ALARMING' SAYS LEFTIST JOURNAL

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 54, 14 Jan 82 pp 10, 11

[Text] The Mojahedin-e-Khalq London Weekly said last week that the equivalent of 1 billion was floating in Iranian markets without cover and it was thus worthless.

In an article on the financial crisis the mullahs are now facing it said: "Last July the U.S. administration deposited some \$1,050 million in the account of the Iranian Central Bank in its Dutch counterpart. Prior to this Iran's foreign exchange reserves were about \$1 billion less than the blocked reserves needed to cover the currency. The timely payment of the U.S. to the supposedly anti-Imperialist regime of Khomeini meant that in July the gap between the foreign exchange reserves and the currency reserves narrowed to a certain extent. But from July to September, 1981, the foreign exchange reserves decreased by \$800 million.

"In any case, in view of the fact that the minimal required currency reserves is in excess of \$3,800 million, then it is evident that the equivalent of \$2,000 million currency floating in the Iranian markets is without cover and therefore worthless.

"Last month the Central Bank's supervisory committee was finally forced to bring all the available gold in the country under its own control, in order to align itself with the international financial and monetary regulations. Thus the possibility of selling the gold in emergency situations is non-existent.

"If the regime is forced to sell the gold, it will have violated international regulations and therefore the sale of even an ounce of Iranian gold is a breach of law."

CSO: 00/238

PEOPLE TELL POLL OPINIONS ON VITAL ISSUES

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 16 Jan 82 p 5

[Poll taken by the Islamic Statistical Research Group of the Majlis Public Relations Office]

[Text] The Islamic Statistical Research Group of the Majlis Public Relations Office has proposed 21 questions concerning important political, economic, and social issues of the country and has asked the people to give their opinions on these issues. The authorities in charge of this poll have asked the people to answer these questions within a maximum of 10 days so that the results can be tabulated and analysed before the anniversary of the victory of the revolution.

In this connection, while getting acquainted with the activities of the Islamic Statistical Research Group, we asked the opinions of a group of people on the questions proposed by this group.

First, we spoke with one of the members of the Islamic Research Group about their activities and accomplishments to date. He said: "Our group has been in operation since the presidency of Bani-Sadr. However, when this group was first established, we did not want our ties with the Majlis to be obvious, since we felt that our actions could be used to discredit the Majlis. We carried out several projects under the heading of the Islamic Statistical Research Group (student institution). The new project of 21 questions, which will be carried out on the occasion of the anniversary of the revolution, is the first project which will be officially carried out in the name of the Majlis. The polling projects which we carry out are done in the following manner. Usually, we choose several subjects after preliminary studies and propose them to the leadership committee of the Majlis. After they make a decision, they choose one subject for us to poll. Or the leadership committee of the Majlis chooses a subject to be polled and after proposing the questions, we carry out the project. After the data have been collected, the Research Group

will write an analysis to present to the leadership committee of the Majlis. In this way, they become familiar with the opinions and wishes of the people, which have been collected by our group and distributed among the representatives." Concerning the projects that have thusfar been carried out by the Islamic Statistical Research Group, he said:

"Our first project concerned the war, for which a poll was taken in greater Tehran and its divisions. The next project concerned the Majlis and its work, which was carried out in the spring. For this project, about 18-22,000 questionnaires were distributed. The difficulties in carrying out this project concerned going to people's homes and filling out the questionnaires. We received effective responses to about half the questionnaires distributed. I must add that an effective response is one in which the respondent's personal data is completely filled out. Then we carried out two projects together. These two projects concerned the issues of housing and the bill for political parties. There was a greater response to the housing project since it was more of a social issue. The Housing Commission, the Housing Foundation, and some of the other institutions used the results. We had two other projects, about the people's elected president and his popularity and about the people's expectations concerning different phases in Tehran, which were not carried out because of the explosions at the office of the Islamic Republican Party and the Prime Minister's Office.

"After these explosions, another project concerning the explosions and assassinations was carried out in the fall. First, in implementing this project, a text was prepared, which we took to the people's homes and asked them to call and tell us over the telephone their opinions about the explosions and assassinations. The method for implementing this project was proposed by university professors. However, because Tehran is widespread and since, in certain areas, there are no public telephones, the telephone method failed. Instead, we put the questionnaires in stamped envelopes and distributed them among the homes to be filled out and returned. This project was quite successful. Another project concerned the people's expectations of the new president and Cabinet, which was carried out during the presidency of Mr Khameneh'i, and the results were given to the leadership committee of the Majlis."

The member of the Islamic Statistical Research Group, concerning the project for the anniversary of the revolution, which is being implemented in the form of 21 questions, said: "We proposed these questions for the occasion of the anniversary of the revolution. To carry out this project, we are contacting the people through letters and distributing questionnaires in some of the offices as well as publishing them in the newspapers. Of course, our main operation is by correspondence, since the responses of the people of Tehran represent the opinions of all the people of Tehran. The responses

of office employees will document the opinions of employees. Separate analyses of each result will be prepared and given to the leadership committee of the Majlis."

In your opinion, what are the most important resolutions of the Majlis to date and what is the most important issue that the Majlis must address in the future? We put these two questions, which are included in the proposal of the Research Group, to a group of people in various parts of the city and asked for their opinions. It must be pointed out that responding to these questions required time and thought. Most of the people we asked were passersby and believed that their responses required a review of what had been ratified by the Majlis and being up to date in the news. Nevertheless, the people mentioned the issues which were important to them, which they considered as necessary for the revolution regardless of whether they had been ratified or not. Let us look at these views together.

Rahim Dara'i, who is in the production business on Hanifnezhad Street, was questioned. He said: "In my opinion, most of what has been ratified by the Majlis is good; but I do not remember anything in particular at this time. But I hope that the Majlis will ratify Paragraph C and Article 44 of the Constitution, because by solving these two problems, much progress will be made. Meanwhile, the most important accomplishment of the Majlis is that it has gained the confidence of the people in theocratic rule and for this reason, it has gained more authority."

Valiollah Javan, a fruit juice seller sitting at his place of business, said: "I don't know much about what goes on in the Majlis, but I would like to ask the representatives of the Majlis to do something about unemployment by creating jobs for the jobless."

Ja'far Rasekh, a samovar maker on Hanifnezhad Street, said: "Presently, because of the war, not much essential work is being accomplished. I think the war has caused slowdowns of work and unemployment. Hence, other issues must be dealt with after the war."

Mahra Ostadi, a homemaker in the same area, said: "I do not precisely know what the accomplishments of the Majlis are. However, the most important problem, which is a problem of many people, is the problem of housing and the Majlis must deal with it. During this period, a large number of people who had houses and money could get housing again by going to the organizations. But poor and helpless people cannot provide themselves with a house. God willing, the Majlis will think of something for the homeless people and will save us from this situation."

The driver of a passenger car, who had stopped at the side of the street, said: "The Majlis has not yet been able to abolish capitalism

and since the war, the capitalists have made more profits. There is talk of Paragraphs C and D everywhere, but nothing has been done in this case. I believe the representatives of the people, whom we trust, must act in a rapid and revolutionary way in this regard."

We went to Rah-e Ahan Square and spoke to a few people. Mohammad Reza 'Abdolkhani and his mother, who are among our fellow citizens victimized by the war, said: "First, we hope that Islam becomes victorious, even if we have nothing to eat. In response to your question, I must say that the implementation of the land reform plan, if it is ratified, can be a very good thing. The actions of the Majlis concerning the war victims was also good. Only, we have a housing problem. Also, the Majlis must make every effort to move us toward agricultural self-sufficiency and modernization, because in this way, we can achieve self-sufficiency. As the crusade brothers help the farmers in the villages, with the ratification of laws, other resources must be provided to help the villages and villagers."

Asad Mardani, a combat soldier from Quchan on his way to the front in Bostan, said: "In my opinion, what the Majlis has done so far is good and for the benefit of the people. I ask them to help the cattle raisers and also to finish the bill for nationalizing foreign trade in the interest of the people."

Bamazan 'A'lami, a businessman, said: "On the whole, the laws ratified by the Majlis have been good. One of the most important that I remember is the ratification of the charter for the guards corps, because these brothers really work hard on the front and the Majlis must praise them for it. Concerning future issues in the Majlis, they should pass laws to solve the problem of unemployment, since unemployment inflicts the greatest damage on the economy of the country. The Majlis should also take steps to end the war in a way which is in the best interests of Iran."

Shahbaz Panjeh'i, a worker at Iran Nasional, who was sitting in one of the automobile showrooms on Rah-e Ahan Square, said: "I do not know much about the previous work of the Majlis. I only ask them to deal with the southern part of the city and its people. For a long time now, no one has spoken about the southern part of the city, except for one or two people (Hejazi), and even now, when gas pipes are installed, they do it for the people in the north of the city."

Morteza Majidi, a worker for Pavarani Company, said: "We support the Majlis and respect what it ratifies. Only, we request of them to investigate the situation in the private factories and companies. For instance, our company at the present time has five Jewish shareholders who have fled the country but whose representatives protect their interests. The Majlis must take steps to end the war in the interests of Iran, because the oppressed feel the effects of the problems it causes."

A passerby, who did not give his name, expressed his opinion about these questions as follows: "The Majlis should go step by step or, perhaps, ahead of other institutions and organizations of the Islamic Republic, in expending its energy and time bringing about changes and finding fundamental solutions. Unfortunately, despite the good intentions of the representatives and the personal desires of each and every one, or at least a majority of them, this has [not] been done in an organized manner by the Majlis and the Majlis, except in certain cases, has been dealing with the solutions to superficial, temporary, and minor issues.

"Although this is also very important, the Majlis should provide solutions for economic, political, cultural, and other changes. For instance, the issue of ownership has not been determined in the Islamic Republic. Because of this, other problems exist, such as problems related to land (Paragraph C) and the ownership of factories. Also, in my opinion, efforts to devise and ratify laws for changes in the administrative system of the country and, in fact, the system of services, construction, and planning for the oppressed have been minimal. The discontent, slowdowns in work, and lack of answers to those with judicial, legal, and administrative problems are the result of the above. The Majlis has not acted strongly and decisively in determining basic, overall, clear policies for the government in controlling, guiding, and supervising the essential tasks such as the bazaar, housing, and some other issues. For this reason, the government has no clear specific guidelines in dealing with high prices, overpricing, inflation, unemployment, housing, and the problem of land. I hope the Majlis pays attention to these points in the future."

Bholam Musavizadeh, an employee of the private sector, said: "As good actions of the Majlis, the bill for abolishing the eviction rules must be mentioned, which must be implemented as soon as possible. Also, the dismissal of liberal representatives from the Majlis has also been one of their important tasks. For the future, the Majlis should place solving the economic problem on its agenda in order to solve housing shortages and unemployment."

We went in front of the Majlis and asked the opinions of a few people who had come to meet with the representatives concerning these two questions.

Haj Sheykh Ebrahim Reza'i, the Friday prayer leader of Abolfazl Mosque of 17 Shahrivar Street, said: "The Majlis moves in line with Islam and all the laws are good for the people. God willing, in the future, they will work even more for the security and comfort of the people."

Dr Sa'id Sam said: "I do not remember all that the Majlis has ratified at the present time. However, the bill concerning the services of physicians in oppressed regions is very good. Of course, the problems of physicians must also be analysed. Also, many of the nation's affairs have remained stagnant because ownership has not been specified. The Majlis must take steps in this regard."

'Abdollah Kazemi said: "The most important ruling was the dismissal of Bani-Sadr. Considering four of the representatives as having resigned was also good. There are still a number of others who must be dismissed from the Majlis. In the future, the Majlis must take the necessary steps to establish security, solve the economic problems, and provide work for the unemployed."

Hasan Sanjideh, a 20-year-old unemployed man, said: "I was on the front for more than one and a half years and I came to Tehran a few months ago. But, no matter where I go, I am told they do not have a job for me. Presently, I must support several people, but because I have no job and no money, I cannot do so. I ask the Majlis, the authorities, and anyone who is in charge of this area to do something about employment for the jobless."

Haj Qows Dayyani from Gonbad also believes that the Majlis, by ratifying the necessary laws, must provide the resources to aid cattle raisers and farmers in all areas.

Rostam Hoseyni, an employee, also said: "In the near future, the Majlis must take steps about housing, high prices, and foreign trade and stop a number of freeloaders and capitalists. Furthermore, the limitations on ownership must be determined so that we know how much a person can own in this country. Among the good works of the Majlis is the abolition of eviction regulations, which, unfortunately, were opposed by the Council of Guardians, and the courts are continually issuing eviction notices."

9593
VSO: 4640/138

REPRESSION OF OPPOSITION, PERSECUTION OF BAHAI'S ALLEGED

Paris LE MONDE in French 30 Dec 81 p 1

[Text] The executions continue without interruption in Iran. Moslems of the People's Mujahedin, Marxist-Leninists of the Peykar or the Fedayeen (minority faction), bazaar traders, Kurds, or royalists are shot or hung daily for "counterrevolutionary activities." Thousands of people have been detained without sentence or charges.

The authorities explain that the country is in a state of war and that the opposition, whether or not in cooperation with the Iraqi invaders, is committing acts of violence to overthrow the government. It is true that not a day passes without a political or religious leader assassinated, a bomb exploded in a public place, usually killing innocent people, a government building taken over, or members of the security forces killed.

"The Islamic revolution has no other means than a violent and bloody cleansing," Majlis Chairman Ayatollah Rafsanjani said Monday in announcing the assassination of a deputy the previous day. There are all indications that in response to the "terrorism" by the opposition the terror by the state will increase. The Islamic courts are operating without any control: Sentences are issued without the presence of lawyers, press representatives, or even relatives and associates of the accused. Trials sometimes last only a few minutes. In the eyes of Iranians, whether supporters of the Islamic government or not, nothing justifies this kind of "justice."

The repression which is being carried out--often blindly--is even more shocking in that it has extended to the followers of the Baha'i religion, whose beliefs forbid any political activity. Holy places and Baha'i cemeteries have been razed. In the past few months, prominent Baha'is have been executed after conviction of "spying for Israel and the United States."

It appears that the government recently decided to eliminate the leaders of this religious community--who total about half a million--without even going to the trouble to bring them before Islamic courts. On Tuesday, 29 December it was learned from a reliable source that five of the eight members of the Iranian National Spiritual Assembly (the supreme body in the community) who were arrested on 13 December had been executed and buried in the "cemetery of the unfaithful" in Teheran, without notification to the families.

It is feared that the 6 other people arrested the same day, as well as 14 prominent Baba'is listed as "disappeared" in August 1980, met the same fate. The silence of officials in their regard is an implicit confession that the authorities can no longer portray these assassinations as penalty against "counter-revolutionaries."

The Teheran leaders should henceforth not be surprised at the indignation they are causing throughout the world, and the isolation of their republic on the international scene. The "good will missions" they are planning to send shortly to various countries will have difficulty convincing anybody of the "virtues" of the Islamic revolution.

9920

CSO: 4619/33

GULF STATES CHARGED WITH COMPLIANCE IN WAR WITH IRAQ

Beirut AL-HURRIYAH in Arabic No 1029, 16 Nov 81 pp 32-33

[Article by 'Adil Amin: "Iraq after 400 Days At War; War Is Continuing And Reactionism Is Being Harvested"]

[Text] Aside from the official military communiques issued by the Iraqi military establishment, and aside from the claims and empty bragging of the Iraqi regime when talking about its victories against Iran, the military situation on the front continues to be unfavorable. Since the battle on the East bank of Karun River which was waged by the Iraqi regime with too much confidence of a quick victory, the situation continues to be unfavorable for the Iraqis.

While the failure of declared goals of the war are announced one after the other, evaporating the dreams of those who planned the war or supported it, this war seems to be an endless one. The war has become a predicament whose end results are difficult to predict whether on the military front or the domestic front where there is increased sensitivity to what is happening on the battle field.

Costly Price of Alliance With Reactionism

The situation on the front is reflected quickly with increasing effect on Iraqi policies and Iraq's relations with Gulf reactionaries in particular and Arab reactionaries in general. This is because those who comprise the Gulf reactionaries, with Saudi Arabia at the forefront, encouraged the Baghdad rulers to wage the adventure of war against the Iranian people. The reactionary regimes applauded the Iraqi rulers and provided them with both financial and political support whenever it was possible.

Recently Sharon, the Israeli defense minister, revealed that the American administration was providing the Iraqi rulers with various types of weapons and ammunition through Jordan and Saudi Arabia. The Israeli defense minister's revelation is considered a definitive confirmation of the American position on the war and its role in encouraging the Iraqi regime to wage and continue the war against the peoples of Iran. It is helpful to be reminded of Brzezinski's statement 5 months prior to the war that a country of the region (Iraq) was entrusted with disciplining the Iranian revolution on behalf of the United States.

Naturally, the Saudi Arabian reactionaries tried to utilize the multi-faceted American Saudi role to confine the Iraqi regime and encircle it with Saudi policy.

However, Saudi Arabia was not satisfied with that. When Iraq became so dependent upon the Saudis and its other reactionary allies' financial support (the latest \$14 billion), political and military support (Sharon statements), Saudi Arabia attempted to isolate the Iraqi rulers from the Gulf states, reduce their size and role, and humiliate them. The Iraqis' are up to their ears in the bottomless swamp of war. The Saudi stand within the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] and its role in keeping Baghdad's rulers out of the "Gulf Club," whose membership is bestowed only upon genuine reactionaries, was a strong blow to Baghdad policies. It was also a contradiction of the appeals of "Arabism" and begging for membership did not lessen the predicament. The voice of Baghdad's rulers became hoarse as they repeated that they were waging the war in defense of Arab Gulf reactionarism and their expressed their surprise at being isolated from the club.

It seems that Baghdad's rulers did not think seriously about the high cost they would have to pay for their alliance with Saudi Arabia. The Saudi reactionaries continuously kept the Baghdad rulers captives to Saudi policies, thus weakening them and tying them to Saudi-American policies in the area.

In the last few months, the saying of the progressive Iraqi writer, the martyr 'Abd al-Jabbar Wahbi Abula-Sa'id, who was martyred at the hands of the Iraqi rulers after the 1963 coup d'etat, has become appropriate. He said, "They ate from the plate of reactionism and it has eaten them."

This saying refers to the alliances with reactionarism against the progressive and democratic Iraqi forces after the Tamuz revolution. Due to the high price imposed upon Iraqi rulers by the reactionaries and the continuation of the blockade imposed by Arab nationalistic regimes along with the seige imposed by the Iraqi masses and their democratic and national forces represented by opposition to the war and to Arab and world policies, the Iraqi rulers were relatively opposed to the Saudi-American Fahd plan.

While Iraq's new position can be explained as an attempt to respond to Saudi policies toward Iraq, i.e., policies of aloofness and estrangement, it can also be explained as an attempt to lessen the dilemmas of foreign policy and domestic policy as a result of the war.

The slogans which do not reflect reality and the rhetorical opposition to one aspect of the Saudi-American policies could never free them easily from captivity and subordination because the real test is the stand regarding the issue of freedom and democracy for the Iraqi people and actual participation in the confrontation front. The position to be taken at the first Arab summit will be the first test to reveal the limits of the Iraqi position.

Thus the disturbing realities on the war front combine with the results of the dilemma of captivity and subordination to the Gulf reactionaries. The end results must be combined with the internal reactions and the effects these have on one another economically, politically, or socially, effects which are generated by every additional day of the war.

Actual Eliminations and Empty Amnesty

With the evaporation of the goals of "liberation" which were set for the war, with the war's transformation into a chronic dilemma and with the increase of victims, prisoners of war, and desertees, the voices have increased demanding that the war be stopped, that the price be paid no matter how high and that those responsible for the adventure be held accountable.

Because of this, and in order to stop the grumbling or uproot it, those who waged the war believe that this leads to increasing eliminations inside the armed forces and the ruling party. The campaign of continuous and periodic eliminations inside the armed forces coincided last September with a wide campaign of executions carried out against a number of prisoners and political detainees of nationalist and progressive Arab and Kurdish parties. This campaign was carried out swiftly and death sentences were executed immediately.

The number of those executed exceeded 100 people of the freedom fighters and military cadres.

The Iraqi regime did not offer any explanation for its measures and there is no realistic explanation for them except getting rid of a large number of the political freedom fighters and military cadres prior to any unpleasant war development or confrontation against the internal situation with its consequent shocks and bottlenecks.

In addition to those bloody eliminations, Baghdad authorities have tried in vain to bribe the nationalist and progressive opposition as well as the masses by declaring a general amnesty for Iraqis in exile on the occasion of the feast of al-Adha.

Those decisions were no more than ink on paper and no results were expected from them. The waves of involuntarily deported citizens continue and the waves of the citizens leaving the country to stay away from policies of terror do not cease.

Nationalist Opposition Widens:

Due to this situation nationalist and popular opposition increases more and more. Massive and progressive forces have expressed themselves in various ways and have not ceased from the beginning of the war until now.

Although the opposition is silent and the authoritarian propaganda overshadows the opposition, it continues to have its effect. It has become more effective within the organs of the ruling party and its organizations, especially within the military establishment. The passive popular opposition coincides with the increase and continuation of operations in Iraq Kurdistan.

Main progressive democratic Kurdish and Arab units participate in these activities.

In spite of the important steps achieved on the road to democratic and national unity in general, there needs to be more coordination among the existing alliances to provide the conditions conducive to the establishment of a broad nationalist progressive front which will restore democracy to Iraq and self-determination to Kurdistan and which will return Iraq to its effective progressive Arab role.

IRAQ

BRIEFS

PURCHASES TOTAL \$26 BILLION--Tariq Aziz, deputy prime minister of Iraq, affirmed to a Palestinian delegation that Iraq has purchased arms and ammunition worth \$26 billion during the Persian Gulf War. AL-HURRIYAH has reliable information indicating that Saudi Arabia has offered \$14 billion to Iraq during that period. Kuwait announced that it has offered \$2 billion and \$7 billion in aid to Iraq. It is noteworthy that some of these arms are American made. This was made known recently by the Israeli defense minister. These arms reached Iraq via Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Al-Sadat revealed that Egyptian arms had been sent before to Iraq. [Text] [Beirut AL-HURRIYAH in Arabic No 1029, 16 Nov 81 p 33] 9607

CSO: 4404/147

PAPER COMMENTS ON HUSAYN'S TRIP TO U.S.

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 92, 14-20 Oct 81 pp 2-3

[Article by Rasel Hawi: "The Jordanian Monarch and American Officials Confirm the Soviet-Jordanian Missile Transaction; King Husayn: 'I Will Not Lose Faith in the U.S.; President Reagan Can Be Fair'"]

[Text] The United States officially reaffirmed that King Husayn informed American officials that Jordan agreed with the Soviet Union to buy surface-to-air missiles to defend itself against any foreign dangers. A top American official indicated that that transaction might complicate the position of the U.S., which is considered the main source of military equipment for Jordan. The Jordanian monarch himself confirmed the news of this transaction during his visit to Washington and revealed that Iraq is financing it. The reporter for the magazine in Washington, Rasel Hawi, reveals in the following report the most important topics that Jordanian monarch discussed with the American officials.

President Reagan, Secretary of State Alexander Haig, and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger confirmed, during their many meetings with King Husayn, that Washington will strengthen the current Jordanian network of surface-to-air missiles, and will consider kindly the king's demand for F-16 airplanes. Jordanian sources say that King Husayn might have the impression that he will obtain these planes next year as soon as he becomes a part of the "peace process" which is supervised by the U.S. It is not expected that Washington will take a new initiative before Israel completes its final withdrawal from the Sinai on April 26, 1982. The American administration also confirmed that the U.S. does not approve at all of Ariel Sharon's proposal calling for the transformation of Jordan into a Palestinian state in the future. President Reagan told the Jordanian monarch that the U.S. "will defend Jordanian sovereignty" and he issued a public statement in this regard. Observers saw in this a sign that the U.S. wants to strengthen the Jordanian defense system in general. Despite the fact that Jordan is primarily threatened by Israel, the U.S. administration, upon presenting the transaction to the U.S. Congress for approval, will argue that the transaction is meant to defend Jordan against any possible aggression from Syria. But sources from the U.S. Defense Department say that despite lukewarm relations existing between Damascus and Amman, it is unlikely that Damascus will undertake any aggression against Jordan. These sources also say that American military exports to Jordan, in the near future, will include six additional F-5 planes, 78 Howitzer 155 caliber machine guns, 29 Howitzer 203 caliber machine guns, 78 armored troop ships, in

addition to unlimited number of improved models of ground-air Hawk missiles. Jordan will also receive from Britain 279 Centurion tanks.

Fear of an Israeli Occupation of Jordan

Commenting on King Husayn's statements, in which he said "that he is now more reassured than in the past and more confident about the future," a source in the Reagan administration indicated that the statements came as a response to reassurances from Washington that Jordan will be a part of a unified defense system which Washington plans to establish. The same source also indicated that the Jordanian monarch declared his full support for Prince Fahd's proposal that aims at achieving a just and comprehensive peace in the area.

During his discussion with U.S. Secretary of Defense Weinberger about operation "Bright Star," the Jordanian monarch looked forward to the day when American policies toward the Palestinian question will enable Jordan to participate in these operations. It is known that operation "Bright Star" will include joint maneuvers in Egypt, Sudan, Oman and Somalia. King Husayn told Secretary of Defense Weinberger that he welcomed shipment of a "small" quantity of American military arms and ammunitions to Iraq through Jordan and he wished that in the near future it would be possible to establish a close military cooperation between Iraq and the "moderate" countries.

As a reaffirmation that the king will receive new Hawk missiles, he was invited to watch a live launching of these missiles at Fort Bliss where the air defense training academy is located. Later the king visited California where he gave a speech at the Council of Foreign Affairs in Los Angeles. He also had dinner with former U.S. President Gerald Ford, and met with some of his wife's relatives who live there.

The king expressed his opinions concerning the Israeli danger. He seemed concerned that his country might be subjected to a military occupation especially by Israel. The American officials affirmed their concern for Jordan and the safety of its territories.

Sources in the Reagan administration said that King Husayn asked President Reagan about the "strategic cooperation" agreement with Israel which will be discussed with Israeli Defense Minister Sharon during his scheduled trip to Washington at the end of this month. But these sources insisted that the agreement is only aimed at preventing any "Soviet threat," and it depends primarily on Israel cooperation in any comprehensive peace agreement in the Middle East.

At the end of his discussion in Washington, King Husayn made some statements before a group of Arab journalists. These statements attracted observers' attention. In these statements the Jordanian monarch reaffirmed the following basic concepts:

- "The picture in the U.S. differs today from what it was in the recent past. Today there is a strong American administration capable and maybe willing to understand the truth, and consequently take stands which we hope will be positive."

- "I don't rule out a reckless move by Israel whether against us or against Lebanon because Israel, knowing her mentality, might try such a venture."

- "President Reagan is a man of principle, he is courageous and has strong leadership. If he is convinced of something he does it. As a consequence I feel he will be just. There is also a great hope that the U.S. approach will be different from what it was during the previous administration."

- "Jerusalem is important for all believers in God....If an acceptable, honorable, and just peace is achieved, Jerusalem will become a symbol of that peace."

9786

CSO: 4404/136

REASONS FOR TOUGH NEW PRESS LAW DISCUSSED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 247, 14 Nov 81 p 20

/Article by Najib 'Abd al-Hadi: "A Lebanon-Type Situation About To Occur"/

/Text/ The Kuwaiti Press Wants Complete Freedom for the Press,
But the Government Looks at the Regional Political Situation
and Is Afraid!

Kuwait--The Kuwaiti press is still waging a battle against the new Press and Publication Law which the Parliamentary Committee for Education, Culture and Guidance has just finished studying in preparation for submitting it to the National Assembly for discussion after the committee sends its report along with it.

The new law contains clauses which are of great consequence, for example, "suspension of the publication of a newspaper for as long as 2 years or more," and "the possibility of withdrawing /a newspaper's/ permit and revoking its license."

The Kuwaiti press, which opposed /an older version of/ the new law and managed to have the government repeal it in view of the clauses contained therein which it considered to be dangerous and of negative consequences for freedom of the press, also considers that the new law, which is currently being submitted to the National Assembly, is even more dangerous than the previous version of the law. For this reason the press is demanding that the new law be more flexible and more in keeping with the democratic and parliamentary life which has been sanctioned and accepted by Kuwait's ruling regime.

What the Kuwaiti press--that is, the newspaper owners and editors in chief--wants is totally at variance with what the government wants. The government sees in freedom of the press, of the type being demanded by the newspaper owners and editors in chief, something which is very dangerous. The political situation in the area is making it necessary for the Kuwaiti government to take preventive and precautionary measures due to its fear that freedom of the press will be misunderstood and that the exercise of such freedom will entail negative and reverse consequences which might affect Kuwait's relations with its fellow-Arab countries and friendly countries. For this reason the new press law, in some of the 64 articles which it contains, stipulates that it is not permitted to assail and oppose the heads of state of fellow-Arab countries and friendly countries. Other articles of the law give the minister of information absolute powers which did not exist in the previous version of the new law which the government agreed to repeal after it had already prepared an alternative law which it immediately submitted to the National Assembly and requested that it be dealt with expeditiously.

The new press law which was published in Kuwait last week was an unexpected surprise for the Kuwaiti newspaper owners and editors in chief. They then proceeded to write articles, commentaries and criticism concerning the contents of the new law, and some of them even wrote the following: "If we had known about this surprise when we were demanding the repeal of the previous version of the law, we would have been satisfied with the previous version because it was more merciful than the new law."

The Kuwaiti government knows that the press has a role to play and that it is very influential. It also knows that the freedom which the newspaper owners and editors-in-chief are demanding is tantamount to a two-edged sword--the government might benefit from one of the edges, but it might be harmed by the other one. This is why the government feels that freedom of the press should be held in check and should be coordinated with the policies of the government and its relations with the Arab and Muslim countries, particularly in view of the tense political circumstances in most of the Arab countries where there is no freedom of the press. Kuwait, as a small nation, is unable to shoulder the burden of a free press alone in an Arab world which views freedom of the press as being a contagious disease which must be resisted and held in check so that its infection does not spread to other places.

Most likely the Kuwaiti newspaper owners and editors-in-chief realize this. Nevertheless, they are attempting to gain for themselves at least a minimum of freedom of the press, bearing in mind that the freedom which is exercised in a small nation such as Kuwait has come to be demanded by many of the citizens of some of the other Arab nations.

There are other considerations which have compelled the Kuwaiti government to hasten to establish rules and principles for the journalistic profession and the exercise of its freedom. These considerations involve the fact that some of the Arab and Muslim nations feel displeasure and are restless about what is being published in the Islamic /as published/ press. The nations which are displeased are apparently unable to grasp and comprehend the freedom of the press in Kuwait. They are also not convinced that the Kuwaiti press is not a government-controlled press and that the government does not exercise any type of pressure on it. This lack of grasp and understanding /of the situation/ has caused a lot of embarrassment and has put Kuwait in embarrassing situations, especially vis-a-vis its fellow-Arab nations. This is in spite of the efforts undertaken by Kuwaiti authorities which have had the objective of convincing the authorities of the other nations that the press in Kuwait is a free press, is not controlled by the government, and that the government has no authority over the press except by means of the constitution and laws which are in force.

Apparently these justifications and arguments have been, and still are, unconvincing and some of the Arab leaders in other Arab countries/ have remained incapable of grasping the truth about the Kuwaiti press situation.

This is why it could be said that the Kuwaiti government took all of these considerations into account before formulating the articles of the new press law which indirectly comply with the needs and demands of some of the Arab nations which feel that a continuation of such freedom of the press is not in keeping with what is normal and prevalent in the press of our Arab world.

There is another reason why the Kuwaiti government has been anxious to formulate this new law. It concerns the Lebanese press and the role which it played before the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war.

Either some or most of the Lebanese press had political ties with particular groups, and the political positions which the Lebanese newspapers took reflected these ties. As a result of this Lebanon became an arena of media and press conflict which served the interests of this or that regime.

After the Lebanese war and the faltering of the Lebanese press, some of the regimes attempted to transfer this conflict to Kuwait, to be carried on by the local Kuwaiti media. Some of the regimes were actually able to infiltrate the Kuwaiti press and proclaim their opinions and policies by means of this forum, either through the publication of news items, commentaries, articles and interviews, or through publishing government-sponsored advertisements. It was only natural that Kuwait would realize the seriousness of this situation and attempt, to the best of its ability, to keep matters in check and keep a rein on the press by means of laws which define the concept and responsibilities of freedom of the press.

The new press law, of course, will be affected by the concern of the National Assembly. It will encounter opposition on the part of quite a few members of the Chamber of Deputies, but a number of others will find it acceptable and will agree to it. Apparently the government will stick to its position and will use all of its means, power and influence available to get the new law passed. Everything seems to indicate that the government's position in the National Assembly will be inflexible, will accept no compromise solutions, and will not effect any amendment of the above-mentioned law.

In any case the press and the National Assembly right now are in a critical situation. No one knows how the situation will be solved, and no one knows which of the two sides--the government or the press--will win out!

9468

CSO: 4404/152

STEPS TAKEN TO PREVENT INFUX OF ARMS

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 92, 14-20 Oct 81 p 21

[Article: "Fifteen Control Centers to Prevent Influx of Arms to Lebanon"]

[Text] Lebanese officials considered with a great deal of caution the results of the recent meeting of the Arab Follow-up Committee, their sixth in a series of efforts to end the war in Lebanon. Prime Minister Shafiq al-Wazzan cautiously noted that the statement which includes the results of the committee's work is still "ink on paper." He expressed his hope that the various sides in the war would cooperate with the Arab ministers' efforts to contain the Lebanese war which has been going on for 7 years. It is known that the follow-up committee includes the foreign affairs ministers of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Syria, Prince Saud al-Faysal, Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmed al-Sabah, and Mr 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam, respectively, in addition to the Lebanese Prime Minister Mr Shafiq al-Wazzan and Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr Fu'ad Butrus.

The Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud confirmed in a statement at the conclusion of the committee's business that they had reached positive results, for they agreed to form a control agency on the Lebanese Coast and to establish a comprehensive plan to open the crossing points between the two sections of the Lebanese capital. Prince Saud also mentioned that the committee will meet again on 18 January to start talks with various sides of the dispute aimed at achieving a National agreement. It is worth mentioning that the Follow-up Committee, in its previous meeting in September, adopted decisions concerning the reopening of routes between the Eastern and Western sections, the establishment of a control center, and the preparation for national talks. But only the museum route was reopened. The other routes stayed closed, and the control agency, which aims at preventing influx of arms, except those for the government, was not formed. The control agency was not formed because of the objections of the "Lebanese Front" lead by Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayl who opposes Syrian participation in that body and the entry of Syrians into the territories of the "Front." Objections were also voiced by the Palestinian resistance because, as Mr Yassir 'Arafat mentioned, preventing arms from getting to the Palestinians contradicts agreements previously concluded between them and the Lebanese government. Now it appears that the dispute about forming the control agency and the identity of its members has been overcome by the committee. Sources from the Palestinian resistance indicated their willingness to facilitate the committee's mission. But the stand of the "Lebanese Front" regarding Syrian participation is still a question mark. Lebanese

President Elias Sarkis, who is the chairman of the Follow-up Committee, insisted on the necessity of deciding the issue of arms influx before looking into re-opening of the capital routes. Mr Sarkis believes that there is no use in making any decisions concerning the land as long as arms are abundantly available to the fighters who, at any time, may violate that decision.

It was known from committee's sources that agreement was reached concerning the establishment of 15 control centers along the coast, in addition to maritime patrols. The same sources indicated that this time the committee obtained guarantees that their decisions will be carried out. The above-mentioned control agency will be composed of units headed by Saudi, Kuwaiti, Syrian, and Lebanese officers; "that is officers of all the countries that have members in the committee." It is not yet known whether Syrian officers will participate in supervising the coast of the Eastern section, "territory of the Lebanese Front," or whether the Lebanese army, which is opposed by the National Movement, because of its structure, will participate in supervising the ports of Tripoli, Sidon, and Tyre where the "National Movement" and the Palestinian forces receive their arms.

The Question of Sa'd Haddad

Observers in the Lebanese capital see three problems facing the supervisory body if its formation actually takes place. The first concerns the Syrian participation in this body because the Syrians refuse to be excluded from any region in Lebanon, and they insist on participation in supervising the port of Juniyah in order to assure the stoppage into it of arms. Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs Halim Khaddam, had often said that the actual evidence of severance of relations between the Lebanese Front and Israel is the reassurance that Israeli arms are no longer getting into Lebanese hands through illegal ports. The second problem concerns the position of the Palestinian resistance regarding arms, especially since the Cairo agreement permits the resistance to obtain arms in order to fight Israel in the South. It is worth mentioning in this regard that the Lebanese Front refuses the closing of its ports if it is not assured of the definite stoppage of arms to the Palestinians. The third problem concerns the authority of the supervisory body. Should it have the authority to carry out its decisions by force, such as to close ports and prevent arms receipt, through the Arab Deterrent Forces which are Syrian forces, or try to carry out its decisions by "mutual agreement" with all parties?

Information from Beirut concerning Haddad's resignation is still contradictory. While it was mentioned that Haddad had reconsidered, due to pressure by the Israeli Defense Ministry, and "responding to the wishes of the inhabitants," sources from the UN forces stationed in the South indicated that the disagreements between Haddad and the Israeli leaders have not been resolved. The disagreements particularly concern Haddad's opposition to the cease-fire agreement that was reached in the South to stop the war between the Palestinian forces and the Israeli forces. Haddad believes that agreement lead to a paralysis of his forces' capability while it strengthened the position of the Palestinians. Information sent to Beirut stated that Haddad received threats of "liquidation" from the minister of defense, Ariel Sharon, and the chief of staff, Rifa'el Eytan, if he does not reconsider because his resignation poses danger to the future relationship between Israel and the "Border enclave."

PAKISTANIS HELD PRISONER IN LIBYAN MILITARY CAMPS

Peshawar MASHRIQ in Urdu 28, 29, 30 Nov 81

[Article by Riyaz Batalvi: "6 Days in Libya"]

[28 Nov 81 p 5]

[Text] The tragedy of Al Murtaza Associates which some 11 months previously had put about 3000 of the country's families in mental and spiritual anguish, reached its conclusion when an 11 member Pakistan government delegation reached Libya, and after 5 days of negotiation, was successful in obtaining permission for some 2700 Pakistanis residing in various camps to return to their country. These Pakistanis had gone to Libya as watchmen under the auspices of a recruiting agent called Al Murtaza Associates. According to their contract they were to receive a monthly salary of 120 dinars; housing was to be free; they were to receive time and a half overtime, a free ticket [to and from Libya], and 15 days vacation. However, as soon as they reached Libya, they were moved to various camps and army bases. Not only were they made to live under harsh conditions, but they also began to be given guerrilla training.

From the complaints of these Pakistanis which reached Pakistan, it was known that the Al Murtaza Associates' recruits were living a life of great anguish in desolate and barren deserts. They were not properly fed. They were ill-treated. Their hair and beards were shaven. Day and night in the blazing sun of the burning desert and in murderous humidity they were being given military training, and were always under strict guard. This news also gave the impression that the Pakistanis had been put in a mercenary army and would be sent to various countries at the discretion of the Libyan government. This impression became fact when it was published in the newspapers that a group of 100 Pakistanis had been sent to Damascus from where they would go on to fight in Lebanon with the Palestinians against the Israelis and Lebanese Christians.

There were also rumors circulating in Pakistan a few months before that the Pakistanis who had gone to Libya as watchmen had been divided into groups. The civilians had been put in a separate group, and those with military experience had been put into an army going to Chad, Aden, Ethiopia and Uganda. People believed these rumors because a few Pakistanis had been included in the mercenary army which had gone to Nairobi shortly before to put the deposed Idi Amin back in power, and these Pakistanis were those who had illegally emigrated to Europe and the Middle East in search of work and had been forced by unemployment to join such secret organizations. The public's anxiety and apprehension increased when they heard the

rumor that the people going to Libya through the good offices of Al Murtaza Associates were being put into Murtaza Bhutto's so-called Liberation Army, and that they would be given terrorist training and brought back to Pakistan. The background for this rumor was that the traitors Brigadier Usman, Col Taufiq, and Col Habib, who were resident in Libya, had many times toured the camps of the Pakistanis and had urged them to fight a war against their country.

The groundwork for this tragedy was laid about a year before in London when a Libyan diplomat Musa Kusa made a contract with two brothers, Col (retired) Wajid Bukhari and Manzur Husain Bukhari of the village Kamrah in District Campbellpore, that they should recruit some 5000 people. The Bukhari brothers had resided in England for some time and had taken up British citizenship. There is also evidence that Manzur Husain Bukhari acted as an agent for Libya outside the country and purchased arms for that country from secret markets in Europe. In addition, he had a contract of millions of dinars to publish literature for the government of Col Mu'ammarr Qadhdhafi. With this new contract for manpower, the Bukhari brothers obtained 600,000 dinars from the Libyan government and, depositing 300,000 dinars in a Swiss bank, established a firm by the name of "Bridges." In order to fulfill the first conditions of the contract they registered this firm in Liberia, and it was attested by the Pakistani ambassador in Switzerland.

After the contract had been signed, the Bukhari brothers went to Libya, and after getting their instructions, came to Pakistan. They had the visas attested by the Protector of the Bureau of Immigration and Manpower and, in partnership with five recruiting agencies--Mirza and Sons, Allied Associates, Azim Recruiting Agency, Umar Agency and Abbassi Recruiting Agency--began to recruit people. Although it was plainly stated in the contract that they were looking for watchmen and guards and that they would not be asked to do any military kind of work, the recruiting agents began to especially recruit people with military experience and those who had fled from defense organizations. The recruiting agents collected from 6000 to 15,000 rupees per head, and in a few days had recruited some 2700 civilians and people with military experience. The people with military experience were mostly from the districts of Rawalpindi and Azad Kashmir, while the majority of the civilians were from the Frontier. At this time these people wanting to go to Libya did not have the slightest idea that they would be asked to do military service or that they would be put in a mercenary army. They were just going to Libya as watchmen in order to better the lives of their wives and children.

Al Murtaza Associates' first group arrived in Tripoli on 26 January. One of the Bukhari brothers met them, painted a rosy picture of the future for them, and had them sent to the military camp Jang Zur under the supervision of the Libyan Army. This camp is situated on the shores of the Mediterranean and used to be part of the customs zone for the port. At first the Pakistanis were given good food and lodging, although there was the restriction that they could not go outside the camp and could not meet with any Pakistani living in Tripoli. After this people began arriving from Pakistan in groups and they were lodged in this camp. When there were 2662 people, they were told that under Libyan law they would have to go through three months of military training and wear para-military uniforms. A list of the names and occupations of the newcomers was prepared there, and the rank and units of those with military experience was noted.

On 14 March the first group of Pakistanis, in which there were some 200 people, was moved to Al Shuwayrif Camp 750 kilometers from Tripoli. Al Shuwayrif is in the Sahara desert. Travel in the desert is difficult and dangerous, and Libya's third largest city Mizdah is about 450 miles away from the camp. There is burning and blowing sand in all directions, and as soon as the sun comes up the sand begins to glow like embers. Al Shuwayrif is a guerrilla camp and it gives the impression of an Italian era fort. The camp administrators dropped the Pakistanis in a square mile of desert surrounded by barbed wire and imprisoned them on the bare earth under the open sky. At first they were made to repair the fort and build roads, and later their military training started. Early in the morning they were made to practice judo, and from 10:00 am to 2:00 pm they paraded on the hot sand under the blazing sun. People fell unconscious during the parade and were injured but were given no medical treatment or care.

After a few days Bukhari, the owner of Murtaza Associates, toured the camps of Pakistanis and gave each of them 10 dinars as wages. When people asked for the rest of their wages, they were told that it had been deposited and would be given to them at the proper time. That day each of the inhabitants of the camp was given an envelope and told to write to his loved ones, but these letters never reached Pakistan. It should be mentioned in this regard that the Bukhari brothers had put their own men in charge of these unfortunate Pakistanis, and these men were themselves Pakistanis. In fact it was they who tortured and oppressed them, and the camp commander Abdul Razaq and his companions who were situated in the various camps, especially took advantage of the powerlessness and helplessness of their fellow countrymen.

On 26 April the 200 Pakistanis in Al Shuwayrif Camp were moved 200 kilometers away to Bu Ghalyan Camp. Bu Ghalyan is surrounded on all sides by burning sand and scorching black rocks. There are furious black dust storms here, and one cannot tell where the sky ends and the desert begins. No sign of habitation can be seen for a great distance. At first sight it seems as though no living soul has ever passed through here. This is certainly the land of desolate deserts and black mountains which is mentioned in stories and fairy tales. The Government of Libya established this camp recently and it is used for military purposes. These men had been brought here too for military training, and they were made to work day and night.

By 10 May there were 2500 Pakistanis in Al Shuwayrif Camp and now they were being divided into various groups. A group of 500 men with military experience was separated from the rest and made into four companies of Infantry, Artillery, Cavalry, and Signals under an organization called al-Sa'iqah. Then those with military experience were given uniforms and began to be given training in the use of various weapons such as pistols and revolvers, G2 rifles, light machine guns, anti-tank machine guns, mortar cannons, and 12 barrel guns. Those who were too old or weak or otherwise unfit for military service were given work in agriculture, carpentry or masonry. These people worked for 18 hours at a stretch with no rest and nothing to eat or drink, and when they became exhausted, they fell where they stood. Muhammad Ishaq of District Kohat died in this very camp. A young man named Siraj fell ill and when there was no hope of his living, he was moved someplace else. Similarly, a former army officer from Gujarat, Abdul Hamid, fell ill, and because of receiving no treatment, passed away.

On 28 August the 500 men with military experience were separated from their companions and taken by truck to Bu Ghaylan Camp. From among them 100 men were selected and taken to Tripoli to be sent to Syria. In Tripoli they were put on an United African Airlines Boeing and sent to Damascus. It is said that their next stop was Lebanon, but when they refused to go to Beirut they were beaten at the airport and brought back to Tripoli, and imprisoned at Ghaylan Camp 20 kilometers from the city. This state of affairs sent a wave of anxiety and apprehension through the Pakistanis and they began to try somehow to reach the Pakistan embassy.

During this period a group of the Pakistanis in Al Shuwayrif Camp was sent to the military site of Al Kufrah, some 3000 kilometers away on the Chad and Sudanese border. Al Kufrah is in the Sahara desert. It is an oil area and there is also agriculture nearby. It is some 1200 kilometers from Libya's historical, second largest city, Benghazi. Some people were also moved to the two camps near Benghazi, Southwest Farm and Benghazi Coast. Southwest Farm was established for agriculture, while Benghazi Coast is a military camp. It was mostly Pakistani military men who had been brought to this camp, and this included those who had been given commando training as well. But they refused to go to Damascus, Beirut, Aden, Chad and Ethiopia.

The unfavorable conditions of the camps and the troubles of the recruits of Al Murtaza Associates would have remained a secret if four Pakistanis had not managed to escape from Al Shuwayrif Camp and reach Tripoli. Their story is also one of agony. According to one of the Pakistanis who fled the camp, during the day they hid behind sand dunes and traveled at night with the guidance of the stars. They were fortunate in that one day they came across some foreign construction companies which were building a road. They asked help of the workers building the road, and the workers gave them a lift in their truck to the outskirts of Tripoli. There they met a Pakistani in a car who took pity on the plight of his fellow countrymen and took them to the city, and then their story became known.

[29 Nov 81 p 5]

[Text] The Government of Pakistan would never have known of the miserable plight of the 2700 Pakistanis who had gone to Libya if some letters and cassettes had not been smuggled from the camps into Pakistan and if a mother had not gone to the home of the Federal Minister of Labor Ghulam Dastagir Khan, and made this plea: "Make me your servant for life, but bring back my son from Libya." And perhaps the Government of Libya would never have realized the deception of the Bukhari brothers if the President of Pakistan, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, had not sent an 11 member delegation to Libya after he heard the story of the difficulties of his countrymen.

After touring 6 camps and hearing the conversations of the Pakistanis present there, and after holding an exchange of views with the relevant Libyan authorities, I formed the impression that a recruiting agent had, for the sake of material gain, not only betrayed his country but had also deceived the Government of Libya. Until the arrival of the Pakistani delegation, the Department of Employment in Libya was unaware of the conditions in the camps, and its leaders had no idea that Pakistanis were being forced to do military service against their will. They were amazed at the miserable plight of the Pakistanis in the camps, and said that they had been deceived.

During the 6-day tour of Libya, I saw the Tripoli, Benghazi and Al Kufrah camps with my own eyes, and talked face to face with Pakistanis who had endured physical and mental hardship for many months in al-Shuwayrif and Bu Ghaylan. There were 500 Pakistanis in the Ghaylan Camp near Tripoli, which is also called Jetty Sulayman and which is next to the Libyan cantonment Jang Zur. Some of them were among those who had been sent to Damascus against their will. The other camp in Tripoli is Saba' Abril which in English translation is '7April.' There were 392 Pakistanis here. The two camps are 10 and 20 kilometers from the city.

There are two camps in Libya's second largest, ocean-side city Benghazi, 1000 kilometers from Tripoli. One is called Southwest and the other is known as Benghazi Coast Camp. The number of Pakistanis in Southwest was 460 and those in Benghazi Coast 102. All of these people were commandos and some of them had come back from Damascus. The number of Pakistanis in the Al Kufrah Camp in the Azam desert 1200 kilometers from Benghazi was 302, and they were passing their days in tents a short distance from the town. The al-Shuwayrif Camp is in the opposite direction from the Al Kufrah Camp and there is a distance of about 3400 kilometers between the two. There were more than 700 Pakistanis in this camp, and this is the camp where the Pakistanis coming to be watchmen had been given guerrilla training, and when they refused the training, had been treated violently. There is an Italian fort in al-Shuwayrif which in its desolation looks like a house of persecution. In this camp there were 12 people who were ill and who had become disabled. The last camp was Bu Ghaylan. This place is even further than al-Shuwayrif, and is surrounded by scorching rocks and dunes of black sand. There were about 175 Pakistanis there. There were also some people in Ghaylan, al-Shuwayrif and Bu Ghaylan who had become mentally ill. I felt like crying at the condition of one youth, Khalid Mahmud of Gujar Khan. At any rate, the Government of Libya has put them in a hospital for treatment.

At every camp the Pakistani delegation visited, they were welcomed with shouts of God is Great, Long Live Pakistan, and Long Live General Zia-ul-Haq. When they met with the members of the Pakistani delegation they began to weep like children, and repeatedly embraced them. I will never be able to forget what I saw in the Benghazi Coast Camp. As soon as the car of the federal minister entered the camp, not only did the faces of the Pakistanis present there light up, but they insisted on lifting the delegation onto their shoulders. With my own eyes I saw the people in the Benghazi Coast Camp kissing the Pakistani flag waving on the car, and touching it to their eyes. Time and again as the minister and his companions addressed their countrymen, their voices would choke up, and time and again, the people there would weep with anguish at the mention of their mothers and fathers, their sisters and brothers, and their wives and children.

During the tour of these camps the Pakistani delegation had to travel 1800 miles a day by airplane. The Libyan authorities were also with them, and sometimes hearing the voices of the Pakistanis filled with tears, their hearts too spilled over. The trip to al-Shuwayrif in particular was a dangerous one and the pilot of the 18 seat plane was unfamiliar with the route. I felt that despite all the trials and tribulations they had undergone in the 11 months from January to November, their courage, patience and love of country was a sight to see. They said again and again that they lived for their country. If they were alive, it was for their mother country; if they died, then it would be in the embrace of the pure earth of Pakistan.

I also learned from several well-informed sources close to the Libyan government that Murtaza Bhutto made a trip here in July and met with those prisoners living near Benghazi who had been sent to Damascus at the demand of the hijackers of the Boeing plane. Dr Ghulam Husain and the Col Habib who was implicated in the Rawalpindi firing case, were among them. Major Faruq, the murderer of the Bangladesh leader Mujib-ur Rahman, also lives with them. At Murtaza Bhutto's request, the Libyan government has set a monthly allowance for Dr Ghulam Husain and has given Col Habib employment in the United African Airlines.

We also heard here that some people in Murtaza Bhutto's so-called Liberation Army have been trained here and the terrorists later sent to Kabul. We also learned that when the Libyan government made a contract with the Bukhari brothers for manpower and asked them to recruit 5000 people from any country whatsoever, Murtaza Bhutto met with the Bukhari brothers in London and, assuring them of his cooperation, asked them to recruit people for Libya from among deserters and those with army experience in Pakistan so that when the time came they could be used in the so-called Liberation Army. In order to take advantage of Murtaza Bhutto's connections and influence, the Bukhari brothers gave their firm the name Al Murtaza and went to Libya with him. The advantage of this was that the Libyan government gave the Bukhari brothers an advance of 300,000 dinars and later gave them an additional 300,000.

The Pakistani delegation had with them the list of 2662 people whom the Al Murtaza Associates had sent to Libya as watchmen, guards and supervisors, and who had been selected for guerrilla training as soon as they reached Libya. However there is also the impression that the number of Pakistanis receiving guerrilla training is 2960. It is said that the remaining 298 Pakistanis are those who went to Europe and the Middle East illegally in search of work, and fell into the hands of the Bukhari brothers. In this special army there were military people and deserters from Bangladesh, Somalia, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Aden, Tanzania, Sudan, Syria and Egypt as well as Pakistanis, and they were commonly transported to various places by the United African Airlines. The United African Airlines is an unregistered airlines and its fundamental purpose is the transportation of troops. The planes of this airline fly between Damascus, Kabul, Ethiopia, South Yemen and Beirut. During my stay in Tripoli I also heard that a few days before some Pakistanis had seen Pakistanis in military uniforms in a truck going to Tobruk. It was also revealed that there were some Pakistanis doing military service in Aden.

The members of the delegation went first to Ghaylan camp some 10 kilometers from Tripoli. The majority of the Pakistanis here had arrived shortly before, after having received guerrilla training in al-Shuwayrif. They were about 500, and they included former Pakistani military men with ranks of major down to the foot soldier. There were also quite a few members with connections with the police and para-military organizations, but the majority were from the Frontier. The recruiting agent had given the Libyan government the impression that they were all "soldiers." While addressing his countrymen, the voice of the leader of the delegation choked up and, seeing his eyes filled with tears, the Pakistanis far from their homes began to weep, and it seemed to me as though the very walls of the camp were weeping. Not only those torn from home and loved ones, but also the members of the delegation were weeping. And seeing their tear-filled eyes, the faces of our Libyan hosts also became grave.

For the first time in this camp the members of the delegation heard in person about the difficulties of their countrymen, the echoes of which had reached Pakistan. Until they reached Tripoli, the minister and the rest of the delegation could not believe that the Pakistanis coming to Libya had really fallen under oppression. The Libyan embassy in Pakistan too had called these matters rumors and imaginary tales. In fact the Libyan ambassador went so far as to tell me that the cassettes had been made in Pakistan and were a conspiracy of the capitalists who wanted to cause bad relations between the two brother countries. But the truth was speaking in this camp, and the Pakistanis were attesting to those heart-rending stories which had reached Islamabad, Lahore and Karachi.

On the way from Ghaylan to the other camp near Tripoli, Saba' Abril, I asked the Libyan police officer Mr Hani, who was appointed to take care of the delegation, whether his government was aware of the conditions in the camps. He shook his head in the negative and said "That is false." I asked if it was also false that the government of Libya had recruited watchmen to guard offices, buildings, construction sites and city property, but they had been selected for guerrilla training instead? Hani answered my question saying that the majority of the people voluntarily enlisted for 'jihad,' and, in accordance with their intentions, they chose 100 men to send to Lebanon by way of Damascus. Mr Hani's answer seemed an admission that the contract had been broken and the Pakistanis given guerrilla training against their will. In the light of this answer, it may be surmised that those who refused the training were treated violently.

When we reached Saba' Abril, the people there were overcome with happiness when they saw the members of the delegation and rent the sky with cries of "Long Live Pakistan," and embraced the newcomers. After the minister's speech, a former army major told the entire story from their departure from Pakistan to their arrival in Libya, going to various camps, and obtaining military training in hunger and thirst. This military man was among those 100 commandoes who had been sent against their will to Damascus and who at the Damascus airport had refused to go further. He revealed that when those men came back from the Damascus airport, their clothes were soaked in blood. And it was not the Libyan guards who had bathed them in blood but their own brothers who had done this violence, especially a Pakistani named Abdul Razaq, who was in the forefront of torturing his fellow countrymen. With him there was a military man named Pahalvan. Both of them were not only the men of the Bukhari brothers but also often met with the terrorists who had been sent from Pakistan at the demand of the hijackers of the plane.

The people at the camp complained about a few of their countrymen whom they said were a disgrace to their country and most certainly were connected with the Al Zulfikar organization. These handful of individuals kept spitting out poison against their country. They had countless times announced that they no longer had any connection with their nation and if the time came they were ready to fight against it. When I asked one Pakistani about these traitors, I was told that they were in al-Shuwayrif and now must certainly be around somewhere. The people in this camp wrote messages on their photographs, letters, and small pieces of paper and asked us to inform their families of their welfare. Since they came here they had not been able to send any messages and they were worried what their parents, wives, children, brothers and sisters, and friends and relatives would be thinking.

That was a sight to see. People were writing messages on pieces of paper, on empty cigarette packages, and on the back of pictures. Those who had no pictures were full of regret, and those who could not write were asking the help of their companions. Most of the people in those two camps were from Rawalpindi, Gujar-Khan, Jhelu, Chakwal, Azad Kashmir, Gujarat, Cambellpore and the Frontier. I met many people who could speak no language other than Pashto and it was very difficult to hold a conversation with them.

[30 Nov 81 p 5]

[Text] The next day after the tour of those camps there was another round of talks with the Libyan authorities and Mr Ghulam Dastagir Khan made Muhammad Abdullah al-Mabruk and the officers of his department aware of the pitiable condition of the Pakistanis and of their desire to return to their homeland. And on that day, in the presence of the Pakistani delegation, Muhammad al-Mabruk confirmed that the Bukhari brothers had received 600,000 dinars from them. He said, "Give us the Bukhari brothers and you take back your people." He also said that both Pakistan and Libya had been deceived.

I had more than 50 pictures, letters and messages from the Pakistanis, and our next stop was Benghazi. Benghazi is the second largest city of Libya. It is situated on the shore of the Mediterranean; 14.5 percent of the population of Libya is in this city. British influences are more evident in this region. The local people are cultured, broadminded and sociable. This region used to be called Cyrenaica. Pakistani doctors, teachers and nurses had come to this city first. The Pakistani doctors here also gave a welcoming party in honor of the delegation. There were two camps of the Al Murtaza Associates' recruits in Benghazi. The Pakistani delegation went first to Southwest. The tales of intolerable treatment people in Southwest suffered made one's hair stand on end. One Pakistani there told me to go to al-Shuwayrif and Bu Ghaylan first, they were even worse off. He also said that many of his companions had died because of the terrible hardships, and others had become crippled and were imprisoned in the fort. Some of the wounds were such that there were insects in them. The people in this camp also complained of Razaq and his companions. The people in this camp told us that there were Pakistani terrorists in this camp and that at first they toured the camps trying to persuade people to accept the leadership of Murtaza Bhutto and fight against Pakistan.

All of those in Benghazi Coast Camp were commandoes, and they were being readied to be sent to some unknown destination when the news of their miserable plight reached Pakistan. The commandoes made the leader of the delegation aware of the suffering they underwent in the course of guerrilla training, and revealed that they were given very little food. Their tea was served in empty olive containers, and they were forced to work even when suffering from fever. People fell while walking and became unconscious while sitting. One day the Bukhari brothers toured the camp and told them that Libya had bought them for 600 dinars each and now they would have to live and die on this soil. We heard many heart-rending stories here. For example, one man from Peshawar had pawned his two daughters to a shopkeeper in order to come here in search of his dreams. One young man from Azad Kashmir had sold the building which was the only cover for the heads of his wife and children in order to come here to work for a better future. One man said

that before he came to Libya his younger brother kept seeing in a dream that he had brought him a car from abroad in which there were grapevines growing, but after he came here the dream disappeared into the burning sands of the desert, and instead of a car, they were living in airtight cabins such a people are imprisoned in for punishment. Tears filled his eyes as he said, "Even on the 'Id we were starving and were not even able to pray."

The third day we were to meet the Pakistanis in Al Kufrah Camp in the Azam desert. Al Kufrah is a small town situated near Chad and Sudan and is a Libyan military station. The majority of people here are Sudanese, in fact the mosques are filled with them. That night the doctors and engineers gave a party in honor of the delegation and invited the Libyan authorities too. The doctors talked with the leader of the delegation about their problems, and frankly discussed the conditions of Pakistanis in Libya. Dr Akhtar Malik had been living in Libya for some time and is the guiding spirit of the Pakistan Association. The young protocol officer, Mr Hadi, was sitting next to me on the sofa. I asked him why Libya had refused permission to the Pakistani Boeing plane carrying the prisoners sent out of the country at the demand of the hijackers to land in Tripoli. Mr Hadi was startled by my question, and after thinking a bit, said, "Pakistan and Libya are two brother countries and we did not want to give the Pakistani people the wrong impression by allowing the prisoners to land in our country." But in contrast to Mr Hadi's answer, some Pakistanis in Benghazi told me that the Libyan authorities were fearful of a severe reaction against the arrival of the prisoners among the 90,000 Pakistanis who live in Libya. It was possible that they might have come out of the houses in protest.

Early in the morning the small Boeing plane which the Libyan government had chartered for us took off for the Sahara desert. Going over the ocean of yellow sand and yellow rocky cliffs emerging from this ocean, the plane landed at the military airport. We could see people of the military of several countries at the airport. We reached Al Kufrah Camp by car and heard the stories of the Pakistanis there. One young man who was brought before the leader of the delegation was standing on crutches. When he left his home he was walking perfectly well. He fell ill during the course of training, and because of lack of treatment, his legs had become crippled. He was wondering what his old mother and father and his innocent children would think when they see him on crutches.

9914

CSO: 4203/33

MAURITANIA

COUNTRY'S SEARCH FOR STABILITY ANALYZED

Paris LE MONDE in French 16, 17 Jan 82

[Article by Paul Balta]

[16 Jan 82 p 4]

[Text] I. The Frustrated Reconciliation With Rabat

Mr Jean-Pierre Cot, minister delegate to the minister of external relations for cooperation, who has visited a number of African countries south of the Sahara in recent months, in particular Cameroon and Senegal, will pay an official visit to Mauritania from 21 to 23 January. Before proceeding to Nouakchott, Mr Jean-Pierre Cot will visit the Cape Verde islands and Senegal again.

Nouakchott--"They have confused the national holiday with 1 May," Lt Commander Moustapha Diop, permanent deputy secretary of the Military Committee for National Salvation and minister of information, commented with tolerant humor during the parade last 28 November marking the 21st anniversary of the winning of independence. The fact is that for the first time since President Ould Daddah was ousted on 10 June 1978, the military portion of the parade, well ordered, it is true, was reduced to a minimum, while the popular aspect was almost exclusively made up of sections of the Mauritanian Labor Union.

Still more significantly, the various union bodies appealed to the imagination of the people in decorating tanks to represent vocations and professions, and above all they proffered slogans making demands of unprecedented forcefulness, even under the old regime. One can judge from the following: "Raise the Interoccupational Minimum Growth Wage," "Agrarian Reform," "Protect Our Workers Abroad," "Standardize the Family Allocation," "Lower Prices," "For a Free, United and Democratic Trade Union," "Free Health Care," "A Social Housing Policy," "An End to Unemployment," "Urgent Solutions to Transportation Problems," etc. It should be made clear, however, that this list of daily difficulties would not have been submitted in this way to the chief of state, Lt Col Mohamed Khouma Ould Haidalla, had he not listed the goals which the CMSN [Military Committee for National Salvation] also would like to achieve.

The development of the trade union is one of the results of the attempted coup d'etat undertaken on 16 March 1981 by a group of exiled officers headed by Lieutenant Colonels Kader and Ahmed Salam Ould Sidi (LE MONDE, 18 and 19 March). Claiming to represent the Alliance for a Democratic Mauritania (AMD) and supported by Rabat, they contributed

to a substantial modification in the situation in this country, which is repelled by bloodshed, due to the very fact that they caused the deaths of a number of persons. In addition, their failure invalidated the hasty and superficial analyses of the Moroccan intelligence services and the opponents of the AMD. On the basis of the discontent existing in some strata of the population and certain disagreements within leading circles, the promoters of the coup hoped to bring about a popular uprising and to rally the officers of the CMSN to their cause. In fact neither the one nor the other occurred. And if the citizens of Mauritania deplore the fact that the felons were shot, which is not usual here, they have some difficulty in taking up their defense, since this method of forceful action is not compatible with the sense of honor characteristic of the country.

Army Control

"It is surprising that the Moroccans, who had laid claim to Mauritania and supposedly understood it well, have not yet learned that we are extremely jealous of our independence," a former colleague of President Ould Daddah, who has now gone into business, told us. "In a peaceful context, Morocco would have a preponderant influence here, because economic and cultural exchange has always been carried out 'vertically.' On the other hand, each time Rabat attacks Mauritania, it throws its friends off balance, leading to a sort of holy union and offering Algeria an advantage," he added.

At the time, the army, which "expected something to happen," had contemplated seven scenarios and developed suitable responses. Later, it drew conclusions from the "foreign and domestic threats," in the words of the chief of state, and it took back all the authority it had begun to relinquish with the formation on 15 December 1980 of a government headed by a civilian, Mr Sid Ahmed Ould Bneijara, whose administration seems to have been a disappointment. On 20 April 1981, the chief of the general staff, Col Moawiya Ould Sid Ahmed Taya, an officer known to be extremely strict, formed a cabinet including civilians and military officers.

The regime took this opportunity to eliminate some individuals whose actions or behavior had been susceptible of criticism, either because they defended the ideology of the Baas party in Iraq with suspicious enthusiasm, or because they proved too "understanding" with regard to Libya. Their removal was carried out "in the Mauritanian style," the individuals concerned being "requested" to return to their native villages to await better days. Others, such as Lieutenant Colonel Boukreis and Captain Breika M'Barek, respectively posted to Nouadhibou and Zouerate, who were thought to be sympathetic to the Polisario Front, although their reputations as patriots were unstained, were transferred to sectors less sensitive than those they had commanded, so that Mauritania would not be vulnerable to the slightest suspicion on the part of its neighbor to the north.

Similarly, Lt Commander Dahane, who had just been made minister of foreign affairs, was removed from that post. Dynamic and full of ideas, he was thought to be "America's man," because he had made a 2-month trip for study in the United States. In fact, he was criticized for having been too hesitant about the election of Mr Mitterrand, which was regarded as "positive" by the CMSN, and too impulsive when it came to the attempted reconciliation between Rabat and Nouakchott. It was believed that he failed to obtain sufficient guarantees before Hassan II and President Haidalla met, under the good offices of King Khalid Saud of Saudi Arabia in Taef on 28 June, after the OAU summit meeting at which the Moroccan sovereign had accepted the principle of self-determination for the Western Sahara.

In fact, the two chiefs of state signed a seven-point agreement in Taef which was drafted by Saudi Arabia, Iraq and the Arab League, with the help of the ministers of foreign affairs, but which has still not been implemented. Article 2 provides that each of the two countries "will refrain from allowing any opposition whatsoever to use its territory against the other," Lt Commander Moustapha Diop explained to us. He believes that the king undertook to expel the opposition claiming AMD affiliation and to block their access to Radio Morocco, which he would not have done, despite a new step taken in July by the Mauritanian minister of foreign affairs which delayed the reestablishment of diplomatic relations for which the Taef agreement provides.

A Burdensome Conflict

Hassan II, on the other hand, has accused Mauritania of aiding the Polisario Front and even of sheltering it after the Guelta-Zemmour attack last October, thus leading to increased tension. "These charges are without foundation," the Mauritanian leaders told us, "but Morocco is not pleased by the neutrality of our government, because it sees therein an obstacle to its expansionist intent. It has not abandoned hope of installing a 'more understanding' regime in Nouakchott which would close its eyes to the maneuvers with a view to annexing the Western Sahara, or at least the 'useful triangle,' although the OAU has expressly specified that the Saharan people may express their will freely."

Military attaches of various countries, including the United States, who visited the northern part of the country before and after the Guelta-Zemmour attack, confirmed to us that the Polisario Front has no basis there and that there was no need for it to seek refuge there since its troops remained in the Zemmour Mountains, as has since been confirmed by the Moroccan army's evacuation of the region. The majority of the diplomats do not think that the Saharans used SAM-6 weapons either. However, the Americans do believe that Libya has supplies such weapons to the front, but they dismiss any Cuban or East German role. "It takes us 6 months to install a SAM-6 emplacement. Taking into account not only the environment, but also the capacity to adapt which the Saharans have repeatedly evidenced, one can presume that some of their fighters have spent between 6 months and a year learning to handle the SAM-6's," an expert told us.

Thus the Saharan conflict continues to cloud the future of Mauritania, although its leaders have made a point of withdrawing from this "fratricidal war" in order to focus on domestic problems, which remain enormous. If they warmly welcomed Under-secretary of State Chester Croker during his spring visit, the first by an American leader since independence was won, they are concerned today about the increasing support promised to Rabat by Washington. "We are persuaded that Hassan II is seeking to destroy stability in Mauritania by every means, and we fear that American aid may be used against us. On the other hand, we understood the attitude of President Mitterand, and that is why President Haidalla agreed for the first time to participate in the Franco-African summit meeting early in November," the minister of information told us.

"The 16 March attack by Morocco," as it is officially known, forced Mauritania to keep more troops under arms than it would have desired, and to adopt stricter security measures. Although the Moroccan cooperative aides returned to Nouakchott recently, airline flights to the kingdom have been suspended and the magnificent mosque built in the capital ("thanks to unobtrusive Saudi financing," the Mauritaniens explained) has still not been commissioned.

The events of 16 March also contributed to a greater awareness on the part of the military regime, which is seeking stability, of the "political vacuum" which existed in the country. With great candor, the CMSN itself used this expression in the 11 November text establishing "mass education structures." In the belief that the establishment of a multiparty system in a country with archaic social structures would inevitably favor the traditional clans, the military rejected the proposed constitution drafted early in 1981 and decided to pursue their reform policy from the bottom up. Thus they took a series of steps to encourage the resurgence of the trade unions, the liberation of the "haratine" (freed slaves), agrarian reform and economic and social recovery.

[17 Jan 82 p 3]

[Text] II. A Man's Price

The coup d'etat attempted on 16 March 1981 by exiled officers failed to shake the Mauritanian military regime but did favor the emergence of the trade union movement and strengthened the leading team in its mistrust of Morocco, which charges that it has supported the Polisario Front. Nouakchott deplores the fact that the agreement reached between the two countries at the Islamic summit meeting in Taef has not been implemented, and complains that Rabat "is not pleased by Mauritanian neutrality" in the Saharan conflict (LE MONDE, 16 January).

Rosso--As one departs from Nouakchott in the direction of Rosso, 200 km to the south, one leaves the desert world to enter a river landscape. The landscape becomes more verdant, then palm trees appear, and finally, along the banks of the majestic watercourse of the Senegal, the vegetation is flamboyant. Violet, red and orange bougainvillea and masses of yellow or purple canna lie along the M'Pourie Plain as far as the dam which blocks the salty influx from the Atlantic from moving upstream. There the Chinese have established rice fields which extend as far as one can see. The south is indeed the breadbasket of Mauritania, but....

Rosso, with its 40,000 inhabitants, is famous for its secondary boarding school which accommodates 1,500 students and has trained the greater part of the country's elite. The city ranks second after Nouakchott in school enrollment, but when one remembers that the national enrollment rate is about 26 percent, one can imagine what the situation must be for the 250,000 people who inhabit the rest of the Trarza, and the other less favored provinces. The Military Committee for National Salvation has contributed to the development of the land and the establishment of some 30 cooperatives for rice cultivation, if indeed the farmers returned from the capital to work there.

We crossed fertile regions in which the land nonetheless lay fallow, in a country which must import grain worth 1 billion uguiyas (10 uguiyas, also known as UM, equal 1 French franc), in order to make up its food deficit. This abandoned land poses the double problem of agrarian reform, which is being planned, and the fate of the "haratine" (freed slaves). Most often, they continue to be dependent on their masters, who have them cultivate "properties" to which their rights are not beyond challenge and which, in addition, have been improved with state aid, for their own benefit.

Abolition of Slavery

In July 1980, the CMSN abolished slavery. This was a political decision based on principle. Then it had to be implemented. It was not until 9 November 1981 that a law was published including the three following main points: 1. Confirmation

of the elimination of slavery throughout the territory; 2. payment of compensation to the rightful owners (the "masters") by the state; and 3. the appointment of a commission responsible for drafting regulatory decrees and establishing the amount of compensation.

Needless to say, this law is forcefully challenged by the haratine. But what is new is that El-Hor, the movement which defends their rights, although it is not recognized (no political groups is) is now tolerated. Not only are its leaders no longer sought out and arrested, but some have even been given responsible posts. Mr Bilal Werzeg, who was its representative abroad, has been assigned a diplomatic post in Europe. Mr Hamoyd Boitgel was recently elected deputy secretary general of the UTM [Workers Union of Mauritania], and Mr Haimer has been appointed deputy director of the radio network.

It is true that these leaders broke with the extremist minority which wanted to enlist them in a rebel Black African movement, if not in the establishment of an autonomous entity known as the "Kingdom of Fouta." A young hartani (the singular form of haratine) told us this about his community: "While those of Arab origin are a minority and the Arabized Arabs (Iraqis, Egyptians, those from the Maghrib, etc) predominate, the Moors are a Berber and Arab mixture. Basically, why can't those of us who are the descendants of black slaves and 'beidane' (white) masters consider ourselves fully Arab, just as the Egyptians or the Sudanese do? We are the foundation of the nation, and in a way, the real Mauritaniens, because we have no other country."

In the view of Mr Haimer, a former school principal, it is not so much a question of race as a social problem. "We are the oppressed and we are seeking to find a modern and equitable solution to this problem," he said. In his view, freedom should lead to equal rights and obligations. He finds it shocking that a commission "should establish a man's price, as if he were merchandise." "In any case," he added, "if there are to be commissions, we should be represented on them because it is we who are primarily concerned."

He explained that the country's leaders are seeking to respect the Islamic precept according to which slaves are freed by compensating the owner. "That is wrong," he said. Islam inherited slavery and it codified the situation with which it was faced. Now Islam offers 16 ways of liberating slaves. Why was only one solution selected, and that which is perhaps the least consistent with the spirit of the Koran at that? Wouldn't it have been more natural and just to compensate the party who for centuries has been the victim?"

Education of the Masses

Our interlocutor also stressed the fact that the blacksmiths, sorcerers and craftsmen have been forgotten, and continue to have a separate, if not inferior, status. In addition, the heratine will find it difficult not to remain dependent on their masters as long as two basic conditions have not been met: the enrollment of their children in school (less than 2 percent of them are enrolled) and land reform, which should be based on the principle "land to him who works it." It is not enough to tell a slave that he is free, Mr Haimer concluded. "He must also be provided with a structure to accommodate him, and his mind and that of his master must be free."

Since the economy is based in large part on the haratine, this is why there are many of them in the UTM. It is significant that the trade union organization undertook a palace revolution in the course of its second special congress on 3, 4 and 5 October.

It eliminated the majority of the old leaders, who were suspected of retaining the mentality and the habits of the Ould Daddah regime. "Elected in 1974 and reelected in 1977, these leaders believed they had hereditary rights," the Mauritaniens say jokingly. They reacted keenly, but the chief of state publicly put them straight. "The main rule of the democratic involves yielding to any decision adopted by the majority," he stated in his speech to the nation.

Parallel to this, the CMSN plans to complete by the beginning of 1982 the establishment, undertaken at the end of November, of "mass education structures." This new institution, headed on the national level by the permanent secretary of the CMSN and on the regional level by the commander of the military region, has four secretaries (orientation and organization, economy, voluntary workers, Islamic morality and social action). "We want to make of it a school for civic duty, responsibility and freedom, such as to train the people for the effective and responsible management of public life," the minister of information, Lt Commander Moustapha Diop, who is also deputy secretary of the CMSN, told us. He explained that in each neighborhood camp or rural sector there will be groups of 10 cells, each cell itself being made up of a dozen families. The minister said that this is "not in any way the embryo of a future single party." This was what was said earlier about the volunteers' movement launched in 1980, which has been integrated into the new structures. "There will be no cards," Mr Diop explained. "We oppose a single party, because that is equivalent to dictatorship. Instead it is necessary to prepare seriously for the establishment of a multiparty system." It remains to be seen if these good intentions will not seem somewhat constraining to the citizens of Mauritania who, extremely jealous of their freedom, must wage a difficult struggle for survival.

The efforts toward authority and strictness made by the government are, it is true, beginning to yield results. In 1981, grain production practically doubled, increasing from 21,000 tons to 41,000 tons, while for the first 10 months of the year which have elapsed, exports of fishing products reached the record figure of 92,500 tons, worth a total of almost 2.9 billion uguiyas. Iron exports came to about 9 million tons, and the Guelbs plan, which is supposed to guarantee an increase in production until the end of the century, is proceeding normally. About a dozen industrial projects have been launched. In the infrastructure sector, only the final 100 km remain to be commissioned on the transverse road linking Nouakchott with Nema, where an international airport built by the FRG to give our country an outlet from the region was commissioned on 24 November.

In the financial sector, foreign aid was reduced from 4 billion uguiyas in 1980 to 1.4 billion in 1981, while Mauritania has met its international obligations. On the other hand, if the balance of payments is favorable, it is because the costs of imports of equipment goods and food products were in part covered by friendly or "brotherly" nations. The fact nonetheless remains that thanks to an increase in income of about 7 billion, the state budget deficit was reduced from 3.4 billion uguiyas to 2.3 billion in 1981, and Minister of Economy and Finance Dieng Boubou Farbie hopes it can be reduced to under 2 billion in 1982.

The main concern of the regime at this year's start is the launching, one year late, of the fourth 1981-1985 5-year plan, for which purpose a total of 76 billion uguiyas has been allocated, including 22 billion which will go to the mining sector. "In reality," Mr Farbie told us, "stress has been placed above all on agriculture, to which 19 billion have been allocated to allow it to carry out land reform, land improvement, the reforestation program and the establishment of staffing for and

organization of the peasants." The other priority sector is fishing, with an allocation of 16 billion, the goal being to make of Nouadhibou a center which can compete with Las Palmas in the Canary Islands. This means that at a minimum, the telephone, telex and hotel systems must function properly.

But in this country, which is one of the poorest in the world although it has considerable potential assets for a population of less than 2 million, none of these projects can be carried out unless two conditions are met: domestic stability and peace in the region. Now rightly or wrongly, Nouakchott still fears action on the part of Rabat, and beyond that, since the increase in American aid to Morocco, the internationalization of the conflict in the Western Sahara.

5157

CSO: 4519/100

AHMED OSMAN ON AIMS, ROLE OF RNI

Rabat ALMAGHRIB in French 22 Dec 81 pp 1-2

[Interview with RNI Chairman Ahmed Osman by AL MOSTAQBAL special correspondent; date and place not specified]

[Text] In answering the questions of the special correspondent of the weekly publication AL MOSTAQBAL, Mr Ahmed Osman, chairman of the National Rally of Independents [RNI], describes Morocco's current political scene in the following interview. Mr Osman points out, in particular, the aims, methods and goals of the RNI and its role in the national democratic process. Special mention should be made of the concept of opposition and the responsibilities which such a role entails for the promotion of national development, the participation of all citizens in the work of construction and the mobilization of everyone. It will also be noted how much this liberal policy and the desire for responsibility and efficiency, which our country so greatly needs, come through in Mr Osman's remarks.

[Question] Your party is a rally of different political groups and factions. You are part of the opposition at the present time. The development of Morocco's political situation will also affect your party, which will lead to a selective process within its ranks. What is your view of the transition from rally to political party?

[Answer] To be honest, we began as a rally because we wanted to change certain Moroccan political habits and practices. In the early 1970's, we noted that Moroccans were starting to gradually become alienated from politics. This may have had different causes, including in particular the fact that existing political parties had not adapted to the development of the times and of the Moroccan people. They had not provided suitable conditions for the political process. We also believe in a multiparty system and in the plurality of public opinion, as well as in the plurality of views within the same political organization. We are therefore firmly convinced of the need to change leaders and responsibilities within a political party in order to prevent continuous domination by a minority over younger members desiring an effective sharing of responsibilities. It was for all these reasons that we considered establishing ourselves as a rally and not as a political party. With practice, we are now gradually beginning to function as a political party. We also accept our party's place in the political scene. Thus for 1 year, in rallies,

meetings and on other occasions, we have told our members of the need for our clear and objective organization on the national political chessboard, distinguishing who is to our right and who is to our left, and assuming our role as part of the left, right or center, for we believe that everyone is entitled to defend his principles and opinions. It goes without saying that we are all supposed to be in the service of the higher general interest.

[Question] Can you specify for us the principles of your party, which claims to be a progressive center party?

[Answer] We believe in a progressive Islamic society and hold that our Moslem traditions, heritage and views can be the foundations of Moroccan democracy; thus we do not have to import any foreign concepts. We believe in the constitutional, democratic monarchy of Morocco, which is a real and modern democracy. We are convinced that this system is best for Moroccan society and that it best conforms to our traditions and history and is the one which the Moroccan people have adopted by conviction, as it were.

In general, we believe in individual freedom, in the freedom of citizens to take action, especially in the case of the economy and public liberties, in accordance with law. With regard to economic organization, we are liberal to a certain extent. The government must be concerned with important matters of general interest and with supervising the economic activities of citizens. A number of vital activities must be in the hands of the government, since they affect the national economy, first of all, and are so extensive that it is difficult for individuals to look after them.

[Question] Is this policy part of a political platform and do you explain it in your political speeches?

[Answer] We have a political platform encompassing all sectors, of course. In reference to it, we want true social justice, equal opportunity and measures to combat our society's existing social disparities. We support private ownership, but it must be accompanied by some kind of activity which is beneficial to society.

[Question] I know that you don't like to talk about social classes and their struggle, but all economic reports indicate that half of the Moroccan people are suffering from a difficult economic situation. What do you propose concerning these underprivileged social classes?

[Answer] Actually, the figures are not accurate. It cannot be said that the situation of 9 million people is bad and that the situation of others is satisfactory. This is wrong. We must learn to control the problem of underdevelopment and tackle it firmly. But in the present situation, we are proceeding on the following basis: Morocco must live according to its means and its potential. Equal opportunity must be granted to everyone, in all areas: labor, health care, the economy, education Thus it is a matter of equity. Certain public and private practices must also be combated.

[Question] Why is there such political apathy among Moroccan youth? Is it due to a feeling of failure? What is the cause, especially since there are more than five active parties in Morocco?

[Answer] For years we have noticed a lack of interest in the political process, especially among Moroccan youth. But although there has been apathy, it should be pointed out that there is now a revival of interest. This responsibility is being assumed by political parties, which, as the constitution decrees, must help to develop the citizen--young citizens in particular--and provide them with the best conditions for the political process. As a new party, we intend to offer youth such conditions. And this issue is in fact starting to be considered in our party. We want to give youth complete freedom to carry out their political activities and to round out their cultural development. Thus despite appearances, we can manage to combat that apathy.

It goes without saying that as a political group we are not shirking our responsibility. Everyone is responsible. The government is also responsible concerning youth. Every Moroccan citizen must receive guidance within a party to assure his political participation. I cannot imagine a Moroccan remaining outside a party or group. I believe that parties achieve the aspirations of youth. Moreover, by being members of different political groups, young people can influence the direction of the political movement. It is quite easy for young people to join our rally. And because of the real democracy which exists within our ranks, we hope that young people will take their place and will be able to obtain a following and have an influence on us.

[Question] The practice of opposition politics varies from one organization to the next. Some opposition parties even oppose the government as a whole. Where is your place in this opposition?

[Answer] Any opposition, wherever it is, is not opposed to the government as such; that would be absurd. For in every country there are rules for the democratic process, for the exercise of democracy. Otherwise there could be no political process.

With regard to opposition, it may be said that it is only the government which has an opposition. It is actually the government that is criticized because of its political platform and its implementation of that platform. For succeeding governments have to deal with the same problems: housing, health care, underdevelopment, education In general, everyone agrees concerning the programs. It is concerning the ways and means of implementing them that disagreements may arise. For example, in a number of European countries there are only slight differences in programs: those of Laborites and Conservatives in Great Britain, and of the Socialists and Christian Democrats in the FRG Thus it is the details that must be worked out. But what is of primary importance is the manner of implementing these programs. The opposition's goal is to acquire an absolute or relative majority for participating in the management of public affairs. That is an obvious general rule. There are also positions. At the time of our response to the government's platform, we told the Chamber of Representatives that we had opposite positions, of course, but that it was not a question of circumstantial or self-seeking opposition; our positions derive from the principles governing our actions. We accept responsibility for what we say and for what we do. If we have the chance, we will put into practice all the principles contained in our statements.

[Question] Are you in favor of cooperation with other opposition parties and on what basis?

[Answer] Our positions, in various areas, are well known. In general, we are in favor of coexistence and cooperation among different groups. We do not reject the principle of cooperation with other parties. But an essential condition for such cooperation is that its fundamental bases must be clear and must respect the basic principles of our rally, as well as Moroccan institutions and cherished values.

[Question] At the present time there is a strike movement and confrontations--between students and watchmen--at the university. Are you considering cooperation with other opposition parties to find a solution to these problems?

[Answer] We of the RNI have already been at that stage for several days. With regard to cooperation with other opposition parties, that is a question which has not been raised. The RNI is prepared to cooperate with all organizations and parties so that the general interest will prevail. Some people believe that our rally cannot assume an opposition role, as though the opposition were private ground or the privilege of one group: the left, for example. But personally, I don't believe in such a distinction of left and right. When you study our platform, you may say that we are more to the left than others, except if the left recommends violence, which I categorically reject.

I am also firmly convinced of the need for factions, including the leftist faction, on the Moroccan political scene. I can't imagine Moroccan politics without a right, a center and a left. What I do hope for Morocco, however, is that all factions remain within legal bounds.

[Question] What is the cause of the recent military escalation in the Sahara, such as what took place at Guelta Zemmour? Why does Morocco maintain that the Soviet Union took part in that affair?

[Answer] Following this escalation, his majesty the king brought up the recent developments--Guelta Zemmour--and the introduction of new and sophisticated weapons. This was aimed, on one hand, at setting conditions for the peace process begun at Nairobi and, on the other, to establish the POLISARIO Front as a "participant", since the decisions of the Implementing Committee recommend negotiations between the respective parties to bring about a cease-fire. The POLISARIO Front thus wanted to establish itself as a "participant." The primary objective was the occupation of land in the vicinity of Guelta Zemmour in order to have an established position. We believe that the peace process should continue and that the referendum should be held under the best conditions.

[Question] But don't Moroccan accusations of the Soviet Union affect the Moroccan policy of contributing to a balance between the two superpowers? What is your opinion?

[Answer] I think that the Soviet Union's responsibility for what has happened in the region is undeniable. The sophisticated weapons used are Soviet-made and are carefully supplied to a small number of countries under special conditions. Morocco has ties with the Soviet Union through joint agreements and interests. We hope that this affair will not affect the existing balance and that there will be cooperation among everyone, unless we are forced to do otherwise. For we are a peaceful country, truly neutral and nonaligned. Our relationship with the Soviet Union is very important, as are our relations with the United States. We have long-standing relations and common interests. We hope that this balance will continue.

[Question] With regard to the Fez summit, there is an imbalance in Arab countries' relations with the United States on one hand and the Soviet Union on the other. This is delaying a solution to the problem. What is your opinion?

[Answer] Actually, if we analyze the existing situation in the Arab world, we note that disagreements are periodic. For example, can we say which countries are hard-liners? What is Iraq's position? What is Algeria's position? These are circumstantial distinctions which change constantly.

[Question] But such discord has now lasted for 7 years.

[Answer] But reality now obliges the Soviet Union to sooner or later take a position on Arab efforts and in particular on the Saudi peace plan.

[Question] But the Arab countries must adopt a clear position

[Answer] We all agree on the impossibility of applying a radical, comprehensive solution without the Soviet Union's participation. In my opinion, the Saudi plan could be endorsed by everyone: the Soviet Union, the United States and Europe, as well as, of course, all Arab countries and the PLO. For we are convinced that this plan serves Palestinian interests and those of the Arab nation: In particular, it stresses the need to establish a Palestinian state with Al-Qods as the capital.

[Question] Do you think that inter-Arab differences can be resolved between now and June, when the Arab summit will be held?

[Answer] We hope that the Saudi plan will become an Arab plan that can constitute an alternative to the Camp David accords. We also hope that both blocs and the Arab community will adopt a clear position on this plan.

[Question] What will Egypt's place be within the Arab community?

[Answer] We hope, of course, for its return.

[Question] Under what conditions?

[Answer] In keeping with the Saudi plan, which is capable of reuniting the Arab community on a minimal basis. There is a difficult point, of course, Point 7.

[Question] Will Mr Abderrahim Bouabid be released and are you working toward that end?

[Answer] I can only hope for the return of harmony within the Moroccan nation. It goes without saying that his majesty the king will remain the magnanimous father to everyone.

11915

CSO: 4519/91

INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE OFFICIAL DISCUSSES MINISTRY PROJECTS

Doha AL-'AHD in Arabic No 346, 17 Nov 81 pp 28-31

/Interview with Engineer Ahmad al'Mani', Qatar's deputy minister of industry and agriculture, in Qatar, by Hilmi Badr: "Bold Interview With Engineer Ahmad al'Mani' Concerning the Future of Qatar's Industry and Agriculture"; date of interview not given/

/Text/ New Industries in Qatar for the First Time. Implementation of the Central Veterinary Hospital This Year.

Our Plan This Year Is To Achieve a Secure Food Supply for /Qatar's/ Families and Individuals.

There are new industries which will be in our country for the first time, such as industries which will produce paint, dyes and plastic bags. There will also be loans, granted on easy terms, to encourage light industries, imported equipment and raw materials will be exempt from customs duties, and protective tariffs will be imposed upon competing imported goods.

There will also be a continuation of the rendering of agricultural services in the realm of agricultural instruction and guidance, the Doha-Salwa road area as well as the al-Qarm and al-Qusayb areas on Qatar's coastline will begin to be cultivated, an agricultural services center both in the northern and southern parts of the country will be opened, a new veterinary clinic in the al-Khawr area will be set up, and the Agricultural and Veterinary Quarantine Law will be implemented in Qatar for the first time.

These are among the most important features of the Ministry of Industry and Agriculture's plan which Engineer Ahmad 'Abd al-Rahman al-Mani', deputy minister of industry and agriculture, talked to us about in an interview which AL-'AHD held with him in his office in the ministry.

/Question/ What plans has the Ministry of Industry and Agriculture made in order to achieve a secure food supply for families and individuals in Qatar?

/Answer/ Actually, before I answer this question, I would like to make clear one important point. It is the fact that the Ministry of Industry and Agriculture in Qatar is a ministry of services just like all other ministries of agriculture in the world. On the basis of instructions given by His Highness the Amir of

Qatar Shaykh Khalifah ibn Hamad Al Thani and His Highness the Crown Prince Shaykh Hamad ibn Khalifah Al Thani, the ministry is formulating an agricultural policy and setting up plans, programs and projects which will implement this policy in a manner which will achieve the objectives of supporting and developing the agricultural sector, achieving a secure food supply for the nation and its citizens, and attempting to avoid the sharp vicissitudes inherent in the world economic structure which entail severe ups and downs in the world prices of agricultural goods. To state things more clearly, a secure food supply for our beloved nation's families and individuals is the chief objectives which the Ministry of Industry and Agriculture is striving to achieve. This is to be done, first of all, by rendering agricultural services such as agricultural guidance and instruction, mechanization, distribution of improved seedlings and seeds, chemical fertilizers, insecticides and other agricultural services. It is also to be done by means of the ministry's programs dealing with controlling the utilization of agricultural resources, setting up infrastructure projects to serve the production and marketing objectives for agricultural goods, and setting up support structure projects or, as some people call them, pioneering guidance and instructional projects which are meant to stimulate the private sector. All of this is to be in addition to programs providing material and commodity support for the farms.

So the question should concern the benefit gained from Qatar's agricultural policy, with its numerous objectives and programs, in terms of the volume of agricultural production and thus secure food supply for the nation's families and individuals. Perhaps I should summarize the answer in terms of a number of points and by using definite figures:

1. The number of farms in Qatar totaled 603 by December 1980 as compared to only 411 in December 1971.
2. The crop-growing area in Qatar in 1980 was 31,900 dunams as compared to only 18,800 dunams in 1971.
3. The increase in crop-growing area entailed an increase in the quantitative production of various crops. This led to the country being able to achieve a larger measure of self-sufficiency in food production in spite of the fact that the country also experienced an increase in population and an increase in demand for food.

/Question/ What benefit is there from the government's experimental farm in the northern part of the country?

/Answer/ The government's experimental farm in the northern part of the country was set up in order to conduct various types of research dealing with agriculture and water supply. The farm also produces the necessary seedlings and seed for vegetable and fruit crops. In addition to this, the farm receives imported seedlings and seed in order to conduct scientific tests on them in order to be sure that they are suitable for use in agriculture. They are also prepared for use in planting on private sector farms at suitable planting times. Furthermore, a number of plastic houses have set up inside the government's experimental farm in order to introduce the idea of protected cultivation into the framework of realistic experimentation for the local environment and in order to make a technical and economic assessment of such intensive cultivation as well as the potential for its future expansion.

/Question/ How has the project dealing with the topographical survey of agricultural lands benefited the nation of Qatar?

/Answer/ The project has still not been completed since work began on it only a short time ago. It is an important project and we hope to benefit from its results, God willing, in the realm of providing orientation for programs of vertical and horizontal agricultural development.

/Question/ What role does the ministry play in the realm of overcoming the water supply problem?

/Answer/ The subject of irrigation has been of great concern to the Ministry of Industry and Agriculture in view of the fact that it is the principal definite factor in Qatar's agricultural development. In general, the ministry so far has been moving in three directions:

1. Studying the optimum volume of use of ground water in order to maintain a balance in the ground water and then strive to have this rate of ground water utilization not be exceeded.
2. Controlling the use of irrigation water by lessening the amount of irrigation water lost, on the one hand, and also by achieving greater benefit from it in the cultivation of various crops.
3. Searching for new sources of water that could be used in irrigation. This includes desalinization of sea water, treatment of sewage water, and utilizing semi-salty water in the cultivation of fodder.

/Question/ During the past 10 years Qatar has seen industrial growth which has been regarded as a huge leap in the field of development. Can we say that the course of this industrial growth has already reached the end of the road, or are there other industrial areas which the country will be engaging in? If so, what are these areas?

/Answer/ Qatar has in fact completed numerous industrial projects which are on both large and small scales in terms of their capital or labor force. There is no doubt that Qatari industrial products such as chemical fertilizers, petrochemicals, iron, steel, cement, etc., are generally of a high level both in terms of the types of products produced and their quality. Of course, this is the inevitable result of the efforts made by the government to provide unlimited material, economic and moral support. During the last 10 years attention has been focused on the industries which rely on crude petroleum substances and natural gases. They have been the focus of the lion's share of concern and enthusiasm. The plants were set up by means of financing from the government. Lately, however, the government has begun to be greatly concerned about small- and medium-size consumer industries which meet the needs of both the local market and the Gulf market and in which the private sector has the largest share. The field of industrial development is still wide open in numerous industrial areas. However, /success in these fields/ primarily depends on our ability to provide the /necessary/ mature and educated Qatari personnel who are trained as engineers, economists and technicians. In addition to this, we need to pass more advanced legislation in order to subject the process of industrial development to regulation which is scientific, sound and coherent.

In any case, we need to be careful and cautious when choosing which industries we need, especially in view of our limited local market situation. We also need to carefully think about what we need in view of our social circumstances and the traditions which we adhere to and which we should maintain.

/Question/ What role has the ministry played in the area of encouraging light industries?

/Answer/ Light industries play a large role in supporting the economy and meeting the needs of the local market in terms of providing consumer goods and other necessities for individuals. In view of this, Industrial Regulation Law Number 11 of 1980 has demonstrated the utmost concern for this sector and provided it with a number of incentives. Some of them are:

1. Granting of loans on easy terms.
2. Exemption of imported equipment and raw materials from customs duties.
3. Preference given by the government to locally produced goods when making its purchases.
4. Imposition of protective tariffs on competing imported goods.
5. Providing prepared industrial areas with all utilities at nominal fees. Also, the ministry's Department of Industrial Affairs and Industrial Development Committee will oversee this sector and provide it with all types of support and encouragement.

/Question/ What new industries will be coming to Qatar during the coming years?

/Answer/ Most of the industries which will be coming to Qatar during the coming years will be of the type which can be channeled toward meeting the needs of both the local and the Gulf markets. They will mainly be consumer industries and industries which rely on raw materials, local products and semi-finished products. The private sector will play a large role in implementing both these projects as well as some joint Gulf projects. The following are examples of some of these industries which will be coming to Qatar:

1. Industries in the public and mixed sectors:
 - A. An oil refinery with a production capacity of 1,000 gallons a day.
 - B. Relocation and expansion of Qatar's flour mills.
 - C. Development of the cement industry by doubling its production capacity.
2. Industries in the private sector:
 - A. A paints and dyes industry.
 - B. An industry which produces polyethylene and polypropylene plastic bags.
 - C. An ice cream and fruit juice industry.

D. Industries manufacturing construction materials such as bricks and ready-made concrete.

E. A confectionary industry.

F. Other light industries.

/Question/ What are the most important features of the Ministry of Industry and Agriculture's plan for the new year (1402 A.H.)?

/Answer/ The organizational structure of the Ministry of Industry and Agriculture includes four technical departments. They are the Departments of Agricultural Affairs, Agricultural and Water Research, Fisheries and Industrial Affairs. Each of these departments has its programs and projects, the implementation of which has been entrusted to it during the coming year. For example, the Department of Agricultural Affairs' plan includes the following: Continuation of rendering agricultural services such as agricultural guidance and instruction, distribution of insecticides and herbicides, distribution of improved vegetable seedlings, distribution of chemical fertilizers, agricultural mechanization services in all necessary farm operations, distribution of fruit tree and date tree seedlings, beginning the cultivation of the area around the Doha-Salwa Road, beginning the project of cultivating the area around al-Qarm and al-Qusayb on Qatar's coastline for the purpose of developing natural pastures to provide green fodder, opening up an agricultural services center in the northern part of the country, the construction of which has already been completed, beginning the implementation of the agricultural services center project in the southern part of the country, establishment of a new veterinary clinic in the al-Khawr region, beginning the implementation of the agricultural and veterinary quarantine in Qatar for the first time, beginning the implementation of the Central Veterinary Hospital, and beginning the expansion of the public resthouse at al-Shunaniyah.

Twenty-four Programs for the Department of Agricultural Research

The Department of Agricultural and Water Research's plan encompasses 24 programs and projects. They include the following:

Completion of the project dealing with making a comprehensive statistical and economic survey of Qatar's agricultural resources, beginning the planning of the project to make an economic classification of arable lands, continuation of field-crop and green fodder crop experiments and programs designed to increase the supply of wheat seed of the "Doha - 8" type and barley seed of the "Gulf" type, beginning the program of making studies dealing with irrigation ditch filling materials in order to select the materials most suitable for the country's circumstances, continuation of the research and studies connected with controlling irrigation water use and the experimental and research program dealing with the utilization of semi-salty water in the cultivation of fodder, beginning the first stage of the plan to improve irrigation efficiency in existing farmlands, implementation of the program involving digging exploratory wells in search of water, completion of the studies dealing with the use of sewage water in the cultivation of green fodder as well as the program dealing with keeping track of the balance of the ground water, continuation of the research concerning local agriculture, construction of new cold storage house units, continuation of work in the program dealing with making an inventory of, and categorizing, /Qatar's/ agricultural lands, and beginning the first stage of the project dealing with making a topographical survey of Qatar's agricultural lands and lands suitable for agriculture.

The Department of Fisheries' Plan

The Department of Fisheries' plan encompasses a number of programs. They include the program for taking a census of the fish population for the year 1402 A.H. which has the objective of providing actual statistical data dealing with Qatar's fish production, the volume of fish consumption, and the principal factors responsible for the changes in supply and demand from year to year. The plan also includes a program dealing with a comprehensive biological and chemical survey of the fishing grounds, using an integrated scientific approach. The objective of the program is to develop Qatar's fish resources on the basis of objective principles.

Ambitious Department of Industrial Affairs Plan

The Department of Industrial Affairs' plan includes continuation of work on the program dealing with studying requests for licenses from the economic and technical point of view as well as the issuing of industrial licenses, /continuation of/ the program for keeping track of the stages of implementation of the projects which have been granted industrial licenses, furnishing the necessary services concerning these industrial projects, and regulating the work done by the Industrial Development Committee and the Committee for Loans to Light Industries. The plan also includes organizing the technical, economic, and statistical data which can be furnished to our citizens so that they can consult these data when preparing feasibility studies. The department is also working on the completion of its administrative and technical /organizational/ structure so that it will be possible for it to offer better services in the realm of granting industrial licenses and registers, and provide consultation and guidance to investors in order to help guarantee them the best possible benefits and revenues.

9468

CSO: 4404/152

TALKS WITH IBRD ON AID, ENERGY MATTERS HELD

Dubai AL-BAYAN in Arabic 22 Oct 81 p 2

[Article: "Talks Between the UAE and the IBRD Begin; Hamdan States UAE Position on Participation in Energy Organization; Agrees to Additional Financing on the Condition That the Industrial Nations Also Participate"]

[Text] Abu Dhabi--Combined News Agencies--Official economic talks began yesterday between the UAE and the IBRD. The UAE delegation was headed by Shaykh Hamdan ibn Rashid, the minister of finance and industry, and the IBRD delegation was headed by Alden Clausen, chairman of the bank.

At the conclusion of a session between the two parties that was held yesterday morning, Shaykh Hamdan ibn Rashid stated that the session had dealt with a suggestion by the IBRD to establish an international energy organization to assist Third World countries in studying and developing energy sources.

In the course of the session Shaykh Hamdan announced that the UAE is prepared to participate in this project as long as the industrial nations also participate.

Shaykh Hamdan said that the bank's policies were also reviewed, and the possibility of the UAE providing additional funds to the IBRD and the International Development Agency was discussed.

He noted that Alden Clausen had said that he looked forward to seeing the UAE become a full member in the International Development Agency. It currently attends as an observer and periodically contributes to the organization.

The minister of finance made it clear that the UAE is prepared to provide additional funds to the bank on the condition that the industrial nations also pay a share. On the matter of choosing the most suitable means for cooperation between the bank and the UAE it was agreed that experts from both sides would study the issue.

The talks also covered areas of technical cooperation in which the bank could provide the UAE with training for technical cadres and project evaluation. The head of the IBRD promised to provide what the UAE needs in the way of training and development programs.

Shaykh Hamdan concluded his statement by saying that the UAE would very soon complete the steps necessary for membership in the International Development Agency.

The UAE delegation to the talks also included 'Abd-al-Mali al-Hamr, governor of the Central Bank; Nasir al-Nuways, director general of the Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development; Ahmad al-Tayir, assistant deputy minister of finance and industry; and Muhammad Khalfan Kharbash, director of the ministry's bureau of investments. The IBRD delegation included Mu'in Quraysh, vice chairman of the bank; Dr Sa'd al-Fishawi, head of the bank's Washington office; and Ghassan Rifa'i, head of the bank's division on technical assistance and projects.

Alden Clausen arrived here yesterday morning leading the bank's delegation on a 3-day visit to the UAE.

He was greeted at the airport by Ahmad al-Tayir, assistant deputy minister of finance and industry, and by Nasir al-Nuways, director general of the Abu Dhabi Fund.

9123

CSO: 4404/78

FOREIGN AID FIGURES REPORTED

Dubai AL-BAYAN in Arabic 25 Oct 81 p 2

[Article: "The Abu Dhabi Fund Annual Report: 62 Percent of the UAE's Assistance Is in the Form of Grants Which Are Not Repaid; 4.9 Billion Dirhams in Foreign Commitments in 1980"]

[Text] The annual report of the Abu Dhabi Fund for Economic and Social Development has revealed that 62 percent of all loans and assistance the UAE gives to developing countries is in the form of grants that are not repaid and [free] assistance.

According to the recently published report the total assistance and loans given by this nation to developing countries, in addition to international and Arab joint investment and partnership undertakings, in 1980 amounted to 4,969,300,000 dirhams.

The report noted that although the UAE is considered a developing country whose major resource--oil--can become depleted, and although it is beset by the same difficulties faced by other developing countries with regard to economic development, and has its own problems as well for which solutions must be found, it has allocated a considerable portion of its total national income to development assistance.

According to the report, total loans and assistance offered by the UAE in 1980 amounted to 3.3 billion dirhams, of which 185.6 million dirhams were offered in loans to developing countries, while 3.1 billion plus 40.1 million dirhams were in assistance to organizations.

In 1980, the UAE also provided a 55.9 million dirham payment as its share in the IMF; a 24.5 million dirham payment as its share in the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa; and 50.3 million dirhams to the Arab fund.

The report added that last year the UAE's participation in joint Arab investments amounted to 507.6 million dirhams.

Loans and investments provided by the Abu Dhabi Fund amounted to 385 million dirhams last year. It also managed loans and grants amounting to 646 million dirhams for the Bureau of Finance inasmuch as the fund was entrusted with the administration and supervision of some of the assistance offered by the bureau in addition to financing and administering numerous development projects.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

REPORT ON OFFSHORE DRILLING OPERATIONS PUBLISHED

Dubai AL-BAYAN in Arabic 23 Oct 81 p 2

[Article: "UAE Offshore Oil Fields Undergo Tremendous Growth; Current Production Is 400,000 Barrels a Day; 160 Oil-Producing Wells Have Been Drilled"]

[Text] Abu Dhabi-AL-BAYAN--Abu Dhabi Marine Areas (ADMA) has announced that its production from the Umm al-Shayf and Zakum fields amounts to about 400,000 barrels of crude oil a day, which is in accordance with the nation's policy.

A production capacity of 570,000 barrels a day has been set for them.

This information is contained in a new booklet published by the company yesterday on its offshore operations. It focuses on two principal fields, Umm al-Shayf and Zakum, which are considered among the most important offshore oil fields in the world.

In addition to these two wells the company also operates a smaller third field, al-Bunduq, for the al-Bunduq Company, Ltd.

The company noted that 200 wells have been drilled in the Umm al-Shayf, Zakum and al-Bunduq fields, of which more than 160 are producing, and about 100 are used with flooding and water injection to get the oil out, as well as several exploratory and surveillance wells.

The water injection capacity in all the installations at Umm al-Shayf and western Zakum--which are like steel islands built by engineering technology in the middle of the sea--amounts to 2.2 million barrels of sea water for injection into the wells.

The booklet noted that the first shipment of crude oil exported by Abu Dhabi on 4 July 1962 came from the Umm al-Shayf field where the first well was drilled in 1958. The first well in the Zakum field, which is considered one of the 10 most important offshore fields in the world, was drilled in April 1963, and production began in October 1967.

The booklet also noted that the advanced and brisk drilling operations in the Umm-al-Shayf and Zakum fields have drawn international attention because of the high level of technology and the low costs of implementation. The drilling techniques invented by ADMA are based on the principle of turbine drilling using a bit that resembles a knife blade.

The total depth of drilling operations increased from 14,512 feet in 1958--the first year of operation--to 452,886 feet in 1977.

The booklet deals with the progress of work at the three installations, which are built upon huge iron frameworks several stories high, with their stanchions in the middle of the sea.

The purpose of these installations is to inject chemically treated water into the wells to replace the pressure which has been lost, and thereby to help pump the oil to the surface.

9123

CSO: 4404/78

BRAHIM GHALI ON FIGHTING, CEASE-FIRE WITH MOROCCO

Algiers SAHARA LIBRE in French 10 Nov 81 pp 8-9

[Report on interview with SDAR Minister of Defense Brahim Ghali at press conference held on 25 October near Guelta Zemmour]

[Text] Addressing a group of journalists of the international press during a press conference which he held about 20 km from Guelta Zemmour, where a very violent confrontation took place on 13 and 14 October between our heroic Saharan People's Liberation Army [ALPS] and monarchist invasion forces, Brother Brahim Ghali, SDAR [Saharan Democratic Arab Republic] minister of defense said:

"We are meeting in the liberated area of the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic about 20 km from Guelta Zemmour, where the extensive fighting of 13 and 14 October 1981 occurred, fighting which has received wide press coverage.

"Following those events, we were asked by several press agencies to return to the site and to describe the major disastrous defeat of the FAR [Royal Armed Forces], particularly its regiment garrisoned at Guelta Zemmour.

"Gentlemen, you are no doubt aware of the false propaganda statements of Hassan II, and of his inconsistency and lack of any real basis in fact; these allegations are the ravings of a defeated man who is trying to implicate neighboring countries which are actually far from being involved in the war.

"To tell the truth, by such deceptive propaganda King Hassan II is looking for a way to shirk the weak commitments which he made at the 18th OAU summit in Nairobi.

"In the case of Moroccan leaders, this campaign has taken on different appearances, depending on this or that official's skill in the art of diversion, even going so far as to incriminate other countries, particularly Mauritania, which withdrew from the war under the terms of the peace treaty signed on 5 August 1979 with the POLISARIO Front.

"As I said, Hassan II is carrying out his great campaign by insinuating that an extraregional, extra-African force intervened at Guelta Zemmour, in an attempt to conceal his defeat from Moroccan and international public opinion, while simultaneously requesting aid from a foreign power in order to drag it into this colonial war that is already lost. The fact that he is trying to use the historic battle of

Guelta Zemmour as a pretext enables him to endorse the decisions of international organizations concerning the Western Sahara issue.

"We were always convinced that Hassan II never intended to seek a peaceful solution to the conflict on the basis of respect for the Saharan people's right to self-determination by means of a referendum, in keeping with the OAU's desire to establish a cease-fire; this goal is attainable only through direct negotiations between the two sides in conflict, something which Hassan II has always rejected thus far.

"The Guelta Zemmour operation was a standard operation like the historic exploits of the ALPS to liberate its homeland and is a natural extension of the war and previous military operations, in particular Bir N'Zarane, Lebouirate, Smara, Ouarkziz, Mahbes, Akka, Tata, Oum Lehsen, etc.

"With the Guelta Zemmour operation, we have achieved our planned goals, both military and political.

"The military goal was to crush the Fourth Regiment, to dislocate the forces concentrated around the so-called 'Vital Triangle,' to inflict a severe defeat on them and to leave the triangle (including Bou-Craa) undefended.

"With regard to our political intentions, Hassan II and international public opinion have been shown that the war will continue as long as there is no real intention to establish a just and lasting peace based on respect for our people's free choice to self-determination--which would mean the willingness of Hassan II to negotiate with the POLISARIO Front.

"At this point we would like to voice our strong condemnation of the false accusations of Mauritania, which has opted in favor of peace and is working for its establishment.

"The battle of Guelta Zemmour completely wiped out the Fourth Regiment and as glaring proof we need only point to the many prisoners that we have captured since 13 October 1981.

"Hoping that I have clarified for you the development of the Guelta Zemmour fighting, I will now give you an opportunity to ask questions."

Question: You spoke previously of 104 prisoners; what is the final figure?

Answer: We could say that there are approximately 230 prisoners.

Question: Hassan II has said that you used tanks and SAM [surface-to-air] 6 and SAM 8 missiles.

Answer: We do in fact have tanks, which we captured from the Moroccan Army in various battles. At the battle of Lebouirate in particular, we confiscated 6 SK-105 tanks; 54 T-54 tanks during the attack at Lengueb, and 42 light armored vehicles during the Ouarkziz fighting. We have already used these weapons at Rass el Khanfra and it is to be expected that our army will use them whenever and wherever it wishes.

Question: Do you think that stepping up operations will force Morocco to negotiate with you?

Answer: We are not hesitant when it comes to peace; we are not among those who have violated international resolutions. We are the ones who have appealed to Hassan II to open negotiations.

As long as the Moroccan Government refuses to accept a peaceful solution to the problem, the war will continue. The King of Morocco alone will be entirely responsible for this.

Question: Did you recently shoot down some Mirage F-1 aircraft in the war?

Answer: Yes, between 8 and 9 planes.

Question: You recently shot down a Puma helicopter; how many soldiers on board were killed?

Answer: Fourteen, including officers, noncommissioned officers and soldiers, most of whom were weapons and communications specialists being sent to aid enemy troops at Guelta Zemmour.

Question: You carried out an operation today (2^d October). Was this another attack at Guelta?

Answer: The attack which took place today was against the reinforcements that had been heading toward Guelta for several days. These forces were intercepted between Guelta and Bou-Craa

Question: Has air force participation diminished since you shot down the C-130?

Answer: If that were the case, we would not have shot down 3 Mirage aircraft and 1 Puma helicopter a few days later.

Question: Do you have any SAM missiles?

Answer: We have the DCA [expansion unknown], which was used to shoot down the C-130, Mirage and F-5 aircraft.

Question: Have you destroyed the electronic warning belt?

Answer: The belt was destroyed because the forces protecting it destroyed it.

Question: Why were the Moroccans unable to detect your forces before the Guelta attack?

Answer: Our forces penetrated the Guelta area in the same way they penetrated the Smara area, despite locally installed radar with a 60-km detection range.

It is not a question of the prevention of attacks, but of how to resist them once the attacker is discovered. The Moroccans have an extremely sophisticated electronic

detection system which has been installed to order in our occupied territory. But that has not prevented us from inflicting very heavy losses on them inside that same territory, particularly at Bir N'Zarane, Mahbes, Tifariti, etc. ..., which has now been liberated.

The Moroccans obviously discovered our presence the night before the Guelta attack, but we attacked them at dawn in spite of everything.

Question: What type of radar do the Moroccans have at Guelta?

Answer: Short-distance.

Question: Is it possible to say that you have neutralized the entire electronic system around the "Vital Triangle"?

Answer: Depending on what is meant by the electronic system, the wall established from Rass el Khanfra to Bou Craa via Smara, with its radar, has been christened the "electronic line" by the Moroccans. From Smara to Bou Craa, it was protected by the Third and Sixth Regiments and by the 18th and Eighth Battalions.

With the Guelta battle, the electronic belt lost its effectiveness, which was only psychological, besides. It is impossible for any enemy force to penetrate this area.

Question: Did you destroy the entire radar system?

Answer: The most important thing to us is troops and not radar. The troops were crushed by the force of our weapons.

Question: What are the size of the enemy reinforcements?

Answer: Three regiments, each composed of 2,600 men; 1 battalion composed of 6 companies of 208 soldiers each. These forces were proportionally distributed between Guelta and the road to Bou Craa.

Question: General Dlimi said that the Laydiyatt area had been bombed, since it was considered Mauritanian territory

Answer: As I told you, Laydiyatt is an area of small mountains 30 km east of Guelta, which our army has never used in the war.

Question: Did the surviving Moroccans remain at Guelta, in the vicinity, or exactly where?

Answer: At Guelta and in the vicinity. The Guelta battle took place on 13 October; the mopping-up operation of the vicinity was carried out on 14 October.

The operations initially began in a limited area and the battlefield later broadened

Question: How long did it take you to occupy Guelta and then withdraw?

Answer: Four days.

Addressing the journalists in closing, the brother minister of defense stated:
"You are the first press delegation to have had the opportunity to visit the area with us. I would like to take this opportunity to issue an appeal through you to all international organizations, in particular the United Nations and OAU, to urge Hassan II to seek peace and to come to his senses, in order to relieve the suffering and to prevent new victims, for which he alone is responsible."

11915

CSO: 4519/91

HISTORY OF MOROCCAN ACTIONS AGAINST SAHARANS OUTLINED

Algiers SAHARA LIBRE in French 30 Sep 81 pp 3-5

[Text] Introduction

Masses of our people, in the occupied cities and villages of our homeland and in the south of Morocco, live in a tragic situation of exceptional hardship because of the oppression and exploitation to which they are subjected by officials of the aggressor Moroccan Government. After failing to subdue our people and to force them to accept its expansionist policy, this government is making every effort to exterminate them.

Thus since its occupation by Moroccan colonialist forces, our homeland has been transformed into a vast concentration camp in which the most basic human rights and dignity are ridiculed with total disregard for the entire world.

Paralleling the war going on daily between Moroccan forces of aggression and the Saharan People's Liberation Army [AIPS], a war whose development is closely followed by the whole world, there is another, more destructive and bloodier war being waged by the police and Moroccan intelligence services against Saharan citizens in the south of Morocco and occupied areas of our homeland, an unfair war between a monstrous repressive apparatus skilled in terrorist methods and peaceful, defenseless people whose only weapon is their conviction of the merit of their struggle for freedom, dignity and independence.

For the sake of history and so that the tragedy of our people does not remain unknown to international public opinion and noble consciences, we are publishing evidence of the ruthless repression of our valiant people, who have always distinguished themselves by their spirit, sacrifice and heroism in resisting forces of aggression.

The terrorist policy of the Moroccan Government concerning Saharans who sought refuge in the south of Morocco before 1975--the initial date of the barbarous invasion of our homeland by monarchist forces of aggression, following the Marid agreement "legitimizing" their occupation of our country and the persecution and massacre of our people--dates back to the 1950's.

When Saharan citizens emigrated to the south of Morocco under the repression of Spanish colonialism, and especially after the "Mop-Up" operation and the drought which struck Western Sahara at that time, they were in fact subjected to the fiercest repression by the Moroccan Government.

This policy of repression was aimed at destroying the national sentiment of those refugees. Thus the Moroccan Government sought to complete the work begun by Spanish fascists, the purpose of which was to eliminate the Saharan national character.

To achieve this end, the aggressor monarchist regime sometimes used the policy of the stick and sometimes the policy of the carrot. The most striking features of this policy included: liquidation of Saharan Liberation Army members, whom the expansionist regime considered the nucleus of the Saharan Movement, which would subsequently work toward effective liberation of Western Sahara from Spanish occupation, and who were in total contradiction to the regime's view on the Western Sahara issue.

Thus a Moroccan Army battalion composed of 1,200 soldiers under the command of the Moroccan officer El Azzouzi attacked a unit of the Saharan Liberation Army in 1958 in the Echbeika region south of Tan Tan. Many patriots were killed during that siege. Survivors were thrown into prison at Bouzekarne, north of Goulimine, and at Anja and the military prison of Kenitra.

From 1958 to 1971, the bloodthirsty monarchist regime followed a policy aimed at starving our people who had taken refuge in the south of Morocco and subjecting them to a slow death. And when those people rose up in 1963 at Tan Tan against that criminal policy, Moroccan forces did not hesitate to open fire on the crowd, resulting in the deaths of several people. Among the martyrs felled by the bullets of Moroccan forces during that uprising were El Mahjoub Ould M'Bareck El Arbi, El Khalil Ould Ely Meygara, Larabass Ould Ajna and Sid Ahmed Ould El Kantar.

Right after that uprising, a carload of police arrived at Tan Tan--from Tiznit. Those policemen, who were sent as reinforcements, were under the command of Tiznit Superintendent El Jebri Ahmed and arrived in a car marked "Ministry of Water and Forests" to avoid arousing the suspicions of the people.

The airplane of Naimi, who later participated in the abortive Skhirat coup d'etat and was then in Agadir, where he personally supervised the torture of Saharan citizens who had organized the uprising, landed at Tan Tan that same day. Following that uprising, our citizens who had taken refuge in the south of Morocco were subjected to a large-scale campaign of repression. Demonstrators who had been arrested were transferred to the Ibn Saghroune military prison at Agadir, where they were subjected to the most unspeakable torture by the torturer Nejaoui and his assistants, Akka and Errifi.

Repression which was just as ruthless was also carried out against Saharan citizens at Assa during 1960 and 1961, leaving dozens of innocent victims in its wake. We could also mention the revolt of our people who took refuge at Goulimine against the policy of extermination followed by the Moroccan Government. Following that revolt, a wave of fierce repression and imprisonment was unleashed and a curfew established. Victims of this repression included, among others, the Rabani and Mellal families and the citizen Mohamed Cheikh Ould El Ouali, who suffered inhuman torture before being thrown into prison at Tiliwine for 3 months. The Royal Armed Forces [FAR] were also ordered to fire without warning on anyone found outside his place of residence. Many of our citizens, particularly rural residents and nomads, were killed in this way.

Development of Colonialist-Expansionist Alliance

With the development of the Saharan people's heroic resistance to Spanish colonialist occupation, particularly after the historic Zemla revolt of 17 June 1970 and the steps subsequently taken to organize the fight against Spanish occupation, and at a time when they expected to be supported by their northern neighbors in routing Spanish colonialism, our people were amazed to find their neighbors plotting against them and trying to take them from behind, while launching campaigns of repression against our citizens who had taken refuge in the south of Morocco, in the same way that the colonial power had done in Saguia El Hamra and Rio de Oro. Thus only after the fascist Franco regime's massacre of our people at El Ayoun, following the Zemla revolt, did the Moroccan Government launch a vast campaign of repression against our citizens who had taken refuge in the south of Morocco, repression which established its alliance with Franco's dictatorial regime. This campaign of repression followed popular demonstrations held at Tan Tan in 1972, during which our fellow citizens loudly proclaimed their rejection of the division of their country and their devotion to its independence. As usual, the Moroccan Government responded to such peaceful demonstrations with a vast campaign of repression. Thus a curfew was declared and armed forces occupied the nerve centers of the city prior to raiding private residences to discover the origin of pamphlets that were being distributed. This act of provocation, which spared neither old men nor women and children, ended with the arrest of dozens of persons of all ages and both sexes, who then suffered the most inhuman torture at the hands of El Akouri, then kaid of the city, at government headquarters.

Other prisoners were transferred to Agadir before being released. These demonstrations were an opportunity for Saharan citizens who had sought refuge in the south of Morocco to reveal to the public their persecution as a result of their indestructible devotion to our people's legitimate right to freedom and independence.

After the establishment of the POLISARIO Front and the beginning of the armed struggle, officials of the expansionist Moroccan Government, in coordination with Spanish occupation forces, launched a witch hunt against our citizens who had taken refuge in the south of Morocco. Thus the border with Western Sahara was closed and Saharan refugees in Morocco were forbidden to visit their families on the other side of the border. This situation caused the destruction of several families, since relatives and even spouses were on different sides of this border. The particularly shameful role played by the Moroccan colonel Lamarty, then military commander of southern Morocco, should be mentioned at this point. During 1973, 1974 and 1975, he collaborated with Spanish occupation forces in hunting down Saharan nationalists and providing them with intelligence concerning the movements of our troops. This situation reached a climax with the visit of the UN fact-finding delegation to the area in 1975. Along with the ban imposed on Saharan citizens in southern Morocco and the arrival of hundreds of police and government secret police, and despite a policy of enticement to ingratiate Moroccan officials with delegation members and persuade them to support their claims to Western Sahara, the expansionist Moroccan Government did not let up on its repression of Saharan citizens. The Moroccan Government therefore reinforced its police force and infiltrated schools, colleges and other institutions and services with its spies. In spite of this, our refugees in southern Morocco waved flags and banners in front of the UN mission, demanding respect for the Saharan people's inalienable right to independence and

the immediate withdrawal of Spanish colonialist forces. They also demanded immediate withdrawal of Moroccan claims to our country. The UN mission, which had been able to see for itself sufficient proof of our refugees' devotion to the independence of our homeland and their impatient desire to return, had not yet left when the Moroccan Government resumed its campaign of repression. Thus in late 1975 it launched an unprecedented wave of arrests while simultaneously preparing for a military invasion of our country.

After the Invasion

Immediately after the invasion of the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic [SDAR] by monarchist troops, the bloodthirsty Moroccan Government launched a large-scale campaign of repression against Saharan citizens. Seeing no further reason to try to gain their favor through trickery, it wanted to liquidate them to settle the score once and for all. It therefore mobilized its police, paramilitary and armed forces. Concentration and torture camps were opened at Tan Tan, El Ayoun, Smara and Dakhla. The repression then took on a savage appearance.

1) The War of Aggression

The campaigns in Western Sahara and southern Morocco continued; in late 1975 and 1976, an extermination campaign was launched by Moroccan forces of aggression against our defenseless fellow citizens. This repression was a desperate reaction to the defeats which they suffered at the hands of our valiant ALPS soldiers. The monarchist forces of aggression therefore pelted the camps with heavy weapons in an effort to take revenge on our people. This shelling caused thousands of innocent casualties, including women, children and old men, at Boujdour, Hagounia, Daoura and Bir N'Zarane.

As a result of this thirst for vengeance and inhuman massacre, many people were forced to flee to the east of our country, where tents were set up to receive the victims of the persecution carried out at Farsia, Hauza, J'Deira, Tifariti and Oum Dreiga. Once again, Moroccan forces of aggression did not hesitate to pursue and bomb them with napalm, whose use is internationally banned. Such inhuman bombing of defenseless, innocent people caused hundreds of deaths and cripples, who still bear the consequences of that crime.

2) The Massacres

In addition, the Moroccan Government used various methods to ruthlessly liquidate our people. For example, we could mention: Tying victims to military trucks and dragging them down rocky roads until dead; crushing them under the belts of tanks....

These unspeakable crimes were supervised by the executioner Dlimi, who with his own filthy hands liquidated 51 Saharan citizens in August 1976 near Guelta Zemmour and then ordered the soldiers to crush them with tanks to eliminate all traces of their execution and to serve as an example to other Saharans.

Prisoners were also pushed out of helicopters. This crime was the favorite pasttime of Colonel Lamarty, the Mussolini of the war of aggression in Western Sahara.

Following this campaign of assassination, the liquidation of Saharan citizens took a new turn. Accidents were thus simulated to get rid of annoying people. This

method was used to assassinate the Saharan attorney El Abadila on the Agadir-Taroudant road in 1976 and the student Lehsen Kamel in Rabat on 21 May 1977.

Arbitrary arrests, kidnappings and torture have thus become the daily fate of masses of our people in the occupied cities of the SDAR and southern Morocco. They have been subjected night and day to a regime of terror and their slightest movements have been followed, watched and scrutinized. There is 1 policeman for every 3 citizens, not counting auxiliary "Makhznis" forces and special police.

With continuous arrests, police stations and torture centers are never empty. On the eve of Saharan national holidays, such as the anniversary of the beginning of the armed struggle, the establishment of the POLISARIO Front or the SDAR's proclamation, there is an increase in the number of torturers' "customers." And every time that pamphlets condemning Moroccan aggression are distributed, the monarchist forces of repression launch a wave of arbitrary arrests to terrorize the people and create an atmosphere of panic among them in an effort to dissuade them from commemorating these national celebrations.

In the south of Morocco, kidnappings began in November 1975 and are still continuing. They have affected Saharans living at Tarfaya, Tan Tan, Goulimine, Zak, Lemseyed and Lebouirate and even those living at Tiznit, Agadir, Ouarzazate This campaign has been launched in defiance of the most basic humanitarian principles and values.

This campaign of repression, which is the largest in the region's history, began when contingents of police and government secret police were sent to Goulimine, Tan Tan and Tarfaya and is carried out according to the following pattern:

Armed men generally surround the victim's house at night, then other men storm and search the premises, including harassment of family members. They destroy all furniture on the pretext of searching for weapons and pamphlets, then they arrest the person wanted, putting a blindfold over his eyes and handcuffs on his wrists before taking him to the police station.

The police stations of Agadir are thus filled with hundreds of Saharan prisoners of all ages and both sexes, who stay there for more than 5 months. They have been subjected to torture daily and live in dirty cells where they are piled up by the dozens, in humidity and filth. The sick, especially old men, pregnant women and children, receive no care. Skilled torture squads trained in Rabat and Casablanca are in charge of interrogation.

Visits to prisoners have been forbidden; their families have been forbidden from asking what has become of them. Some of these prisoners have disappeared since 1975, having been secretly transferred from Agadir police stations to an unknown location. Unconfirmed rumors tell of their detention at the "house of Leglaoui" near Ouarzazate. Repressive Moroccan officials are totally silent about their fate. This is how they expressed their obstinacy and contempt of humanitarian organizations when they asked to visit them and tried to inquire about their prison conditions. Not until 1 year after being arrested and after suffering all kinds of mental and physical torture were these prisoners tried and sentenced to 3 to 5 years in prison. These arrests were made without court-approved warrants and without

bringing the prisoners before a judge. The only exception was the arrest of 27 persons in May and November 1977, who were imprisoned for 6 months before being brought before judges in a mock trial in an attempt to make international public opinion believe that they are the only Saharan prisoners.

All Saharans taken prisoner in southern Morocco and in the occupied areas of the SDAR were arrested on false accusations, such as for being suspected of belonging to or sympathizing with the POLISARIO Front. Or because a member of the prisoner's family belongs to ALPS or because he was an active militant against Spanish colonialism during the 1960's. Any Saharan student found in possession of revolutionary books, even if they are sold commercially, is also suspect and is thrown into a Moroccan jail.

Cities are also shut off and turned into vast internment camps, since Saharans are prohibited from entering or leaving these cities without the express authorization of Moroccan security services.

As part of the Moroccan policy of eliminating the Saharan element in southern Morocco and Western Sahara, the aggressor Moroccan Government has tried to "Saharanize" the war as a means of exterminating Saharans.

Thus hundreds of Saharans have been drafted by force into the Moroccan Army to fight their brothers in the POLISARIO Front at the side of Moroccan forces of aggression. This criminal policy has resulted in hundreds of orphans and widows. Another purpose of this measure was to make suspect Saharans subject to the requirements of military discipline.

A War Against Saharan National Sentiment

Along with the massacres, arrests and daily harassment of masses of our people in southern Morocco and occupied cities of the SDAR, they are also subjected to another kind of pressure that is much more dangerous, since it is intended to depersonalize them. Such pressure is exerted by banishing people, in an attempt to cut them off from their roots, while trying to assimilate them. To achieve its Machiavellian aims, repressive Moroccan officials have used the following methods:

1. Banishment of entire families from Western Sahara. Thus in 1976, groups of Saharan "makhznis" were banished from Tan Tan and moved to "Kallaat Sraghna," Settat and Zilal. Groups of Saharans have also been drafted against their will into the police force and banished from Western Sahara and sent to Rabat, Casablanca, Agadir, Marrakesh, Tetouan
2. Prohibiting Saharan citizens from wearing national dress (the boubou for men and the veil for women). Anyone wearing it is in fact harassed by the police, since he is automatically considered a POLISARIO Front sympathizer or even an active member of the movement, with all the consequences of persecution involved. To dissuade our citizens from wearing such dress, which represents a symbol of Saharan authenticity, the Moroccan monarchist government does not hesitate to use any means. Thus women have been stripped and beaten right in the street.
3. As part of this campaign to forcefully assimilate our people by forbidding every cultural characteristic of their own, the bloodthirsty Moroccan Government has banned

the storage and even the consumption of Saharan foods such as "Al Migli" dried meat (roasted barley). Anyone found in possession of such food is accused of supporting the POLISARIO Front and is arrested. The use of the Saharan dialect (Hassania) is also banned and our citizens can speak it only in secret, for fear of being persecuted for supporting the POLISARIO Front!

In fact, every expression of Saharan originality is banned. Thus marriages, baptisms and other manifestations of Saharan culture are subject to prior authorization by Moroccan security services. Saharan folklore has also been banned, with the exception of songs praising the Moroccan monarchy. Thus a group of young people were arrested quite recently in Tan Tan because they owned cassettes of our national music.

4. Saharans are prohibited from traveling abroad. Even the passports of immigrant Saharan workers, especially from France, Holland and Belgium, are held and they are prohibited from returning to their place of work. Many of them can actually no longer visit their relatives for fear of being stopped and prefer to spend their vacations in Europe. In this criminal undertaking, a special role has been assigned to intelligence services. All Saharan immigrant workers, especially those in Europe, are placed under strict surveillance and their slightest movements are watched and scrutinized. It has become commonplace for any Saharan entering from abroad to spend 1 to 2 weeks at a police station, where he is questioned about his activities and what he knows about the POLISARIO Front.

5. Attempts to destroy the national unity of the Saharan people: As part of its effort to subdue the Saharan people and weaken their potential for resistance, colonialism, and then the expansionist Moroccan Government, has followed a divisive policy in keeping with the old principle of all oppressors: "Divide to conquer." This policy has led to the establishment of military units composed of Saharans and organized by tribes and the proliferation of tribal chiefs. Thus there are 100 chiefs in Goulimine, more than 300 in Tan Tan and 500 in El Ayoun.

6. The destruction of Saharan identity and values in order to establish an atmosphere of crime aimed at the moral destruction of youth and at turning them away from their real situation and ensuing duties. In this connection, the Moroccan Government encourages the consumption of drugs such as kif and alcohol through reduced prices. Bars and brothels have also started to spring up in Western Sahara, encouraged by Moroccan authorities, who bring in prostitutes from Morocco.

7. Daily oppression and harassment of the people by the army of occupation. Like any army of occupation, the Moroccan forces of aggression consider theft and fraud a basic principle of their conduct toward the people.

Not fighting for a just ideal of which he is convinced, the Moroccan soldier goes to Western Sahara to get rich. He behaves like a conqueror, robbing stores and homes and raping women, not to mention persecution and harassment on the pretext of "defending territorial integrity."

8. The attempted corruption of citizens. Following the old policy of its masters, the colonialists, a policy of the stick and the carrot, the Moroccan Government alternates the use of torture and other coercive methods with corruption. This policy can be summarized as follows:

- a) The establishment of an elite composed of merchants and soldiers, which found favor with the government immediately due to its role as intermediary between the government and the people and for aiding its operations.
- b) The organization of pleasure tours to appeal to Saharan youth so that they will be diverted from their country's real plight and to deceive international public opinion.
- c) The distribution of certain spoiled foodstuffs in order to accelerate the plan of exterminating the Saharan people. The scandal of the poisoned oil, which caused the deaths of several of our citizens, may be recalled.

Cultural and Information Blackout

Saharans living in southern Morocco and in occupied cities of the SDAR are formally forbidden to listen to the broadcasts of the "Voice of Free Sahara" and the "SDAR National Radio" or to possess revolutionary newspapers or magazines, or to talk about the Western Sahara issue.

Saharan citizens living in southern Morocco and in occupied cities of the SDAR have thus been subjected for several years to a vast extermination campaign by Moroccan occupation officials, who have spared no effort to depersonalize them by killing national sentiment among them, particularly by attacking our culture and age-old history.

But the Saharan people, who resisted Spanish colonialism's efforts of cultural alienation and assimilation for more than a century, have shown the aggressors that their policy is doomed to failure and that their methods are in vain. The untiring struggle of our citizens in the occupied cities of the SDAR and in southern Morocco, paralleling the armed struggle of our people, has also unmasked the imaginary plans of the expansionist government of Rabat (plans for "development, elections of councils ...") and revealed their true character of plans for the extermination of defenseless people.

11915

CSO: 4519/91

END

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

February 19 1982